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Electing Wellington's City Council

R. H. BROOKES

A SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE who questions the process by which he was elected runs the risk of appearing ungrateful. But I believe that many citizens, among them candidates both successful and otherwise, share the misgivings widely publicised during and after the civic elections of November 1959 about the way in which Wellington chooses its Councillors. Perhaps I may be pardoned then for analysing these misgivings, and for considering some of the remedies which have been proposed to remove them.

If to question the process is to appear ungrateful, then to justify the outcome is to seem swelled-headed. I have nevertheless the impression that it is the process, rather than last November's result, which causes the disquiet. While few (I imagine) would maintain that the fifteen Councillors then elected represent the best possible selection from the forty-six candidates on the ballot paper, many would probably concede that the result might well have been worse had the names been drawn at random out of a hat. Judged by this test, the outcome was not merely tolerable — it was also meaningful. For the decline in Labour representation (the loss of three out of six seats) is not a freakish result attributable to flaws in Wellington's electoral machinery, but reflects a general tendency, evident in Council elections both in the Wellington district (e.g. at Hutt and Petone) and elsewhere. Nor is the significance of the result confined to the inter-party swing; there is logic too in the intra-party distribution of votes. Mayor Kitts and Councillors Bateman and Churchill polled well, in spite of the anti-Labour trend, as a result of the personal prestige they had built up during their previous term in office; on the other hand, Councillor Barton-Ginger trailed behind the rest of the Citizens' candidates, doubtless because the public held him responsible, as chairman of the relevant committee, for the Council's shortcomings in dealing with the thorny problems of road traffic and public passenger transport.

Indeed, to me one of the most surprising things about the voting figures is the extent to which voters seem to have discriminated between candidates. Assuming (as I think we may) that all who participated in the Council election had also recorded a vote in the Mayoral contest, we can calculate from the Mayoral results how many voters at most did participate; allowing for informal ballots, this

maximum was 35,908. Since 11,364 votes were cast for the leading Independent candidate, at least 31.6 per cent (and probably many more) of those who voted made an independent selection, i.e. did not return a 'ticket' vote for Citizens' or Labour. Nevertheless, all fifteen Citizens' candidates shared, with four Labour candidates, the top nineteen places, and the remaining eleven Labour candidates filled all but one of the next twelve places. So while a substantial minority (if not a majority) of voters made an independent selection, it is plausible to suppose that after choosing a few candidates on the basis of a personal appraisal, irrespective of the party label, they completed their ballots by following a party ticket. (While there is no compulsion to vote for a full fifteen candidates, most voters probably did so; assuming 35,908 to have participated, the average number of selections per ballot paper was over fourteen.)

At this point it might be noted how groundless were the fears that the voters, confused by forty-six names on the paper, would be guided in their choice by the alphabetical order in which the candidates' names were printed, rather than by considerations of personal capacity or party affiliation. Party affiliation was clearly the most general influence on voting; but even within each party list the relationship between alphabetical order and order of polling strength was too slight to be statistically significant. (See table.) If there was indeed

TABLE

COMPARISON BETWEEN ALPHABETICAL ORDER AND ORDER OF
POLLING STRENGTH OF CANDIDATES, BY PARTY

<i>Party candidates in alphabetical order</i>	<i>Party order of polling strength</i>		
	Citizens'	Labour	I.U.A.
1	1	6	2
2	15	7	5
3	9	2	3
4	8	4	7
5	4	3	6
6	5	15	4
7	10	13	8
8	11	1	1
9	3	10	10
10	7	11	9
11	2	5	
12	6	12	
13	12	9	
14	14	8	
15	13	14	

any 'alphabetical' influence, it was so small as to be masked by the effect of the personal reputation of well-known candidates. This conclusion is consistent with the hypothesis advanced above about the way in which voters tend to make their selection: a well-known and popular candidate loses nothing by occupying a low place on the ballot paper, since he tends to secure a 'personal' vote before the elector reaches for a party ticket to complete his fifteen selections; among relatively little-known candidates however it may well be disadvantageous to appear too low down on the party list (though the evidence for this is suggestive rather than conclusive) since the elector may have completed his ballot before he reaches the last names on the ticket.

If both the inter-party and the intra-party distribution of votes appear meaningful, if the voter made a genuine effort to discriminate between candidates, and if the Council so elected proves to be tolerably efficient (as I believe it will), what *was* wrong with the election?

Properly to answer this question we must bear in mind the various functions which an electoral system may usefully perform, in addition to that of eliminating y candidates from a total of $(x + y)$ so that x vacancies may be filled. One we may call the 'screening' function: if selection is by vote, rather than e.g. by lot, it enables the voters to reject those candidates who through defects of character or of capacity are deemed unfit for the responsibilities of office. Another we may call the 'representative' function: the system of selection may be so designed that voters can choose which of two or more groups, each identified (through performance or profession) with a particular trend of policy, shall hold office, and (where more than one vacancy exists) in what proportions. A third function, too often neglected, we may call 'educative': if an election contest heightens interest (as it should) in matters of public policy, the campaign affords an exceptional opportunity to explain to the public the nature of current problems and the range of alternative ways of dealing with them. It may be remarked in passing that the representative function has virtue only to the degree that the educative function is also effective; there is little merit in the representation of uninformed opinion.

The criticisms most frequently voiced during and after the election were: (1) there were too many candidates; (2) the campaign provided insufficient opportunity for candidates to make themselves

known to the public; and (3) too few people voted. What force is there in each of these objections, bearing in mind the functions which an election can and should perform?

The contention that there were too many candidates is usually based on the assumption that the 'screening' function is primary, i.e. that voters should be concerned above all to evaluate the personal qualities of the contestants. This assumption seems to me to be mistaken, on the grounds that in many cases it is not possible for a voter adequately to assess personal qualities in this way, and that it is not of vital importance that he should attempt to do so; it is on the other hand both possible and desirable for him to choose between alternative policies. We have already noted, in examining the distribution of votes, that electors appear to make a personal appraisal in a few cases (notably of candidates who through previous service are well known) and then to follow a ticket in completing their ballots. It is not the number of candidates, but the fact that some of them are necessarily new and relatively unknown, that creates the difficulty. One cannot expect to make an adequate assessment of a candidate by listening to him make a five-minute election speech, nor by reading the fifty-word autobiography which he may have submitted for publication in a party pamphlet or in the press. Indeed, one could not expect to do so in the course of a campaign even if the constituency were smaller and the number of candidates fewer, as would be the case if a ward system were adopted. To judge a man personally, in the absence of a striking public record, one needs to know him personally, or to consult a number of people who do so. It is reasonable to expect a party Selection Committee to make this effort, since the party's reputation will suffer if its candidates subsequently demonstrate their incapacity; it is not reasonable to expect every voter to do so. In other words, all save Independent candidates have already been screened before their names appear on the ballot, and it is unlikely that most voters in most cases will be so placed that they can do a better job than the selectors have already done. At the stage of election (as distinct from that of nomination) the screening function is therefore of secondary importance. If it were indeed primary, it would be logical to adopt the 'Electoral College' proposal, the effect of which would be to entrust the choice of Councillors to a Selection Committee. The fact that this proposal has received little support suggests a degree of public awareness that there are other and more important functions which an election should perform, which would not be performed by a system of indirect election.

This enduring obsession with men rather than measures is doubly unfortunate. It fosters the belief that shortcomings in city government are the result of foolishness or of knavishness among Councillors, thereby diverting the public from acquiring an adequate understanding of the real weaknesses in civic policy or administration; and it tends to ensure bureaucratic rather than democratic determination of policy. In local government perhaps even more than in central government the elected part-time amateur tends to be at the mercy of his nominal servants, the appointed full-time professionals. We need not assume (and I do not wish to imply) that the professionals are consumed by a lust for power; they may not even wish to make policy, but — lacking a clear lead from the people's elected representatives — their strategic situation in tendering advice, backed by a wealth of experience which few amateurs can match, makes it probable that their views will prevail.

Nature abhors a political vacuum, and the experts are well placed to fill this one. This situation is tolerable provided that the public retains the right and the opportunity to demand a change in the policies which experts have devised. It is after all the citizens who know best where they are chafed by the Wellington boot. But while in theory they have this right, in practice they are deprived of the opportunity to exercise it so long as elections are fought on personalities and not on issues.

It should also be noted that, while the election may be *fought* on personalities, it will for the most part be *decided* on issues — but on issues which have no civic relevance. Labour's decline in 1959 reflected not dissatisfaction with the policies of Labour Councils in Hutt and Petone, nor satisfaction with the policies of the Citizens' majority in Wellington, but dislike of the performance of the Labour government in national politics. The present author is well aware that many votes for Brookes should be regarded rather as votes against Nordmeyer. Why should national issues thus intrude into city politics? Not, I am convinced, because there are no interesting and important issues in civic affairs, but because those issues are not put before the public in a clear and effective fashion.

Wellington's civic parties did indeed make a greater effort to produce comprehensive policy statements in 1959 than in previous elections, but paradoxically the result was rather to blur the issues than to give them greater definition. There are two reasons for this. First, the traditional party division in civic elections between Citizens and Labour is not maintained in Council debate; there are of course

differences of opinion in Council, but they do not often follow party lines, and it is therefore likely that party programmes at election time will reflect no sharp cleavages of opinion, and will be where possible noncommittal. The second reason was well illustrated in the 1959 election. If a retiring Council has been unpopular, each party will be tempted to offer something new and different in the way of policies and candidates; but neither party can afford wholly to reject its sitting members, nor indeed would it be in the interests of the city that there should be no continuity of membership between one Council and the next. To be efficient a Council should contain a pool of experience — a pool preserved from stagnation by periodic replenishments from the springs of public opinion. But to minimise the appearance of schizophrania a party must attempt to play down the differences between its renominated sitting members and its new recruits; it is not in its interest to focus attention on controversial policy questions which may expose disunity among its candidates.

How, in the face of a party system of this sort, can civic elections acquire the representative and educative functions without which they degenerate into referenda on the performance of the national government of the day? The fact that the party organisations are keen to secure a straight ticket vote is not an insuperable obstacle, for as we have seen many voters are prepared to make an independent selection when they are capable of discriminating between the candidates. Furthermore, many candidates are prepared to express their views on policy questions, and others might be induced to do so if the campaign provided them with the necessary opportunity and incentive. It is in this context that the twin objections, that there are too many candidates and that the campaign provides insufficient opportunity for the public to judge them, are most telling. While it is difficult to assess a candidate's character and ability from an election speech or a newspaper report, it is much easier to ascertain the degree of his awareness of civic problems and the trend of his thinking on proposed solutions.

The most frequently canvassed remedy for these defects is the adoption of a ward system. This, I am convinced, would be disastrous. In the first place, it would do little if anything to remove present difficulties: taking the city as a whole we could expect at least as many candidates as there have been in the past, and (unless we assume in the face of all political experience, local and national, that voters would flock to campaign meetings) the candidates would still be competing for a limited amount of newspaper space in order to put their ideas before the public. But not merely would a ward

system do little if any good; it would do harm in distracting public attention from the problems of planning and financing and administering the city as a whole. The pattern of representation on Education Boards provides no parallel, since the main function of an Education Board (at least from the point of view of the School Committee members who elect it) is to determine how the limited budget for school maintenance should be allocated between the various schools in the Board's district. Let no one think that the main function of Wellington's Council is to allocate funds for the maintenance of amenities in the various suburbs; but by adopting a ward system we would run the risk of making it appear so, and indeed of reducing civic politics to the squabbling of suburban pigs round the municipal trough.

How then, while retaining city-wide elections, can we reduce the number of candidates (thereby simplifying the task both of the voters and of the candidates themselves), and achieve a reasonable balance between continuity of Council membership and sensitivity to public opinion? One possible solution, as yet unconsidered, is to adopt the principle of partial renewal. In boroughs (and some other local bodies) in England, while Councillors serve for three years, one-third of them retire each year. If this practice were followed in Wellington, we could expect between ten and fifteen candidates to compete each year for five vacant seats. But the principle might be accepted without following British practice in detail; for example, elections might be held every other year, with Councillors serving a four-year term, half of them retiring at each election. The important point is that, by providing for overlapping terms of office, we reduce the number of candidates at each election, thereby giving each of them a better chance of making his views known, thereby giving voters a better chance of judging between them; and, at the same time, we ensure that the Council will contain a substantial proportion of experienced members.

It is also possible that more frequent elections would result in a less spasmodic interest in civic affairs on the part of voters. If this were so, it would be a desirable consequence. In general, however, I have chosen to ignore the third principal objection to the present electoral system — that too few people vote — on the ground that it is properly a criticism not of what happens *at* elections, but of what happens *between* them. It is evident from the high turnout at general elections that New Zealanders are keen to vote on issues which are of interest and importance to them. The policy of the City Council

is undoubtedly of importance to the citizens of Wellington ; but one cannot expect much interest to be aroused during an election campaign when the public proceedings of the Council between elections are anaesthetic, controversy for the most part being confined to discussions 'in committee'. It would be easy to ensure a high turnout at local elections — by making voting compulsory. If one hopes however for a considered and informed judgment from the voter, one must get him to the polls not by coercion but by exciting his interest. And if the Council wants to stimulate interest and make local elections as vital as national ones, it must take a leaf out of Parliament's book and conduct its arguments in public.

The Role of Voluntary Welfare Organisations*

J. H. ROBB

INTRODUCTION

THERE IS AN EXTENSIVE LITERATURE on the place of voluntary organisations in the total welfare services of the community.¹ In most countries a period of debate on this topic has arisen at the time when the development of State welfare services has forced an examination of current practice. New Zealand is somewhat unusual in that this debate appears to be getting under way at a time when the State services have already been extensively developed.

This is only one of the special features of the New Zealand scene and, as I am convinced that the details of the most effective roles for voluntary organisations will vary from one social setting to another, I propose to begin this paper with a statement on some of the local conditions which I believe should be kept in mind when considering the general topic.

In the second part of this paper I shall attempt to state certain general principles which, in spite of this necessary emphasis on specific local variations, it appears from the experience of other countries should underlie the organisation of voluntary services.

Finally, I shall put forward some suggestions as to the manner in which some of these general principles might be applied to the current situation in New Zealand.

Throughout my paper I have, where possible, drawn on the New Zealand pre-school health service for illustrative material, but, as I have been more concerned with the working out of general principles than with describing a specific service, I have not hesitated to draw upon other services and other countries for illustrative material where this seemed appropriate.

* This paper is a revised version of evidence submitted to the Consultative Committee on Infant and Pre-School Health Services, Wellington, 1 July 1959.

1 Probably the most notable work in this field is by Lord Beveridge, *Voluntary Action*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1948. For more recent discussions and detailed bibliographies see Rooft, M., *Voluntary Societies and Social Policy*, London: Kegan Paul, 1957, and Hall, M. P., *The Social Services of Modern England* (Fourth Edition), London: Kegan Paul, 1959.

There is some variation as to the way in which the term 'voluntary' is used when referring to 'Voluntary Social Services'. I have, therefore, thought it desirable to state briefly how I shall be using this word. 'Voluntary' in this context is sometimes used as equivalent to 'unpaid', 'part-time', or 'amateur' and as opposite in meaning to 'professional'. I do not agree with this usage, and, with reference to organisations, I will be using 'voluntary' in the sense of 'non-governmental' or 'non-statutory'. The situation can be illustrated rather clearly in the case of the Plunket Society, which is 'voluntary' in the sense that it was established through the voluntary efforts of private individuals and is not an official agency required by law; but it is 'professional' in the sense that its work is carried out by trained staff who are paid for their services. It is sometimes convenient to refer to 'voluntary workers' who are unpaid, usually part-time, assistants in a social welfare agency, whether statutory or voluntary, but again the title does not carry any necessary implication of lack of training, as the services of highly qualified professionals may be obtained in this way.

THE BACKGROUND TO SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES IN NEW ZEALAND

In many overseas countries, particularly those which enjoyed a relatively high standard of living during the nineteenth century, social welfare services developed very largely on a voluntary basis. State intervention was regarded as undesirable, except in certain very limited fields, and the emphasis was placed on the study and relief of individual problems, and on the training of individuals and families to overcome current difficulties and avoid them for the future. It was only as medical and sociological research disclosed the extent to which problems were rooted in widespread social conditions as well as in individual defects, and as a more socially centred political outlook developed, that there came to be an acceptance of State responsibility for the prevention as well as for the alleviation of distress.

By the time this stage had been reached, an extensive set of voluntary social services was already in operation and the relations between these and the developing State services became a matter of considerable practical importance.

In the case of New Zealand, a very different situation came about. There were many reasons for this, but the two most fundamental were the smallness and wide dispersion of the population and the lack of accumulated capital typical of an under-developed economy. Much

more quickly than in the developed economies, the cost of even rudimentary social services reached a level which could be met only through taxation, with the result that statutory services took a leading place much earlier than in most other countries. In addition, there were considerable differences in the types of service offered. In Britain, as in many other European and American countries, the welfare organisations tended to provide services rather than financial help; they aimed to adjust these services to suit the specific needs of individual cases; and, insofar as financial help was provided, it was seen in curative rather than preventive terms. The New Zealand State welfare schemes were almost exactly the opposite in character. They were applied fairly indiscriminately to large sections, or even to the whole, of the population; they were mainly financial in character and aimed chiefly at the prevention of large-scale poverty. Given the economic and social circumstances of the time, it was appropriate that this should be so. The problems faced were very largely the economic problems of unemployment and the inadequacy of opportunities for saving. The social and medical problems of overcrowding and other features of urban life were not then so important in New Zealand. To take only one simple example: the New Zealand infant mortality rate of 1900 was seventy-five, while the British equivalent was 154 (per 1,000 live births).

It is unnecessary to follow these developments through in detail to the present. The important point is that if one is comparing New Zealand social services with those of, for example, Britain, it is necessary to keep in mind these very different histories which, for understandable reasons, have produced very different present-day services. It is also important to remember that in both cases the current services and traditions that have grown up around them are to a considerable degree the products of circumstances very different from those that are in operation at the present time.

At this point I wish to do no more than list those features of the current situation in New Zealand which seem to me to be relevant to any consideration of our welfare services.

As in the past, the great bulk of our welfare services is provided by the State, and, although this situation has changed somewhat since the end of the Second World War, the State services are still made up very largely of financial benefits designed to prevent poverty and applying without much variation to all who prove eligibility. Even the health services are, in great measure, a means of paying for, or subsidising, services which were previously available on payment of a fee. Public Health and District Nursing services constituted the

main pre-war exceptions to this generalisation. Since 1945 there have been some important new developments in welfare measures providing services rather than financial benefits. These include the expansion of the Child Welfare services, the development of the Probation service, Child Health Clinics and the Welfare Branch of the Social Security Department. As yet these constitute a very small part of total expenditure on welfare and a majority of those employed on these tasks have had no specialist training for the work apart from what they have been able to obtain on the job.

Among the voluntary agencies, the situation is very varied. Even more than the statutory services, they suffer from a shortage of trained social workers, but such people are employed by voluntary organisations and some work of an extremely high standard is being carried out in this way. Other organisations make use of professionally qualified people in a variety of ways—for example, doctors and nurses in the case of the Family Planning Association; doctors, physio-therapists, midwives and others in the case of the Parents' Centres; doctors, psychologists, lawyers and others in the case of Marriage Guidance Councils. The outstanding example, of course, is the Plunket Society with its fairly elaborate system of training for Karitane and Plunket Nurses. This Society is also by far the largest voluntary welfare organisation in New Zealand. Most of our societies are on a small scale and operate under serious financial handicaps. All this is in striking contrast to the situation in many overseas countries.

Apart from the relative smallness of the contribution made by voluntary societies, the most striking contrast between New Zealand and most of the older nations lies in a point that I have already referred to—the relative scarcity in New Zealand of welfare programmes based on services (especially social case work) as compared with those based on financial benefits, direct or indirect. We have, for example, very little in the way of extra-hospital psychiatric services for children or adults; medical social work is at a rudimentary stage of development; the more strictly welfare aspects—as opposed to the medical aspects—of services to handicapped children (apart from the work of the Crippled Children's Society and some smaller local organisations) are decidedly underdeveloped in spite of the strenuous efforts of bodies such as the Intellectually Handicapped Children's Parents' Association and the Pre-School Deaf Children's Parents' Association. This scarcity of services is particularly obvious in the case of pre-school children,

because where such services exist they are operated chiefly by the Education Department and therefore tend to exclude children under school age.

In general, these are the services which in other countries have been developed in the first place chiefly by voluntary societies, even though the State may by now have come to play the largest part in their operation. Is it desirable for us to rely on the State for the development of these services, as with the financial services, or should we look first to voluntary bodies? I hope to make some attempt to answer this question later on. For the moment I am concerned only to assess some of the obvious present strengths and weaknesses of the State and voluntary organisations as potential sources of such services.

The most obvious strength of the State organisations lies in the fact that, if the Government so decides, they have at their disposal far greater resources than any voluntary society could ever hope to obtain. These resources are not only financial; they include legal powers, opportunities for the collection of information, and access to existing, nation-wide administrative organisations. The most obvious weakness of the voluntary organisations lies in their lack of these same resources. Given adequate financial backing, there seems to be no real reason why voluntary societies should not develop — no doubt on a more limited scale — services of at least the same standard as could be achieved by State organisations.

The main source of income for most voluntary agencies consists of donations from the public. Reasons for low income no doubt vary greatly from one society to another, but two general reasons can be mentioned. First, New Zealand seems to be almost the only country which does not seek, by such means as tax remissions, to encourage gifts of money and legacies for charitable purposes. In Britain donations to charitable organisations, if paid annually for a period of at least seven years, are not subject to income tax. In the United States, reliefs of this kind are extremely generous. I am sure that encouragement of this nature would make a great difference to the incomes of voluntary welfare organisations. Second, New Zealand is unfortunate in having few charitable trusts, and those that do exist all appear to have adopted a policy of making small grants to numerous organisations, rather than concentrating their efforts on helping a limited number of agencies to build up really high standards. The latter approach is the one that appears to be favoured by many overseas trusts and, while perhaps not appropriate as a universal policy, it is to be regretted that it has not been attempted at all in New Zealand.

The most important weaknesses of the State Departments when viewed as potential sponsors of welfare schemes involving services rather than monetary benefits seem to me to arise from certain aspects of the structure of the New Zealand Public Service, and I feel that it is therefore necessary for me to comment briefly on this.

The New Zealand Public Service, more than most such services, is a highly centralised organisation. Many duties and responsibilities which in other countries are delegated to local authorities are in New Zealand retained by the central government and administered by the Public Service. This is particularly true of services connected with health and education.

The division of responsibilities between Departments involves some important features which in this context can best be illustrated by reference to the Health and Education Departments. The Health Department employs (apart from its clerical staff) chiefly doctors and nurses; the Education Department chiefly teachers.² Their respective spheres of responsibility are largely defined as covering those tasks most appropriately performed by these particular professional groups. Problems as they affect people – particularly children and their parents – can rarely be divided up in this way, with the result that they are often dealt with in a partial fashion, with unnecessary overlapping and inefficiency. When problems arise which are not specifically medical or educational, they may be missed altogether or provide a basis for inter-departmental rivalry. I am prepared to venture a guess that some of the gaps in our social services, particularly those affecting children, may be due to the inability of the various departments concerned to reach an agreement on the division of responsibility for a particular problem.

In the case of the Health Department, this fragmentation is carried a step further by the organisation of semi-autonomous Divisions, each with specific but overlapping responsibilities. It is the experience of many people and organisations that an approach to the Health Department is often extremely complicated because of the difficulty of determining which Division is responsible for a particular problem. The complications can be, and sometimes are, increased when senior officers in different Divisions hold conflicting views on the allocation of responsibilities in such cases.

2 Admittedly this employment is usually indirect. The Education Boards are the direct employers of most teachers, but the control of the Department is so detailed, and the powers of the Boards are so limited, that this qualification is of little importance in the present context.

These sharp dividing lines between Departments have at least two unfortunate effects. First, the combination of this situation with the extreme centralisation already mentioned means that responsibility for any particular welfare service always lies, or at any rate appears to lie, very definitely with some easily identifiable individual – the Head of a Department or Division. This means that when changes, developments or reforms are suggested they are very likely to be seen as, and reacted to as though they were, personal criticisms of the officer concerned.

This situation must make life extremely uncomfortable for senior officers, and it certainly creates embarrassments among those who wish to argue in favour of changes in any departmental activities. This state of affairs is not confined to welfare departments, but is general throughout the Public Service. It was revealed rather clearly recently when the Honourable T. P. Shand, M.P., made some suggestions for changes in the organisation of the Ministry of Works. The Commissioner of Works, in reply, said 'If you have a Commissioner of Works who cannot do [the job] get a new one.'³ The real point of Mr Shand's suggestions, as of mine, has no reference to the qualities of particular officers. They refer to the type of organisation which has grown up over the years and which seems to be inimical to efficiency, particularly when changes in policy are under consideration. I am sure that even the best of divisional and departmental heads find it difficult to remain impartial and emotionally uninvolved in this sort of situation.

The second unfortunate effect to which I have referred arises when a department or division has assumed definite responsibility for a particular problem. The persons best qualified to deal with, or advise on, certain aspects of this problem may well be located in another department, and, professional rivalries aside, are administratively not easily accessible. The one department is then under great temptation to attempt to deal with every aspect of this problem, even in the absence of appropriate specialists, and, as a result, some of its employees may be expected to cover a much wider range of duties than is really warranted by their particular qualifications. One example of this situation is the use of Public Health Nurses as all-purpose social workers in spite of the fact that their training is in nursing and public health work, and only at the most elementary level in social work. The result is an inevitable lowering of standards and a tendency to obscure the need for additional trained social workers and other specialists.

3 Reported in *The Evening Post*, 15 May 1959.

Much of this would be avoided if there was greater unification of the services. Public servants must not comment officially on the work of other departments. One can see the point of this rule, but when the divisions between departments cut right across people's lives the breakdown in communication has serious consequences. It means that it is virtually impossible for anyone in the Public Service to get any really effective overall picture or to plan a policy which takes proper account of matters outside the workings of a particular department. Communication both to and from the public is greatly hampered, as is always the case with an organisation which lacks unity. In describing the similar lack of unity in hospitals, Professor Titmuss⁴ refers to the 'discourtesies of silence' to which it gives rise and the consequent resentment and ill-will on the part of the public.

These two difficulties are made worse by the fact that in New Zealand it is usual for a Departmental Head to be professionally qualified in the field which is his department's concern. This is a most extraordinary practice, which, so far as I know, obtains nowhere in the world except New Zealand and Australia. It means inevitably that, unless he is a superman, his professional loyalties and prejudices become involved in his administrative work. Differences in professional background must add to his difficulties of communication with other Departmental Heads. It also means that having qualified himself professionally he is then expected to acquire high administrative experience and ability as well, while, because of his earlier training, he will be seen by the public as personally and professionally responsible for decisions on technical matters made by his department. The normal practice elsewhere is to appoint an administrator as head with professional advisers.

Finally, I would draw attention to what is popularly known as the 'great degree clause' — the Public Service Amendment Act, 1951, Section 4 (3) — which, after referring to the conditions under which persons who are not already serving officers may be appointed to posts within the Public Service, states :

Provided that no person shall be appointed to a position under this sub-section unless, in the opinion of the Commission, the person appointed is in great degree more suitable and capable than any officer for the time being in the Public Service and available for appointment to the position.

⁴ Titmuss, R. M., *Essays on the Welfare State*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1958, p. 125.

Decisions made by the Commission are, of course, subject to appeal to a tribunal. It is relevant in this context to point out that the rules, traditions and precedents of the Public Service and the tribunal have been built up chiefly in relation to clerical staff. Many specialist positions associated with welfare services require qualities of personality and character which are absolutely essential to the proper performance of the duties of the position but are not easily described or demonstrated on the basis of formal criteria. I understand that some State welfare services have found this situation a serious problem in their efforts to appoint suitable staff. I would point out that, as far as social workers are concerned, for example, an unsuitable appointee would not be accepted for professional training either in New Zealand or overseas⁵ and it is possible to envisage a State welfare service accumulating, unwillingly, a number of officers who could never be given the proper training, but who, once appointed, could not normally be removed.

These structural and organisational weaknesses in the Public Service seem to me to imply very considerable limitations on the standard and scope of the welfare services that could be operated by the State in New Zealand under present circumstances and the question must, I think, be raised as to how far voluntary services could meet these deficiencies.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS

Because of the relatively small role which voluntary organisations have so far played in the New Zealand social welfare services, it seems to me desirable, instead of enumerating their strengths, as opposed to the weaknesses already described, to consider in more general terms, and without confining myself to New Zealand, the part that voluntary organisations have shown themselves able to play in a total welfare service. I must emphasise that I am certainly not implying that all voluntary societies exhibit the virtues I am about to list. I am merely indicating the heights to which they can rise under appropriate conditions. In general, these conditions have not hitherto existed in New Zealand.

5 The great majority of social workers employed by the New Zealand Public Service are appointed before receiving any professional training, and after obtaining some experience may be provided with bursaries in order to undertake such training.

It seems to me that the two most valuable general characteristics which have been displayed by many voluntary organisations in the social welfare field have been their close and informal contact with the general public and their flexibility of policy. These two characteristics are in some degree inter-connected.

The contact with the public has two aspects. It implies, on the one hand, an opportunity to discover and assess unfilled needs which the welfare services should meet, either by the development of new spheres of activity, or by alterations in the organisation of those already in existence. On the other hand, it implies an opportunity to carry out effective educational work and propaganda.

This opportunity for contact with the public, if utilised, helps to promote flexibility of policy by giving the knowledge on which changes in services can be accurately adjusted to changes in needs with a minimum of delay. The flexibility, however, also stems from the independent status of the voluntary organisation, its freedom from all but the most general statutory obligations, and the absence of Treasury control of its financial resources. Also, and by no means least importantly, it is usually a unified organisation with a minimum of internal sub-division.

The development of new social services to meet special needs which have been overlooked or ignored by the State has been a striking feature of the social history of the last hundred years in many countries. This has been especially notable in the field of maternity and child welfare, where, for the most part, the original initiative has come from outside the statutory services, most often from an alliance between some members of the medical profession and non-medical voluntary organisations.

One authority on the British health services has pointed out that, beginning with Florence Nightingale and continuing to recent developments in the visiting of sick children, practically all striking changes in the operation of hospitals have been forced on the hospitals from outside official circles.⁶ In the case of the English maternity and child welfare services, it is recorded that most of the early progress was made by local medical officers whose enthusiasm had been aroused by the efforts of voluntary organisations and who were able to make progress only by exercising 'a wonderful gift for interpreting the "sanitary" measures allowed under the Act, cheerfully running the risk of a challenge by the auditors'.⁷ A New Zealand historian

6 Titmuss, R. M., *Essays on the Welfare State*, p. 121.

7 Rooff, M., *Voluntary Societies and Social Policy*, pp. 33 and 44.

has described the development of children's services in New Zealand as the result of 'constant pressure' from the women, supplemented by professional guidance from the medical profession'.⁸

Mental health services for children, particularly those for the mentally retarded, have been very largely the result of steady pressure on the authorities from voluntary bodies, often organisations of parents of the afflicted children. This has been the case in Britain, the United States, Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, as well as in New Zealand. The Child Guidance and Marriage Guidance movements, throughout most of the world, began through voluntary effort and in many cases are still organised largely on this basis. New Zealand, with its mental health services almost entirely State-operated, and with its relatively weak voluntary movements, is almost the only independent nation in the world that is virtually without child guidance services. Our one and only clinic is non-governmental and part-time.

Medical social work originated almost entirely from voluntary effort: in the United Kingdom, for example, it was begun under the auspices of the Family Welfare Association, a voluntary organisation which was also responsible for the pioneering of general family casework, the care of convalescent and chronically sick children, special T.B. clinics, the Citizens' Advice Bureau movement and a professional marriage guidance service, as well as providing the main stimulus for the setting up of the first course for social-work training at an English University.

The contact of voluntary societies with the public should, however, involve a good deal more than the collection of information about the public's needs and making efforts to satisfy them. To go no further would imply a relatively passive attitude on the part of the public. An active government department with a good social research section could probably manage as much — though the research section would have to be very good indeed.

Health, educational and other welfare services are not merely provided or given. They must also be accepted and used if they are to accomplish their purpose. If the history of fluoridation in New Zealand has done nothing else, it has demonstrated this. A service which is merely provided may arouse resentment rather than gratitude, even though it comes from the best of motives and is well designed

⁸ Condliffe, J. B., *The Welfare State in New Zealand*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1959, p. 288.

to meet the needs of the community. The history of health and welfare services is full of accounts of well-meant, efficiently-planned, schemes that have failed because community participation was not secured.

It seems to me that it is in this aspect of welfare services that the voluntary organisations have their most valuable part to play. Most of the tasks which voluntary societies have done well can be done as well, and on a larger scale, by State agencies if (and this is the really important part of the sentence) they are sufficiently well organised and staffed and equipped with the necessary research units, including a social research unit. But, there is, I think, no substitute for a sense of participation. A sense of participation can be achieved and maintained only by actual participation, and I see no way of bringing the community actively into the health and welfare services except through the use of voluntary organisations.

I do not want to suggest that all welfare services must therefore be operated by voluntary bodies. This is clearly unrealistic. Nor do I wish to suggest that there is only one pattern by which this participation can be achieved. The possibilities are many, and different patterns are likely to be appropriate for different services and in varying situations. No one system is, of itself, better than the others. The following examples are intended merely as illustrations of possible kinds of public participation.

(1) The service may be left largely or wholly to the voluntary organisations, usually, but not necessarily, with some financial assistance from the State. This may take such forms as grants-in-aid or direct payment for services rendered. It is sometimes implied that if the State aid gets above some particular level then the activity should, more properly, be taken over by the State. It seems to me that the amount of aid is irrelevant. The real question is whether or not the service could be more efficiently or economically performed at the same standard.

A striking example can be found in the Citizens' Advice Bureaux in Britain. These Bureaux are financed wholly from public funds, usually through local bodies. They accept these grants only on condition that they are entirely free from official control and they will even use their funds to assist people to prepare claims against the authorities who provide the funds. So far from this being improper, it seems to me that the Bureaux perform an invaluable service for the authorities and one which the authorities could not possibly perform themselves. I have heard the Bureaux described as 'a kind of social service Woolworths — everything on the open

counter', and I am sure that the existence of these Bureaux has a most beneficial effect on public attitudes towards the authorities because they do so much to remove from the ordinary citizen the feeling of being alone against an all-powerful government.

(2) There is an almost unlimited range of possibilities for sharing services between statutory and voluntary bodies. It is this situation that is most likely to give rise to complaints of wasteful competition and overlapping on the part of one or other of the participants. It is true that there is a danger here which needs to be watched in the public interest. But there is also a danger that the public may be deprived, in the name of efficiency, of a service that it needs. When two agencies offer a service having apparently the same content, one may be greatly preferred by many because its service is offered in less authoritarian fashion, or with more understanding of its relations to the demands and circumstances of everyday life. To abolish it as redundant may be to deprive many people of something they value greatly. Equivalence is difficult to measure and should never be taken for granted.

My own view is that *some* competition does little harm and may do much good. It can help to increase efficiency and it can provide people with a choice of services — a state of affairs often conducive to public satisfaction. My own experience is that very often the most eager supporters of co-ordination and standardisation are the organisations providing services of doubtful effectiveness. They frequently appear to fear any competition which may expose their own shortcomings. Agencies which are confident of their ability to provide an effective and welcome service will usually find it possible to work out amicable arrangements with related organisations.

(3) Even when the State is wholly responsible for a service, it is possible to provide for public participation at both the organisational and operational levels. In the latter case, one can take such examples as the use of voluntary workers in maternity and child welfare clinics in Britain and the employment of the mothers of patients for domestic work in the children's wards of hospitals. On the organisational level, one finds the use of advisory committees which include members of the public. Again, the British maternity and child welfare services supply instances, but a particularly effective example is the Social Welfare Advisory Committee of Hong Kong, a territory which, in the face of appalling difficulties, has built up an amazingly fine set of

social services, with a most effective co-operation between the statutory and the voluntary agencies.⁹

The really important point about any such approaches is that they should be genuine. An advisory committee whose advice is never taken or which is consulted only on trivial matters will be treated by the public with contempt, while voluntary workers who are regarded as useful for work that officials consider dull and unimportant will not feel that their participation has any meaning.

Apart from those which have been more fully stated above, the following principles should, I think, be taken into account when considering which voluntary societies should be given support (financial or other) by the State.

(1) Many people prefer to have dealings with unofficial, rather than official, bodies and unless 'consumers' are to be given no choice some voluntary services are necessary. As suggested above, with reference to the Citizens' Advice Bureaux, the existence of such a service may even improve the relations of the official service to the public.

(2) Many now well-established social services were at one time regarded as unnecessary, or even impossible or undesirable, and a considerable period of experiment and development was necessary before any official action could be taken. Changes in existing services, special variations to suit local conditions, or pilot schemes to test out new ideas, are often not politically easy, and a practical demonstration by a voluntary service may be of great value. This is particularly true where official administration is centralised and the varying approaches of local bodies are missing.

(3) A not uncommon, but very undesirable, reason for supporting services in a voluntary agency is that this is cheaper. This can be almost an encouragement of services of lower quality. It is, of course, desirable to save money if this can be done without sacrificing standards.

(4) Grants in aid of training schemes, or for the employment of professionally qualified specialists, are usually the most effective ways of assisting voluntary agencies. This has, for example, been the main basis of official support for the marriage guidance movement in Britain.

(5) As long as they have adequate professional support, the voluntary services most deserving of encouragement are usually those involving new developments and experiments, even somewhat

⁹ Hong Kong Council of Social Service, *Working Together*, Hong Kong: W. F. C. Jenner, Government Printer, 1958.

adventurous experiments. Almost the worst reason for withholding assistance is that a service is operated on lines differing from official or departmental policy, as this is a sure method of discouraging progress. I would almost go so far as to say that a voluntary agency which is doing its job properly will be in some measure unpopular with the authorities.

THE NEED FOR VOLUNTARY SERVICES IN NEW ZEALAND

Finally, I want to consider, in the light of the principles and examples already outlined, what part the voluntary services might most usefully play in New Zealand at the present time. I can, of course, do no more than state some generalities, but they will, I hope, give a more practical point to the observations already made.

It seems to me desirable that voluntary organisations should be actively encouraged to take a much greater part than they have done up to the present time. This is not merely — or even mainly — because they play a smaller part than in overseas countries. It is chiefly because many services of the type provided by voluntary agencies overseas are not being supplied in New Zealand by the State, and because, as at present organised, the State agencies do not seem likely to be able to supply them in a really satisfactory manner.

If the State services could be de-centralised to a greater extent, if the various existing fragments could be united to a greater degree, and if a really effective planning and research unit, with terms of reference covering the whole range of social services and not just the activities of a single department, could be set up, then the need for expansion of the voluntary services might be less striking. Apart from such a revolution, however, they seem to me the most likely means of overcoming some of the more serious drawbacks of our welfare services.

These benefits will not accrue just from the voluntary agencies actually performing the services. In many cases, if a really effective national service is eventually to be given, only the State will have the money and the other facilities to provide it in its final form. Very often the benefit should arise because the voluntary agency is able to give a demonstration of a particular service as a unified whole and so, one hopes, prevent it being set up as an ineffective fragment by some partially interested department.

The fragmentation of the welfare services is one of our most serious problems and this is nowhere more striking than in the pre-school services. Many of the infants and children who will come under the

notice of a pre-school health service are those who are mentally or physically handicapped. The initial diagnosis of these children is at least in part a medical matter, though, particularly in the case of the mentally handicapped, it can never be entirely that. But even if the diagnosis can be satisfactorily completed by a medical practitioner the treatment (which in many cases will consist chiefly of training the child to cope with life as well as possible in spite of the handicap) will be largely an educational matter. In this field, as we have been recently reminded by a B.M.A. sub-committee¹⁰ 'the medical profession are amateurs'. Add to this the need for social work services to assist the parents in their adjustment to their child's handicap and we have a problem which spreads far beyond the boundaries of a health service as usually defined, but with no provision within the official welfare services for any arrangements which would enable this problem to be handled in a unified fashion.

As has been the case in other countries, the association of departmental officers, as members or, perhaps more desirably, observers, on the committees of voluntary agencies could prove an effective means of educating them in matters outside the scope of their departments and helping to overcome the consequences of their inability to have official contact with matters which come under the authority of other departments.

Such an arrangement might also help to avoid the situation which arose frequently in England, and is by no means uncommon in New Zealand at present, where a senior departmental officer claims that the whole of some service is being given effectively by his staff, when in actual fact they are able to maintain the service only by calling, unofficially, on the advice and assistance of the voluntary services.

As standards of living and education increase, as a century of efforts to educate the public in matters of health and hygiene produce their cumulative effect, so will demands build up for higher standards of service. So also will the public ask more and more for opportunities to participate actively in the planning and organisation of the community services. To oppose these demands is to run counter to all the trends of modern education and to discourage democratic processes.

There are no really effective ways of permanently resisting a widespread demand for services of a certain kind, or for participation in community activities, and, even if there were, I believe they should

¹⁰ 'The Mental Deficiency Services', *N.Z. Medical Journal*, 1959, Vol. 58, p. 87.

not be used. One particularly important aspect of this is that, if co-operation and opportunities for participation are refused by the official services and the professional associations, then sections of the public will undoubtedly carry on in spite of the refusal, and under these circumstances greater opportunity and encouragement will be given to cranks, fanatics, and unorthodox practitioners. The history of the welfare services seems to me to demonstrate conclusively that, when interested and enthusiastic voluntary bodies are given official and professional guidance and co-operation, they are capable of developing useful and effective services based on sound principles. I am sure that the path of wisdom lies in working with such movements rather than opposing them, but I must emphasise again that, unless such co-operation is genuine, it will be rejected.

With few exceptions, people do not really like things being done *to* them, or even *for* them, but are usually happy, given the opportunity, to co-operate with those who are willing to work *with* them. One of the major defects of the welfare State as it has developed in New Zealand, with its emphasis on the passive receipt of financial benefits, is that it has run counter to these potentialities for active citizenship. It is often argued by opponents of the Welfare State that its inevitable result is the production of a nation of people who selfishly demand service without responsibility. My own view is that this is basically erroneous, but it could be made to appear true if welfare services are presented in a manner which excludes active community participation in the planning and operation of the services. Greater encouragement of the voluntary principle, either independently or in some way allied to the State services, could play an important part in avoiding the suggested danger.

The Franchise and New Zealand Politics, 1853-8 *

D. G. HERRON

THE MODEST PERCENTAGE of the total European population registered as electors on the New Zealand electoral rolls in the years immediately after the introduction of the 1852 constitution,¹ when considered in conjunction with the socially respectable personnel of the early parliaments, has encouraged the belief that under the terms of the 1852 Act many settlers did not qualify for the vote. Professor Lipson has erected a formidable superstructure partly on this foundation. Speaking of the provincial period he says:

This was not in the proper sense a democratic or popular government. No system could be thus described when the right to elect members of Parliament was so narrowly restricted. . . . Participation in politics remained a class privilege.² . . . But . . . it was inevitable that wealth would one day be forced to share its privileges. . . . Proposals to democratize the vote, already stimulated by the gold rush, received further backing in the seventies from the newer immigrants. . . .³

Lipson says later:

. . . in the seventies and eighties privilege was slowly forced to enlarge its boundaries. . . . The overthrow of political privilege was accompanied by a successful assault on some of the social and economic inequalities which sheltered behind it . . . all changes over the last fifty years are ultimately explicable in relation to the franchise. The sheer increase in the number of voters can be considered the root cause from which all other developments have sprung in sequence.⁴

* Fuller documentation is available in Dr Herron's 'The Structure and Course of New Zealand Politics, 1853-1858' (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Otago Library).—Ed.

1 Actually, whereas about one in five of the total New Zealand population secured the franchise, in Britain as a whole the proportion was about one in thirty—see N. Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel* (London, 1953) p. 89, and J. L. Robson *et al.*, *New Zealand, The Development of its Laws and Constitution* (London, 1954) p. 30.

2 Leslie Lipson, *The Politics of Equality* (Chicago, 1948) p. 20.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 167-8.

Similar views, expressed by other commentators, suggest that the growth of social services was probably retarded by the limited franchise, that it was the gold miners with their Chartist views who disseminated ideas of universal suffrage, and that it was the electoral legislation of the post-provincial period that transformed New Zealand into a democracy.

Considerable investigation would be necessary to test the general validity of Lipson's observations. It is possible that the franchise was more restrictive in the 'sixties and 'seventies than previously, but in the period under discussion, namely 1853-8, his conclusions are unacceptable. The anti-democratic excerpts he reproduces from the parliamentary debates of the period do not, as he implies, describe the existing franchise.⁵ They are protests against it. All the evidence points in the direction of almost universal male suffrage among Europeans. Limited participation at the polls was usually a matter of choice, not of disfranchisement. Social legislation went by default in a youthful community enjoying full employment in a rapidly expanding rural economy because there was little demand for it, not because working-class protests went unheeded.

Admittedly few Maoris were enfranchised — despite the abandonment of the contentious literacy qualification that had been given in the constitution of 1846 (in the part of the constitution that was suspended before it went into operation). During debates in the British Parliament on the Bill of 1852, Buxton was assured by Pakington, the Secretary of State for Colonies, that Maoris and Europeans would be treated alike;⁶ but in practice the Maoris were at a great disadvantage. The electorates set up in 1853 did not cover the whole country; hence residents of some districts were disfranchised irrespective of their qualifications. Subsequently, when there were rumours of large-scale native enrolments, there were suggestions that the electorates be further contracted.⁷ Even within the electorates, there were almost unsurmountable obstacles to the registration of native voters. Qualifications which were a complete farce where Europeans were concerned suddenly became invested with an air of sanctity when natives attempted to enrol. It was

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 20-1.

6 *Hansard*, vol. 121, cols. 102-38, *passim*, contains several comments on this issue. Cf. the views of W. Fox in the *New Zealander*, 4 Dec. 1852.

7 E.g., *Southern Cross*, 16 March 1858. The electorates covered the whole country from 1860 — see F. A. Weld in *P.D. (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates)* 1858-60, p. 513.

widely held that a crown grant, or at least some sort of individual land tenure, was a pre-requisite for enfranchisement, although this was not authoritatively and categorically laid down until 1859 when the Crown Law Officers decided that not even householders could claim voting privileges in respect of land not held under a crown title.⁸ This issue had come to a head at the time of the introduction into the General Assembly in 1858 of a Native Territorial Rights Bill and a Qualification of Electors Bill, measures which Governor Gore Browne felt were directed against native electoral rights. The ministry for its part felt that the modifications to these bills suggested by the Governor were intended to facilitate native enrolments.

The attitude taken by the ministry on this occasion is no more than could be expected considering the temper of the European electorate. Despite manifestations of enterprise and thrift in agriculture and trade, the Maoris were often stigmatised as unclean, unintelligent, lazy, unrepentant savages whose only useful function was and could be that of hewers of wood and drawers of water, whose presence in the country was an incubus to settlement, and whose conversion to European ways, if at all possible, must be a long and tiresome process. It would simplify matters considerably if they had the decency to die out quietly and leave the Europeans in undisputed possession of their lands.

There were many exceptions – Archdeacon Hadfield for example preferred substantial native enrolments as an alternative to the King movement,⁹ and E. W. Stafford (Superintendent of Nelson) regarded it as a sign of political maturity when some Nelson Maoris adopted European voting techniques in indicating their choice for native assessors¹⁰ – but on the whole the colonists reacted violently against any suggestions of native enfranchisement. For example it seemed to J. E. Fitzgerald (Superintendent of Canterbury) that by 1856-7 the Maoris had been so encouraged by their rapid progress in wealth and education that they were about to take a more active part in politics, and he predicted civil war if his fears were realised, since he considered that the southern settlers in particular would not tolerate such a state of affairs. ‘They will draw the sword,’ he said, ‘and

8 *A to J (Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives)* 1860, E7, pp. 7-8.

9 *Wellington Independent*, 9 Dec. 1857.

10 Stafford to Governor Grey, 24 Oct. 1853, I.A. (Archives of the Colonial Secretary, National Archives, Wellington) 1/117, 54/57 (with 54/1731).

to my mind it will be a sacred cause.'¹¹ When Captain Cooper suggested, in the text of his *Settler's Guide*, that the Maoris must shortly qualify for enfranchisement and even representation since, 'as orators and practical men, [they] are at least equal to the majority of our own members', the *Southern Cross* cast doubts on the sanity of the author of such a wild scheme.¹² Even settlers who demanded universal male suffrage for Europeans usually hastened to add that a similar privilege should not be extended to the great mass of uncivilised Maori barbarians. Opponents of universal suffrage argued plausibly against it on the grounds that it would encourage wholesale native enrolments. Both groups insisted that enfranchisement imposed obligations as well as rights, and that an illiterate child-like race of savages obviously incapable of exercising political privileges without abusing them could not be permitted to swamp the European electorate, particularly as the constitution had been designed for Europeans, not natives. Native enrolment, if permitted, would probably be followed by demands for native representation. This would provide all the ingredients for a first-class farce discreditable both to the performances and to the institutions in which the performances would be enacted. The very suggestion was ridiculous, particularly as the colonists could be entrusted to administer native affairs equitably and competently. According to such views, in their own interests the Maoris should be shielded from a premature exposure to large doses of intimidation and bribery and corruption, which might debase them and eliminate their chances of achieving a satisfactory European-type political morality in the future. In the meantime they could hardly be expected to understand politics as anything more than a 'one vote, one blanket' transaction. Hugh Carleton, the Auckland politician, confidently asserted in 1858 that :

... the Natives are advancing in knowledge, and must pass through that phase of knowledge, which is sufficient for evil, before rising to that which will render them able for good.

Apparently he doubted if they would ever achieve the level of civilisation required for enfranchisement. With a fine disregard for the disgraceful bribery and corruption characteristic of Auckland politics at the time, he advanced the hypothesis that 'we have to deal with a race whose point of honour consists in receiving payment,

11 Fitzgerald to Stafford, 21 July 1857, Stafford Papers (MSS. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington).

12 I. R. Cooper, *New Zealand Settler's Guide* (London, 1857), pp. 25-6; *Southern Cross*, 29 Sept. 1857.

as ours is in refusing it'.¹³ There were always demonstrable vindications of such views, for example the Otago chief who, with rather less subtlety than similarly motivated Europeans, blatantly put his vote up for sale to the highest bidder.¹⁴

The occasional attempts to enrol large numbers of Maoris were usually inspired not by concern for their welfare, but by the almost fanatical determination of some political factions to thwart their opponents at any cost. Thus in 1853 the official party in Otago was responsible for registering 70-125 natives out of a total of 500 enrolments, although subsequently, after protests by their opponents, all except one of the disputed names were struck from the roll. In Auckland in 1853 each political party claimed substantial native support, but was restrained from utilising it by the conviction that the other would follow suit. Subsequently some Auckland politicians considered the advisability of native enrolments, but only to bolster up Auckland's claims to additional members in the Assembly and to justify her retention of the seat of government. In Wellington there seems to have been no serious attempt to register large numbers of Maoris until 1856, when thirty-five were successfully enrolled. At this stage Dr Featherston (Superintendent of the Wellington province) took fright, and protested to Stafford (the leader of the Central Government) that at subsequent registrations Hadfield intended to swamp the rolls with native voters. Stafford pooh-poohed his fears, and suggested that the ordinary processes of revision would be sufficient to eliminate unqualified native voters from the roll.¹⁵ Rumours of large-scale native enfranchisement persisted — up to 1000 enrolments were predicted in one estimate — but in 1858 there were actually only about 120 new Maori registrations. Of these fewer than a dozen were allowed, despite evidence from tradesmen employed by Hadfield that most of those concerned lived in houses worth £5 *per annum*.¹⁶

Some Maoris qualified for votes and exercised them. There were about 100 on the various electoral rolls in 1853. Forty-eight were enrolled in Wellington in 1857, five being plural voters. At one election in Wellington in 1855, the nomination took place in the home of a chief. On several occasions the Wellington newspapers described

13 *A to J* 1860, E7, pp. 4-6.

14 *Otago Witness*, 21 May 1853.

15 *A to J* 1858, E2.

16 *Wellington Independent*, 3 July 1858.

electioneering manoeuvres designed to subvert Maoris from their political affiliations. Some political meetings were even addressed in Maori. At one meeting, held in a chief's house, a candidate for the Provincial Council suggested that so many Maoris were qualifying as voters that they would soon be entitled to representatives of their own. The meeting then proceeded to discuss the appropriate time for such an innovation and to consider possible future candidates.¹⁷ Some Maoris joined in Wellington party warfare to the extent of wearing party cockades and attending and speaking at post-election banquets. On the whole, however, the Maori population was not directly involved in politics in the eighteen-fifties. Carleton said in 1858 that up to that time all but a few natives had been persuaded by the settlers not to enrol; he himself had recently been instrumental in dissuading 200 Maoris from registering.¹⁸

The post-1852 period was a difficult one for the Maoris. It has frequently been observed that, accustomed as they were to personal rule, they resented both the removal of a paternal Governor—Sir George Grey—and the limitations on the powers which his successors exercised. Gore Browne certainly held this view; hence his anxiety to retain some control over native affairs. Possibly this attitude had some justification. For example the New Plymouth Maoris were said to have become alarmed at the results of the 1853 elections, and were only placated by the assurance that Charles Brown, the newly-elected Superintendent, was no more than a *pakeha* ruler, and that so far as the Maoris were concerned the old system of government was to be perpetuated.¹⁹

But it is possible to exaggerate the Maori predilection for paternal gubernatorial control. Although unaccustomed to representative government, Maoris were not slow to adopt some of its features. At the first Auckland elections, a group of them withdrew in alarm from the shouts and gesticulations of the hustings; on hearing laughter they returned, and subsequently enlivened proceedings by mounting the vacant hustings and mimicking the speakers they had just heard.²⁰ At a more significant level, the changed political

17 *Spectator* (*New Zealand Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian*), 24 Feb. 1858.

18 *A to J* 1860, E7, p. 6; *Southern Cross*, 16 March 1858—the editorial is almost certainly by Carleton.

19 G. S. Cooper to Donald McLean, 18 July 1853, McLean Papers (MSS. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington).

20 A. S. Thomson, *The Story of New Zealand* (2 vols. London 1859) II, p. 209.

situation probably stimulated the King movement, not just because the Maoris were reacting against their exclusion from *pakeha* politics, but because the implementation of the 1852 constitution was in itself an indication of growing European strength which must be fought by a Maori movement organised along similar lines.²¹ At a Wellington political banquet in 1857, a Maori chief said :

... we ... have learned from your customs. We have attended your meetings, we have marked your proceedings. ... You have of late been holding public meetings ; we intend to do the same, (cheers). You have elected a Pakeha Superintendent ; we intend to elect a Maori one, (expressions of disapproval). Be not angry friends, but let me explain. We have recently heard of the Maori King movement at the North (Waikato). We have agreed to recognise the Maori King, and to elect a Maori Superintendent for this district, to whom we shall commit the management of our affairs. He will be subordinate to the King, and will act under the advice of, and in concert with the Pakeha Superintendent, Dr Featherston. Think not that we wish to separate ourselves from you. We shall live together on the same terms of peace and friendship as hitherto.²²

This all sounded harmless enough to some Europeans. Thus the Rev. G. A. Kissling comforted himself with the observation that Maoris often took fancies to features of European life of which they subsequently tired. Hence the King movement need not be taken too seriously.²³ Many Europeans were eager to believe such views. They preferred to avoid any real consideration of the effects on the Maoris of the 1852 constitution and their exclusion from its benefits. They were more concerned to preserve the existing system so far as the franchise was concerned, and to investigate ways and means of facilitating land purchases from the Maoris.

The prevailing attitude towards European enfranchisement was strikingly different. The same franchise when applied to the non-Maori population resulted in something approaching universal male suffrage. This had been in demand for years — for example at the great reform meeting held in Nelson in 1850.²⁴ One Canterbury

21 K. Sinclair, *The Origin of the Maori Wars* (Wellington 1957), pp. 76-82.

22 *Wellington Independent*, 14 Aug. 1858.

23 *New Zealander*, 26 June 1858; *Southern Cross*, 29 June 1858.

24 Enclosures to Governor Grey to Earl Grey, 29 Jan. 1851, no. 15, *GBPP*. [C] 1420, pp. 112, 116-17.

settler stated that he 'never heard a sound or serious objection raised to universal suffrage', and that unless he were badly mistaken, 'the only constitution we should accept would be based on these views'.²⁵ Conditions of life and labour were propitious for the dissemination of ideas which in England were generally unacceptable. However modest his previous aspirations, however deferential to authority he had been, the New Zealand labourer soon felt a cut above his English counterpart – and began to behave accordingly. If one man was as good as another – a common summing up of colonial life – he was as entitled to a vote as another. Sir George Grey specifically rejected any suggestion that universal suffrage be introduced,²⁶ but he also considered that, since only the most intelligent and enterprising of the humbler classes had emigrated, there were no New Zealand equivalents to the poorest strata of English society. He held that providing they avoided the temptations of colonial life:

Generally speaking, every well-conducted family, however humble their circumstances may originally have been, acquire here in a few years a property of their own.²⁷

Grey's suggestions for a modest property franchise seem to have been accepted almost without question by those responsible for the 1852 Act. J. R. Godley deplored this state of affairs, and declared that Parliament would not have sanctioned such a liberal measure for the English electorate.²⁸ But how could an accurate calculation of the effects of any franchise for New Zealand have been arrived at, even supposing its provisions were strictly observed? The colonists themselves had no clear ideas on such matters. One group had pressed for universal suffrage on the grounds that certain of Grey's proposals of 1848 would exclude many worthy land-owners and occupiers.²⁹ Another group felt that Grey's proposals amounted to universal suffrage, and that it would eliminate the necessity for a

25 C. L. Rose to 'Issy', 25 March 1852, Rose Letters (Photostat, Canterbury Museum Library).

26 Governor Grey to Earl Grey, 9 Jan. 1851, no. 5, *GBPP*. 1551 [C] 1420, p. 107.

27 Governor Grey to Earl Grey, 15 March 1849, no. 23, *GBPP*. 1850 [C] 1136, p. 56.

28 Godley (ed. J. E. Fitzgerald) *Writings and Speeches of John Robert Godley* (Christchurch 1853) p. 159.

29 Enclosure to Governor Grey to Earl Grey, 29 Jan. 1851, no. 13, *GBPP* 1851 [C] 1420, pp. 116-17.

good deal of red tape if this were formally recognised.³⁰ In 1853, the *Nelson Examiner* estimated that adult males disqualified by the 1852 Act would vary from 5% to 80% according to the district.³¹

Once the constitution was in operation, demands for the introduction of universal suffrage practically disappeared. There is a simple explanation for this, and it is not that the workers meekly but reluctantly accepted their inferior status. Whatever the hopes and intentions of those who decided on the franchise, in practice it proved to be almost universal, and therefore required no champions except when it was attacked or when its formal recognition was mooted. Many contemporary observers deplored this state of affairs, but few of them failed to recognise it. When Hugh Carleton pressed for the enfranchisement of University graduates, William Swainson, the ex-Attorney-General, pointed out that virtual universal suffrage made this unnecessary.³² Dr Monro, a Nelson conservative, regarded E. G. Wakefield's proposed special land regulations for workers as undesirable; the workers were fully represented under the almost universal suffrage and could fend for themselves.³³ The Auckland Early Closing Association justified its existence on the grounds that, in a community where everyone had a voice in politics, working men required some leisure to educate themselves for their new responsibilities.³⁴

Universal suffrage did not go unchallenged. Those who hoped to transplant to New Zealand a slice of conservative agricultural England could not be expected to show pleasure when one in every five in the population secured voting rights. Some Nelson conservatives had stated in a memorial:

A small property qualification would include, with few exceptions, all the intelligence and respectability of the settlement — almost all, in short, who may be considered as *bona fide* settlers . . . it would become a stimulus to industrious and prudent habits. . . . Universal suffrage . . . would admit all newly-arrived immigrants, ignorant of the condition and wants of the colony, all those persons of a migratory character whom the formation of new settlements

30 Enclosure to Governor Grey to Earl Grey, 12 Feb. 1851, no. 39, *GBPP*. 1851 [C] 1420, p. 163.

31 *Nelson Examiner*, 19 Feb. 1853.

32 *P.D.* 1858-60, p. 61.

33 *Nelson Examiner*, 18 Oct. 1854.

34 *Southern Cross*, 11 Nov. 1856.

attracts to the harvest of high wages, and all those . . . who through intemperance, indolence, or other defects of moral character, accumulate no property and offer no guarantee for the conscientious or intelligent discharge of public duties.³⁵

Many of the early political leaders, probably a majority of them, held such views. They would probably have applauded Captain Cargill's description of the democratic element as 'essentially grasping, intolerant and overbearing';³⁶ have approved of C. W. Richmond's references to the 'democratic devil', the 'menace of unbridled democracy', and the need to restrain the 'many-headed monster';³⁷ and have agreed with Dr Monro that emphasis on 'the people' was an un-British Yankee notion.³⁸ Samuel Butler said of farm labourers that:

Their political knowledge is absolutely nil, and, were the colony to give them political power, it might as well give gunpowder to children.³⁹

Few important figures were prepared, as Weld was, to accept democracy as 'the only actual element in the country', and even he welcomed it only in its most conservative manifestations.⁴⁰

But although the conservative elements in society talked a good deal about the rising tide of democracy, they did nothing practical to combat it, probably because the working classes, who could spare neither the time nor the cash that general politics demanded, were usually content to return members of education and substance to the Assembly and to be satisfied with a modest representation in the provincial councils, where most of the topics they were concerned with were discussed. In any case society was still in a state of flux, and the working classes were not so reconciled to a permanently inferior economic status that they looked for relief to a political programme promulgated by working-class representatives. Hence opponents of universal suffrage probably considered that a crusade against it was hardly worth the trouble.

35 Enclosure to Governor Grey to Earl Grey, 5 Feb. 1851, no. 22, *GBPP*. 1851 [C] 1420, p. 129.

36 *Otago Witness*, 16 July 1859.

37 *P.D.* 1856-8, p. 604; Richmond to John Hall, 16 Dec. 1857, Hall Papers (MSS. General Assembly Library, Wellington).

38 Monro to Stafford, 20 Oct. 1857, Stafford Papers.

39 Butler, *A First Year in the Canterbury Settlement* (London 1863) p. 147.

40 *P.D.* 1858-60, p. 13.

There were other reasons why the suffrage was so wide. One was that the necessary property qualifications were not difficult to secure. Gore Browne put this down to the enormous increase in wages and prices after 1852.⁴¹ Weld subsequently pointed out that any sort of property test was almost useless in a country like New Zealand.⁴²

It also seems clear that European claims for enrolment were little more than a formality. A. S. Thomson said :

By general consent all settlers claiming the right of voting were permitted to register, and the franchise became universal. Men who influenced elections in England by brickbats were voters in New Zealand.⁴³

The system of registration facilitated irregularities. Even if the same names were registered several times, the officials concerned were powerless to take action. The onus for objecting to the inclusion of unqualified voters was left to individual electors, but they were often in no position to secure the requisite information to substantiate their suspicions, and were sometimes discouraged by a regulation which compelled them to serve objections personally on those being challenged. Of ninety-two unsuccessful objections in Otago in 1857, sixty-six had to be withdrawn because this stipulation had not been observed.⁴⁴ In Lyttelton in 1853 some prospective electors with dubious claims disappeared in an attempt, unsuccessful as it happened, to avoid having objections served on them.⁴⁵ William Fox, a leading politician, felt that it was particularly difficult to serve objections personally on Maoris, since to him they seemed indistinguishable one from another.⁴⁶ Moreover, if it was difficult to serve objections personally on flesh and blood electors, it was impossible to do so on those dead or non-existent. Hence the suggestion that it would be sufficient if objections were lodged in writing, and, ultimately, the empowering of revising officers to expunge names on their own initiative. Until 1858, when special revising officers were appointed, it was the duty of the bench of magistrates to consider any objections and to purge the roll of the names of the dead. They usually performed their duties either in a perfunctory manner or to serve party interests, yet there were strong objections to the introduction of a

41 Gore Browne to Russell, 20 Sept. 1855, no. 13, *GBPP*, 1860 [C] 2719, p. 151.

42 Sir Frederick Weld, *Notes on New Zealand Affairs* (London 1869) pp. 62-3.

43 Thomson, II, pp. 208-9.

44 *Otago Witness*, 4 July 1857.

45 *Lyttelton Times*, July 1853, *passim*.

46 Fox to Hall, 16 May 1858, Hall Papers.

better system. The numbers struck off varied greatly from year to year. In 1857 the Otago Bench sustained nineteen of eighty-six objections to names already on the rolls, and twelve of thirty-seven objections to new candidates.⁴⁷ In 1858 all was quiet again, and no objections were lodged. Possibly the most conspicuous example of party bias on such occasions was the disfranchisement, on patently flimsy grounds, of Colonel Campbell, the eccentric anti-liberal candidate for the Canterbury Superintendency in 1853.⁴⁸ But, except where there were attempts to enrol large numbers of Maoris, the electorate was usually indifferent to the revision of the rolls, and grudged the expenditure of time and money which it involved. There was considerable disinclination to interfere, particularly where the electors had already been on the roll for a year or more. Hence some rolls continued to bear year after year the names of those who had initially secured their votes as householders merely because they slept under a roof, or who had established domicile by sleeping in a particular house once in six months.

The Auckland electoral rolls were a public scandal.⁴⁹ In 1853 there were 400 more enrolled electors than adult males in the province, even when plural votes were subtracted. Yet there was only one objection made to a name on the roll. In 1855 voters outnumbered adult males by 800-900. At three successive elections on Waiheke Island in 1855-6, forty *bona fide* electors polled twelve, sixty-two and ninety-eight votes. In 1856 one political agent secured ninety-two votes for his candidate in a district with a population of fourteen. The way the revising machinery operated in 1857 was a complete farce. Neither party was prepared to put its house in order, and each resorted to technical quibbles on behalf of its supporters. Even the records of the registrar of births, deaths and marriages were not accepted unreservedly. In one case there was an objection raised to the fact that the body of a deceased elector had not actually been seen in the coffin.⁵⁰ It is not surprising that in 1857 4,600 adult males supplied 7,020 names for the rolls, a discrepancy which cannot be explained entirely by plural votes. Of 2,100 names on the 1857 City roll, more than half were said to be unqualified, while the

47 *Otago Witness*, 4 July 1857.

48 C.S. (Archives of the Civil Secretary, National Archives, Wellington) 1/10 and 1/11, 1853, *passim*.

49 H. J. Hanham, 'The Political Structure of Auckland 1853-76' (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Auckland Library) *passim*, discusses this question fully.

50 *New Zealander*, 4 July 1857.

Howick roll was made up of 116 genuine electors, eighteen dead men, thirty-one boys, and eighty-nine former residents who had moved from the district. Dr Monro was not at all surprised, in view of the composition of such rolls, to learn that one New Zealand electorate had elected a dead man to represent it.⁵¹ The *Nelson Examiner* saw evidence in this of a thorough-going democratic spirit :

In our anxiety for the extension of political rights we do not even regard the limitation of life ; we hold the grave to be a good qualification — a freehold tenement in 'possession' and 'possession' not likely to be disputed.⁵²

It was said that an honest revision would strike 1,000 names from the Auckland rolls — and the 1858 electoral regulations were designed, *inter alia*, to effect this. They seem to have had the desired result, temporarily at least, and in 1859 1,300 names were struck from the City roll and only thirty-nine added.⁵³ Later, in the 'sixties, the Auckland rolls were again very corrupt. In the other provinces the position was rather better, though here too there were occasional complaints of corrupt rolls.

A franchise which was virtually universal did not automatically produce a high percentage of enrolments. Registration was not compulsory, and in country areas in particular, where interest in politics was sometimes confined to little more than the provision of roads and bridges, enrolment was often regarded as a chore rather than a privilege. Viewed only through the medium of official papers, parliamentary debates, and the personal papers of leading political figures, the nature of political life in New Zealand at this time can easily become distorted. A perusal of colonial newspapers does little to redress the balance. Most of them were owned or edited by prominent politicians or by those with strong political affiliations. When there was a scarcity of overseas news — not an uncommon situation at a time when the arrival of a ship was still quite an event — editors often filled out their columns with abuse of their political opponents, much of it scurrilous and in the worst of taste. What went for public opinion was often little more than the strident voice of a noisy urban minority. Since country areas often remained unaffected by the issues which inflamed politics in the towns, residents there often did not bother to register as electors, or, if they did, they often did

51 *Nelson Examiner*, 24 Oct. 1857.

52 *Ibid.*, 12 Aug. 1857.

53 *New Zealander*, 9 March 1859.

not exercise their votes. Attendances at some country elections were so small that proceedings were completely farcical. One Wanganui settler said :

I always detested politics, as such, and take so little part in the petty party squabbles out here that I would not take the trouble to vote at the contested election for Wanganui and Rangitikei.⁵⁴

A Nelson runholder spoke in similar vein when he declared :

Elections . . . were not considered of much consequence. Settlers had so much to occupy them in attending to their own affairs, and were so widely scattered, that but few electors, and only those in the immediate vicinity of the place of residence, cared to attend. In the towns there was often considerable excitement, but more personal than political.⁵⁵

The towns were always liable to political enthusiasms. It was in the towns that the dedicated politicians lived: for example E. G. Wakefield, who would rather have been carried to the poll in his bed than let his vote go by default.⁵⁶ At a time when entertainment was not always readily available, public meetings had an important social function and politics had some amusement value, particularly at general elections, when the whole community often became involved. The most fiercely-fought town elections were boisterous, colourful, and so time-consuming that other activities and organisations were neglected. Thus just before the 1853 elections, the Dunedin Mechanics Institute and the Agricultural Society were in the doldrums.⁵⁷

But, if the differences between parties were based on nothing substantial, participation in politics could be no more than a passing fad. The *Wellington Spectator* said that by 1857 many Wellington settlers preferred the more rewarding associations to be derived from new voluntary organisations such as the chamber of commerce, savings-banks, building societies, ecclesiastical synods, and societies for the promotion and encouragement of literature and art. Moreover, even in the towns, by-elections or elections for the Assembly attracted far less attention than general elections for the provincial councils or the superintendencies. Seats for the Assembly often went a-begging,

54 H. Field to J. Hall, 7 April 1854, Hall Papers.

55 Edward Jollie, 'Extracts from Edward Jollie's Reminiscences 1841-65' (ed. A. J. Allom) (Typescript, Alexander Turnbull Library) p. 44.

56 Irma O'Connor, *Edward Gibbon Wakefield, The Man Himself* (London 1928) p. 259.

57 *Otago Witness*, 28 May 1853.

not only because few settlers could afford the expense of membership, but because many politicians were more interested in securing a seat in a provincial council. In 1853-4 eighteen of thirty-seven seats were uncontested for the Assembly, but only fourteen out of eighty-seven for the provincial councils. Moreover, in most electorates, fewer electors bothered to cast votes for elections for the Assembly than for other elections. E. J. Wakefield said in 1863 :

Generally speaking interest in politics has been confined in Canterbury to the politics of Canterbury itself. The remarkable prosperity of this province . . . has had the no less remarkable effect of concentrating the attention of most of its inhabitants on the local consequences of the prosperity and of rendering them comparatively indifferent to what was going on in other parts of the colony. It is a matter of notoriety that the people here have, mostly, been quite careless as to elections for the House of Representatives, and as to the proceedings of that body in all its sessions, except the first ; provided always, that nothing was done or proposed, which might manifestly interfere with the Provincial prosperity of Canterbury. It has, with few exceptions, appeared as though Canterbury people thought it was no matter who represented them in the General Assembly. . . . Far more interest has been displayed in Provincial elections.⁵⁸

The percentage of those eligible who bothered to enrol varied from time to time according to the political temper of the electorate and to the likelihood of a contested election. On important occasions there was vigorous canvassing to encourage registrations. It was in the interests of each province to expand its electoral rolls, since by the terms of the Constitution Act, often ignored nevertheless, seats in the Assembly were to be allocated according to the distribution of electors. J. E. Fitzgerald supported this provision, rather than one based on population, on the grounds that it was more likely to encourage enrolments and foster interest in politics.⁵⁹ In 1855 he urged Canterbury settlers to register in the interests of the Province's representation in the Assembly.⁶⁰ Whether at his urging or for some other reason, the response was heartening ; the total enrolments, including plural votes, had increased from 535 to 1,113 since 1853,

58 E. J. Wakefield, *What Will They Do in The General Assembly* (Christchurch 1863) pp. 1-2.

59 Fitzgerald, *The Representation of New Zealand* (Christchurch 1864) pp. 31-2.

60 *Lyttelton Times*, 17 March 1855.

although the population had only increased from 3,900 to 5,437 in the same period. But in the same period the percentage of adult males enrolled in Otago dropped from 66% to 54%. On the whole enrolments were usually disappointing. As Fitzgerald said in 1864 :

It is a singular fact that in so purely democratic a country as New Zealand . . . the difficulty has hitherto been, not to restrain or control the popular power, but to persuade a great part of the people to take any interest at all in public affairs. . . . The state of our electoral rolls all over the colony, the proportion of numbers who are enrolled to the numbers who might be and ought to be enrolled, sufficiently proves that the material cares and labours of a colonist's life more than outweigh his interest in public affairs.⁶¹

The percentage of enrolments in the colony in 1853 was as shown in Table I.

TABLE I					
	Voters	Adult Males	Houses	Percentage of Adult Males Enrolled	Percentage of the whole Population Enrolled
Auckland	2,323	1,906	2,107	125 *	23
New Plymouth	370	426	361	89	22
Wellington	1,051	1,494	?	70	18
Nelson	672	1,059	864	63	15
Canterbury	431	900+	700+	48-	11
Otago	338	516	?	66	19

* The Auckland rolls were corrupt.

Table II shows that in Wellington in 1858 about a third of those who could have enrolled did not do so. Other provinces exemplified the same phenomenon. For example C. C. Bowen was not far wrong

TABLE II			
	Qualified and enrolled	Qualified but not enrolled	Unqualified - including minors
Wellington City	525	206	1,163
Wellington Country	261	68	667
Wanganui, Rangitikei	317	217	589
Hutt	223	171	610
Wairarapa	136	118	410
Hawkes Bay	181	74	542
	1,643	854	3,987 *

* Enclosure with the Wellington Provincial Gazette, 2 Nov. 1858. *Statistics of New Zealand, 1858* shows that in Wellington there were 3320 males under 21. Hence no more than 667 adult males were disfranchised.

⁶¹ Fitzgerald, *The Representation of New Zealand*, pp. 31-2.

when he complained in 1853 that only half the potential voters in Canterbury were enrolled.⁶² Two years later he stated that according to several sources every adult male in the province could vote if he so desired, but once again many did not bother to register.⁶³ In 1854, fifty-eight settlers between the Rakaia and Waitaki rivers declined to register, either on the grounds that they were unaware that an election was pending or because they resented being included in the same electorate as others with whom they had nothing in common and whom they could not influence.⁶⁴ In 1855-6 only eight of them enrolled, in 1856-7 eleven, but when in 1857 a new Timaru electorate was created, no fewer than fifty-seven applied for registration.⁶⁵ It was similar elsewhere in rural Canterbury. Only five Oxford residents enrolled in 1857 and twenty-eight in 1861, yet in December 1858 the settlement contained 278 residents and fifty-nine houses, and in 1862 it boasted 105 ratepayers.⁶⁶ In Amuri—in the Nelson province—on one occasion there were only twenty-five enrolments out of some 80-100 who were qualified.⁶⁷

It is evident that factors other than the statutory franchise profoundly affected participation in, and the content of, the politics of the 'fifties. Interest, or lack of it, affected enrolments. No doubt, as Lipson observes, enrolments under the 1879 franchise would have been higher had all registered who were qualified,⁶⁸ but this is just as true, or even more true, of the 'fifties. After 1879 an increasing proportion of those enrolled were interested enough to vote.⁶⁹ It would be reasonable to suppose that more of those eligible also bothered to enrol. It is not therefore necessary to attribute all increased enrolments to the legislation of 1879. It has been pointed out that when with the abolition of the provinces the control of land affairs passed to the general Government there was increased radicalism in general politics.⁷⁰ Increasing urbanisation and the deteriorating economic situation in the late 'seventies probably fostered interest in politics as well as influencing the content of legislation. Lipson's view that the franchise was all-important is surely an over-simplification.

62 Bowen to Godley, 5 June 1853, Canterbury Papers.

63 *Ibid.*, 16 Feb. 1855.

64 R. H. Rhodes in the *Lyttelton Times*, 25 Nov. 1854.

65 Johannes C. Andersen, *Jubilee History of South Canterbury* (Auckland etc. 1916) pp. 296-8.

66 O. A. Gillespie, *Oxford, The First Hundred Years* (Christchurch 1954) pp. 243-4.

67 W. J. Gardner, *The Amuri, A County History* (Christchurch 1956) p. 189.

68 Lipson, p. 24.

69 *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 172.

70 W. Pember Reeves, *The Long White Cloud* (London 4th ed. 1950) p. 195.

The 1879 General Election in Canterbury*

EDMUND BOHAN

BETWEEN JULY AND OCTOBER 1879 a general election occurred in New Zealand, and an attempt was made to convince the electorate that two parties, divided by impassable gulfs of principle, existed. During these months Sir George Grey and his followers tried to give to the colony's various political groups and temporary coalitions the labels of Conservative and Liberal, reactionary and progressive, black and white. If Grey failed to persuade the voters of his time he somehow has been much more successful with historians. T. G. Wilson, in his recent bulletins on the New Zealand Liberal Party¹ between 1877 and 1890, has argued that in 1879 minor and confusing phenomena such as provincial interests and personalities cut across the main radical-conservative cleavage. In his own words:

'... there was the deliberate effort of Grey's opponents to obscure the conservative-radical issue by attempting to avoid appearing as the opponents of reforms in the franchise.'²

In fact, the opposite was the case, and it seems rather that Grey tried to confuse the real issues and his own Government's incompetence and failure by introducing just this notion of a conservative-radical split. An intensive study of the election campaigns, candidates, and constituency associations in Canterbury, supposedly one of the most 'Conservative' provinces, has shown that public works, local activities, personalities, and the imagined rights of Canterbury itself were the fundamental political realities.

Grey had taken office in October 1877 as the leader of a coalition of provincialists, chiefly from Otago and Auckland. His Government had quickly gained support and public confidence but, in two years, failed almost completely to pass a popular policy into law. That policy included: new land laws, extended franchise, improved representation, triennial parliaments, financial retrenchment, and a

* This article is based on the writer's M.A. thesis: 'The General Election of 1879 in Canterbury' (1958, Canterbury University Library). The thesis discusses the election in detail, electorate by electorate, candidate by candidate.

1 *The Grey Government, 1877-9* (Auckland, 1954) and *The Rise of the New Zealand Liberal Party, 1880-1890* (Auckland, 1956).

2 *The Grey Government, 1877-9*, p. 42.

cultivation of friendly relations with the Maoris. After the initial flush of victory, moreover, there was slowly revealed a Cabinet both divided and incompetent.

The first bad ministerial bungling occurred during the session of 1878, in spite of there being only a small, unorganised, and leaderless Opposition,³ when electoral reforms were introduced but abandoned. Although Grey had toured New Zealand during the recess promising redistribution of seats and triennial parliaments, these were omitted from his official parliamentary programme. A Government Bill did propose, however, to give votes to all males resident for one year in the colony and for six months in any constituency. Except for one clause, the Bill met no opposition in the Lower House and was passed without a division. The single contentious clause concerned the Maori dual Vote, which would legalise and encourage Maoris with any of the European qualifications to vote in both European and native electorates. When the Legislative Council deleted this clause Grey refused to accept their amendment and withdrew the entire Bill. Stout later wrote that the Liberals would not risk a dissolution on the question because the North Island feared swamping by Maori electors if the clause was allowed to pass, and in the South Island no enthusiasm could be evoked for the measure.⁴ Obviously, then, the Maori dual Vote was unpopular and we may justifiably ask now, as Grey's opponents asked them: why drop the rest of an important and exceptionally popular bill? Grey could blame no one but himself for such a curious and stupid action.

The session of 1878 ended with little achieved, and in the succeeding months the state of the country steadily deteriorated. Te Whiti opposed the Waimate survey, and the Government's mounting expenditure on negotiations with Tawhiao seemed to result in less benefit to the colony than to Sheehan, the Native Minister, and his motley and undesirable retinue. Economically, New Zealand was also slipping into trouble; the depression was setting in. While it is always easy to blame a Government for aggravating hardship under similar circumstances, the removal and reduction of customs duties in 1878 and the imposition of an inadequate land tax of ¼d. in the pound on land over £500 in value could have helped matters but little. Both the timber and wheat trades were affected, and unemployment resulted.

3 For an account of the Opposition's effort to find a leader during 1878-9, see *ibid.*, pp. 16-20.

4 R. Stout, 'Political Parties in New Zealand', *Melbourne Review*, January 1880, p. 70.

The Ministry began to fall apart during these same months of early 1879, for ministers fought with one another and with Grey, practically in full public view. Stout resigned from Cabinet and the House in June 1879, and within a week a violent argument between Grey and Ballance led to the resignation of the latter. Estimates of Ballance have varied considerably: Reeves judged him to be careful and extremely economical as a Treasurer, but E. C. J. Stevens, a fellow free trader, roundly condemned the departing Minister as an utter failure: '... totally devoid of capacity, ingenuity, experience or judgement in financial matters and ... incapable of speaking, save on extreme preparation ... a great weakness to the Govt [sic]'.⁵

Parliament met in July 1879, and Grey was immediately faced with a no-confidence motion. Fox, the Opposition's compromise choice as a temporary leader, stated after hearing the old policy repeated in the Governor's speech:

This programme contains nothing new — nothing that has not already been in possession of this House. I am not going to discuss the question of policy. ... We have got to decide who are to be the Government whose measures we are to pass in this House, and who are to be intrusted with the carrying of them out in the future.⁶

After a very bitter debate Grey was defeated but, instead of recommending the Governor to call Fox to form a Ministry, he asked for and received a dissolution. The terms of this are very important:

A majority of the House of Representatives has declared that Ministers have so neglected and mismanaged the administrative business of the country that they no longer possess the confidence of Parliament. It is indispensable, in such circumstances, if Ministers do not at once resign, that Parliament shall be dissolved with the least possible delay, and that, meanwhile, no measure shall be proposed that may not be imperatively required, nor any contested motion whatever brought forward.⁷

Grey, however, in spite of these conditions, then proposed to re-introduce the entire electoral reform policy as uncontested motions. The franchise reform was again to include the Maori dual vote which had caused the withdrawal of the 1878 Bill. There was also to be a Redistribution Bill, of which not even the principle had been discussed. When such a Bill was eventually passed in 1881 the provincial distribution of members altered considerably, and it could

5 Stevens to Stafford, 3 Dec. 1878, Stafford Correspondence (Alexander Turnbull Library).

6 (*P.D.*) *Parliamentary Debates*, XXXI, p. 66.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 325.

only be passed after a famous stonewall, led by the Greyites Seddon and Andrews and Gisborne, had been broken by Speaker O'Rorke's intervention and Hall's introduction of the first closure motion in New Zealand parliamentary history. Far from seeming likely to be an uncontested motion in 1881, redistribution was considered to be the rock on which even the strongest Government might split;⁸ one can thus hardly expect that the same measure would have passed without contest in 1879.

In July 1879, as Sir William Fox explained to the House, the Opposition was ready to pass supply and a loan bill but, with the Governor's terms before them, they were not prepared to discuss reform until Grey had resigned or gone to the country. Grey thereupon agreed, meekly and ominously, to drop the reforms until after the election. He had made a very clever move and caused the Opposition to appear to the large, uninformed section of colonial voters as opponents of reform. The Greyite press, led by the *Lyttelton Times*, the *New Zealander* and the *Auckland Herald*, were quick to begin an intensive propaganda campaign based on just this point. As the *Christchurch Press* observed: 'It is absolutely essential to even the partial success of the Grey party that people should believe that the Oppositionists are opposed to the Liberal cause.'⁹

Before the election proper started, before even the vote of no-confidence had been taken, Grey and another M.H.R., George Feldwick, had formed in Wellington a constituency organisation glorying in the name of the 'New Zealand Liberal Association'. Similar bodies soon appeared in the other main centres, but were not countered by any equivalent type of Opposition organisation. Grey opened his own election campaign in Wellington on 16 August with a speech on Liberalism as he interpreted that word.¹⁰ Shorn of the highly emotive language and without the benefit of the type of dramatic eloquence of which Grey was a master, the essentials of that policy were: (1) extension of the franchise; (2) improved representation; (3) redistribution of seats; (4) a land tax; (5) administrative economy. It was stated that foreign or imported capital was both undesirable and unnecessary. New Zealand's rulers and leaders before 1877 were also unequivocally and collectively condemned for being a Conservative oligarchy which had grown rich

8 *The Press*, Christchurch, 5 July 1881, Parliamentary Reporter.

9 *Loc. cit.*, 21 Aug. 1879.

10 A newspaper report, bound as a pamphlet and entitled *Sir George Grey's Speech on Liberalism at Wellington, 16 August 1879* is in the Alexander Turnbull Library.

by legislating in its own interest and by ignoring the needs of the people. Thus came into being the 'Liberal myth'. Grey took on himself the mantle of New Zealand's first true 'Liberal'; all other leaders, the Welds, Staffords, Fitzgeralds, Foxes, were unregenerate, self-seeking reactionaries. In the terms of the myth, Grey had introduced the very idea of reform into colonial public life; therefore, Grey owned electoral and parliamentary reform, by right of discovery it would seem. The myth is as false as it is long-lived. Grey did not introduce these reforms into New Zealand public life; the liberal tradition in our politics was established by Grey's very opponents. To make this clearer we now turn to the oft-reviled 'Conservative' province of Canterbury, the province of the men whom Grey accused of seeking to destroy him. By studying the men and their speeches at this election we may be able to decide whether or not an ideological split did exist in New Zealand at this time.

In Ashley, Canterbury's most northerly electorate, W. S. Moorhouse defeated two locally-minded and provincialist farmers, W. C. Fendall and J. A. Cunningham. Like Grey, Moorhouse was no longer the man he had once been. When Canterbury's second Superintendent twenty years before, he had enunciated a Vogelite policy before Vogel had even been heard of in the Colony, and he forced all cautious opposition aside to finance and build roads, railways, and the Lyttelton Tunnel — a great monument to him and his engineers when one considers its magnitude and the comparative pettiness of other public works in colonial New Zealand. The years since his glorious hours of vision and financial speculation had been spent in wandering the face of the Colony and being in and out of Parliament. In 1879 he relinquished his seat for Christchurch City for the stated reason that he wished to give the electors a chance to return Grey, who could thus be given a further opportunity of displaying his utter incompetence. Moorhouse was never without an answer. He simply refused, however, to make speeches on either policy or administration, allowing his ideas on these matters to be drawn from him by anyone interested enough to ask questions; instead, he talked about himself exclusively. A witty and fluent speaker, he advised his opponents to retire, stating that as their views were the same and his own personal merits so superior to theirs, the result was a foregone conclusion. Wilson has banished him to outer darkness as a 'conservative';¹¹ in early Canterbury he was judged to be a radical and a man of the people. One might call him a *laissez-faire* liberal.

11 *The Grey Government*, p. 46.

Charles Bowen defended his seat at Kaiapoi against G. H. Wearing, the owner of the Kaiapoi Hotel and an avowedly extreme provincialist. Bowen, a centralist, an intellectual, a practical and tactful man who scorned the pretentiousness of his political contemporaries, won by a mere handful of votes. He ignored local issues and the desires of his very parochial constituents, and spoke almost exclusively about the Government's unconstitutional conduct and maladministration. Bowen barely seems like a colonial politician.

In Christchurch City, five candidates fought for three seats in a campaign made colourful by tumultuously disorderly meetings, the intensive and extensive activities of the rival committees, the machinations of the last-ditch provincialists of the Canterbury Liberal Association,¹² and the polling-day riots.

Sir George Grey stood here and for an Auckland constituency as well. He was an old man, not over-conscientious about telling the truth, extremely emotional, and firmly convinced that he was the victim of all kinds of diabolical plots, the long-sought-after prey of the British Government and the Canterbury runholders led by John Hall and William Rolleston. As already mentioned, he declared himself to be the one and only fountainhead of political truth and wisdom. The ironical fact is, however, that, although he tried to build a party around himself, he was incapable of accepting that fundamental of parliamentary democracy, an Opposition.

Samuel Andrews, Grey's running partner, was a plasterer, a Patriarch of the Sons of Temperance, and one of the organisers of the Canterbury Liberal Association. Strangely enough, although called a 'Liberal', Andrews opposed Grey's land tax, opposed schemes for advanced education, and opposed Stevens's schemes for workers' sickness benefits. He similarly opposed female franchise. He even promised to support Fox if Grey was defeated, and he attacked Sheehan, Grey's rather wild ministerial protégé. With Grey's backing, however, Andrews won a seat.

Edward Cephas John Stevens, the third successful candidate, had entered Parliament in 1866 as a supporter of Weld, demanding on his own account abolition of the provinces and free trade. Such a dangerous policy resulted in his defeat by one vote in 1870 at the hands of William Reeves, but Stevens was re-elected in 1875 and continued to sit for Christchurch until 1881, when he went to the Legislative Council. Stevens was a man of ideas: he had suggested the Public Trust scheme to Vogel, he had been one of those who

¹² For a detailed account of this important and colourful organisation, see the writer's thesis, pp. 166-192.

introduced triennial parliaments as a political issue, and he was one of the first to agitate for state charitable aid, in particular sickness benefits or pensions. After becoming a Legislative Councillor, he threw his weight behind the movement for female franchise and the limitation of the Upper House. Stevens, with Rolleston, was also a champion of the system of selling land on deferred payments. Of all the Canterbury candidates and members he appears to be one of the most interesting and perhaps the most able; yet Stevens has suffered from our unfortunate historical traditions more than most of his fellows. At least Bowen, Hall, Atkinson, Rolleston, and Pollen have been damned with some faint praise; Stevens has been ignored, although Wilson does mention him as the 'conservative Stevens'.¹³ If his actions, speeches, and contemporary reputation mean anything at all, he was one of the least conservative politicians of his time.

Edward Richardson, who now lost his seat but regained it when Grey was unseated later in the year, had been the engineer who completed the Lyttelton Tunnel. In politics he had already held office as Minister of Public Works for Pollen, Atkinson, and Vogel, and he was to do so again in the Stout-Vogel Ministry. Thus he belonged to both the 'Continuous Ministry' and to one of its so-called 'Liberal' interruptions; surely an illuminating commentary on the fluidity of colonial politics! Richardson was essentially a specialist in politics, a successful engineer and a good Minister for Public Works who did not involve himself in party struggles. At this election his pet policy was an arbitration system in disputes between railway employees and their employers, whether private companies or the Government.

The fifth candidate for the City was an unofficial Liberal Association nomination, J. W. Treadwell. He was undoubtedly an eccentric and, although he added colour to an already colourful scene, he was ignored by fellow candidates, newspaper editors, and most of the electors.

At Heathcote, the Hon. J. T. Fisher, the Postmaster-General, defeated a local farmer named Morgan. Fisher was, like many of the other Greyites or self-styled 'Liberals', a political nonentity. He was a farmer, a man of few words and no pretensions, but was also delightfully modest and frank. He never made any bones about the fact that he had taken office with Grey simply because no other Canterbury man would and it was essential that someone should look after the province's interests.

13 Op. cit., p. 46, n. 94.

Lyttelton was won by Harry Allwright, ostensibly a Greyite, from H. Wynn-Williams, a land-owner and businessman. Allwright had been a Canterbury Pilgrim and a successful tradesman, and was now Mayor of Lyttelton. He was quiet, inoffensive, pleasant, and patently honest, so honest that he felt it his duty to honour his election pledges by leaving Grey later in 1879 when the Greyite group began to oppose and obstruct Hall's efforts to pass the electoral reforms. Despised henceforth by the Greyites and the virulent *Lyttelton Times* as a traitor, Allwright retained his constituents' faith and followed Hall, Whitaker, Atkinson, and Vogel successively until 1887.

Coleridge, the vast area of rural mid-Canterbury between the Rakaia and Rangitata rivers, was fought for by local factions. Here the electors consciously set out to find a member who would look after his constituency above all else. Greyism, Liberalism, Conservatism, constitutionalism, were alike ignored and superfluous to the political reality here. The sitting Oppositionist, the runholder George Hart, was defeated after a violent battle by another Oppositionist and runholder, E. G. Wright, a retired engineer. Wright was an independent throughout his fairly long political life and at this time he opposed both Grey and Fox. His voice was to be raised in the House of Representatives mainly when matters connected with railways, harbours, and Coleridge appeared on the Order Paper.

South of Coleridge in Geraldine, Edward Wakefield, with all the brittle and eloquent brilliance characteristic of his uncle Edward Gibbon and his cousin Edward Jerningham, defeated the organiser of the New Zealand Liberal Association, George Feldwick, a farmer and, like Wakefield himself, a journalist. Feldwick was defeated by half a dozen votes at Invercargill on 1 September but two days later was nominated for Geraldine.¹⁴ Appearing in Canterbury a day or two after that, he launched a vicious personal onslaught (not altogether unjustified) against the sitting member. Wakefield had entered Parliament in 1875, a brash, ambitious, young man who began his sojourn there by making some unpleasant remarks about Vogel's personal honesty. He had been a moderate provincialist and had followed Grey for a while. When Ballance received the portfolio he particularly coveted, however, Wakefield became a fierce opponent of the Ministry and of everyone else, so that when the dissolution was announced he had been seen to look appalled at the prospect of meeting his constituents. His whole political career was dominated by an overwhelming ambition to sit in Cabinet — anyone's

¹⁴ Elections did not take place on the same day all over New Zealand until 1881.

Cabinet. His political allegiances were never constant and he could not be relied upon. In 1884, for example, he was elected as an opponent of Atkinson; yet he at last gained his cherished portfolio some weeks later in Atkinson's Ministry of a few days. Wakefield led a lonely, embittered, disappointing, and rather sad political life. His tongue whipped friend and foe indiscriminately and unmercifully, and, while his speeches as we read them in Hansard are often devastatingly witty, members enjoyed them best when they were directed at other members.

In Timaru Richard Turnbull, the sitting Greyite member, had little trouble defeating Belfield Woolcombe. Turnbull was a local merchant, extremely popular, honest, and possessed of so much prestige that electoral opposition was hopeless. He held his seat on the most secure of tenures until his death in 1890. Woolcombe, on the other hand, was tremendously unpopular. The most interesting feature of this election was Turnbull's denial of Grey as the founder of 'Liberalism'. Here speaks one of the best-known Greyite 'Liberals' of the day:

Much as we are indebted to Sir George Grey it is doing him too great an honour to attribute those principles they call Greyism to him. I see men around me who have bravely battled for those principles in the Old Country. I see men around me from whom I have learned these principles.¹⁵

It is worth noting that before the election began Turnbull wrote to Stout on behalf of a section of the Grey party in Parliament and requested Stout to re-enter politics and become their leader.¹⁶

In Gladstone, Canterbury's most southerly electorate, the landowner John Studholme, fighting the only contested election of his career, was not troubled by the obscure Dr Deane. The latter was torn between support of Grey and the expectations and desires of rural electors; the combination was, not surprisingly, unsuccessful.

Three of the most important men in Canterbury in 1879 were elected unopposed: William Rolleston for Avon, John Hall for Selwyn, and William Montgomery for Akaroa.

John Hall, pushed on by Oppositionists who did not like Fox, had just resigned from the Legislative Council to oppose Grey. He has done service to many historians as the prime example of the New Zealand landed 'Conservative': the 'Knight of Gridiron Fame' as Seddon called him during the 1890 election; the representative of

¹⁵ *Lyttelton Times*, 19 Aug. 1879.

¹⁶ Turnbull to Stout, 12 Aug. 1879, Stout Papers (Alexander Turnbull Library).

the large land-owner interest of which Lipson writes so vaguely. Reeves called him one of the three great men of the Conservative Party, and modern writers follow rather uncritically along the same well-trodden road. Hall himself, who has seldom been allowed a hearing in recent times, once called his party the 'independent Liberals' as distinguished from the Greyite or 'dependent Liberals'.¹⁷ Alfred Saunders noted that he could hardly have been called a Conservative in any other country but New Zealand as, on the largest and most important political questions, he was infinitely more liberal than the self-styled 'Liberals' who opposed him.¹⁸ The proof of the assertion, though, lies in what Hall himself actually said and did. The fact remains that between 1879 and 1882 Hall carried through a complete series of electoral reforms, all in the face of Greyite obstruction. During these years Hall laid the trail for Pember Reeves, Ballance, Ward, and Seddon. Essentially Hall was the practical man of action; Grey was the flamboyant theoriser. Grey took the ideas current in the Colony and claimed them as his own; Hall passed those ideas into law, while Grey voted against them because it was someone other than himself who was now championing reform. In October 1879 Hall's majority was less secure than Grey's had been in October 1877; in two years Grey did nothing; in the next two years Hall carried triennial parliaments, improved franchise, and reform in voting procedure, and was pressing on with his campaign for female franchise. Perhaps the trouble has been that Hall was personally colourless and did not publicise himself.

William Rolleston was a highly independent and obstinate man who never fulfilled his youthful promise of triumph in central politics. He had been Canterbury's soundest and most efficient Superintendent but after abolition he dedicated himself to the Colony; he refused to put Canterbury's interest before the good of the whole country, and so became unpopular in his own province and served as a butt for the carpingly ultraprovincialist *Lyttelton Times* for a decade. Rolleston was an intellectual, and educationalist, a sincere land reformer and innovator; a land reformer, moreover, from the landed class itself. There is no contradiction or incompatibility in such a statement. His personality was complex to a more pronounced extent than Reevesian generalisation can encompass but, judged by any standard, Rolleston is one of the great New Zealand liberals, just as Hall is one of our great practical politicians and Grey one of our great men.

¹⁷ *P.D.*, XXXII, p. 392.

¹⁸ Alfred Saunders, *A History of New Zealand* (Christchurch, 1899), Vol. II, p. 478.

William Montgomery, the last candidate, had been Rolleston's provincial colleague and had fought beside him against abolition of the provinces and Atkinson's Government. Both had thereby smoothed the path for Grey's entry into office in 1877. Like Rolleston, Montgomery was in no sense an arresting speaker or dynamic leader, although always considered one of the members with a following in the House. Even the friendly *Lyttelton Times* did not think very highly of him as a public figure, and after reading his speeches one can only think of him as an honest, kind, dull, and unimpressive politician. Montgomery had refused office with Grey in 1877 because he feared that any Auckland-Otago ministry would try to absorb Canterbury's large land fund into colonial revenue. Montgomery also feared that Grey would carry insular separation. After Canterbury had lost her land fund and Grey had abandoned separation, Montgomery became a lukewarm ministerial supporter. Although called a 'Liberal' by most writers, Montgomery was to be among the most outspoken opponents of Atkinson's old age insurance scheme. He also continued to protest against the system of central government until late in the 'eighties. Until he joined Vogel in 1884, Montgomery shared the leadership of the southern part of the Opposition with Macandrew and during this time he once made the interesting statement that Grey did not belong to their party.¹⁹

So much for the background and the chief characters in this colonial comedy. We must now try to answer such questions as the following: How did these men react to Grey and 'his' policy? Can one find any issue, or even several issues, which may have divided them into parties? Is there any evidence at all for talking about a conservative-radical cleavage? What was the essential structure of New Zealand politics?

If the liberal policy be placed in relation to contemporary English political trends, it is readily apparent that triennial parliaments, secular education, redistribution of seats, and extension of the franchise were Radical concepts. It is arguable, therefore, that most New Zealand politicians could have been accommodated quite safely within the expansive and rather ill-defined Gladstonian Liberal Party. If Grey and his friends were really what their propaganda claimed them to be, however, and if party distinctions were as clear as Grey and his friends asserted they were, two things were necessary: all the Greyites or 'Liberals' would have had to be united in support

¹⁹ See *Lyttelton Times*, 12 July 1882. This report also contains his references to Atkinson's pensions schemes.

of their policy and, even more essential, all the Opposition or 'Conservatives' would have had to be enemies of that policy. Neither condition was present.

Grey's propaganda was not even fully believed by his colleagues.²⁰ Fisher admitted that the real issue of the election was administration; Grey flatly denied this. Fisher also affirmed that the rulers of the past had been honest men who had ruled well; Grey continually charged those same men with class interest, corruption, and incompetence. Fisher realised the truth that since abolition Parliament had been subjected to provincial pressures greater than ever before, that it had become, in effect, a large road board. From a different standpoint, Bowen saw that attempts to copy the British party system in so young a country were simply pretentious, based on false analogy, and doomed to fail. Bowen placed his campaign on the elevated level of constitutional principle, and retired in disgust before the next election. Fisher realised that the proper duty of the member was to get what he could for his district; higher things had little place.

Any Greyite claim to have initiated and carried out educational reform was ill founded. Bowen was the author of the 1877 Education Act which established our present free, secular, and compulsory system, and he had been supported by Montgomery, Rolleston, and Stout; Grey had been obstructive. Of the other Canterbury candidates, Fendall, Richardson, Fisher, Stevens, Morgan, Wright, Studholme, and Allwright followed Bowen's ideas without reserve. Andrews approved of elementary education but opposed anything more advanced. Hall, Feldwick, Deane, Turnbull, and Woolcombe wanted a denominational system with state aid, the Nelson system.

The credit for introducing the topic of triennial parliaments into our politics would seem to go, by common consent, to Stevens, not Grey. Stevens claimed it, Andrews and Wakefield supported his contention, and none of the Greyites actually denied him the honour. Everyone approved except Bowen, who stoutly declared that five years was good enough for English Liberals and so for him. Andrews and Rolleston both doubted its value but pledged themselves to vote for it. Hall, Fendall, Richardson, and Wakefield were not enthusiastic but did not oppose.

The issue of redistribution of seats was inextricably associated with provincial interest. Obviously, the greater representation any province could get, the greater its chances of getting loan money for

²⁰ The various election speeches were reported very fully in all the Canterbury newspapers between 12 Aug. and 15 Sept. 1879.

public works within its boundaries. Grey talked idly of pocket boroughs and family interests as in Britain, and of a colonial ruling class which had caused the current inequalities in distribution of seats, yet changes had been made as recently as 1875, and in Canterbury the inequalities told rather against the rural electors and the supposed oligarchs. When Hall carried redistribution in 1881 Canterbury's representation rose from fourteen to twenty. Canterbury had been calling for changes for many years, for the simple reason that any redistribution on population was bound to be in her favour. While Lyttelton was the smallest constituency (won by a Greyite), Heathcote was the most heavily populated single-member constituency in New Zealand, and Coleridge was the largest in area.²¹ It is idle, besides being inaccurate, to give Grey any credit at all for introducing into public life an issue that was already a recurring one.

Extension of the franchise was part of the policy that found general acceptance but at the same time there was a certain diversity of opinion over details. Grey spoke about manhood suffrage, but his followers, except for Deane, made reservations and qualifications. Fisher wanted a ratepayer and residential qualification, as did Allwright. Andrews wished three months' residence. Feldwick, Grey's right-hand man, firmly opposed manhood suffrage and wanted a conservative two years' residence; like Richard Turnbull, he was against raising up a legion of small voters. Of the rural Greyites, Wearing was content with residence for one year, but Fendall and Cunningham, while in favour of lodger franchise in towns, set their faces sternly against shepherds and landless men being given the chance to swamp the farmers' votes. Among the so-called 'Conservatives', Stevens was ready to accept full manhood suffrage, Richardson wanted residence for six months, and the others, without exception, wanted residence for one year. Again, no significant division is apparent. The floating population was so considerable a feature of colonial life that even Andrews' three months' residence would have kept many voteless. Female franchise was mentioned but was not yet of major importance. Hall, Saunders, Fox, and Wallis (an Auckland Greyite) were campaigning for it already but, of those who mentioned it in Canterbury, Grey looked on the matter with 'coldness and indifference'²² and Andrews, Fisher, and Bowen were firmly opposed to such liberality as giving votes to their wives.

²¹ Lyttelton, consisting of merely the port and immediate vicinity, had only 432 names on its roll (373 voted); Coleridge had 1297 on its roll (865 voted); Heathcote's roll contained 2214 names (971 voted).

²² An expression used by W. Sidney Smith, *The Women's Franchise Movement in New Zealand* (Christchurch, 1905).

One aspect of franchise reform which had not been mentioned by Grey at all was the actual administration of registration, supervision of electoral rolls, and extension of polling hours. Bowen, Hall, Stevens, Rolleston, Wakefield, Andrews, and Wright made much of the need for improvement and, in the light of constant and widespread references to impurities of the rolls and anomalies of registration, they may well have been striking at the roots of New Zealand's suffrage problem. It is arguable that extension of the hours for polling and the registration of voters all the year round helped the spread of democracy in New Zealand fully as much as added qualifications. In 1879 only a little over half of those on Canterbury rolls voted at all, and it is possible that, as Richardson maintained, many more people did not bother to register.²³

Stout later declared that the root of the difference between the parties at this time was the attitude each took towards taxation, in particular the land tax.²⁴ My findings reveal that Grey proclaimed the absolute justice of the land tax and he promised to institute a fair system. He did not elaborate. His followers were not so sure about the land tax, however. Andrews could see no justice in it, Wearing and Fendall opposed it, Deane eventually came out against any tax at all on farmers, Feldwick felt it justified but imposed unwisely. On the other hand, every candidate except Grey and Richard Turnbull agreed that the rival property tax was better. Dr J. S. Turnbull, President of the Canterbury Liberal Association and himself a land-owner, regarded the land tax with intense disfavour because Canterbury and Otago had to pay most of it. Stout also asserted that free trade or protection divided Conservatives from Liberals at this election, but all the candidates here except Stevens, Treadwell, and Rolleston were protectionists and no division emerges.

The discussion about land centred on the desirability of purchase by deferred payments. As vague on this as on everything else, Grey demanded 'liberal land laws' so that a French type of peasant economy could develop. He said nothing about methods he would use to place men on the land. Stevens made the question one of leases and claimed that the Government already had the power to declare enough land open for sale on deferred payments to satisfy everyone who wanted land. As he further pointed out, Grey had

23 At this time people could only register as voters during a specified period each year. Polling booths closed at 4 p.m. on election days.

24 Op. cit., p. 78.

been Premier for two years. No one ever tried to question Stevens's and Rolleston's sincerity in advocating this type of purchase, and most of their fellow candidates agreed with them on the value of deferred payments for helping men with small means.

How great was the problem of 'locked up land' at this time? By 1879 the best agricultural lands of Canterbury were already in the hands of the small farmer. Rangiora, Kaiapoi, Ellesmere, Heathcote, Banks Peninsula, Ashburton, Geraldine, and Waimate were dominated economically and politically by the farmer and the storekeeper. Most of the squatters had been forced into the back country by purchase and they were, as Studholme and others so frequently stated, a dying and, in a depressed economy, impecunious race. Until refrigeration opened up wider markets, small farming in Canterbury had reached its economic limit.

As a political force the big land-owners were not really powerful, nor were they all on one side. Studholme was scarcely an important politician; he was as much a political nonentity as Andrews and Allwright or Turnbull. He certainly was no gray eminence, whispering diabolical schemes for locking up land from settlement into the Continuous Ministry's dirty ear. Instead he and his brother were practical farmers and landowners who were selling their lands to their managers and employees on deferred payments. Hall was returned to represent the independent small farmers of Ellesmere. He had been a squatter years before and perhaps a gridironer also, but so had several of the leading figures in the Liberal Association, in particular the Australian R. L. Higgins of Cust. In Coleridge the really big owners backed the losing candidate, Hart, and Wright was elected in spite of their fierce personal enmity.²⁵ The smaller owners and storekeepers won him his seat. On the other hand, many of the Liberal Association men were landowners and substantial farmers: Fisher, for example, whose brother was also a squatter; James Gammack, an infinitely wealthier man than most of his opponents; Charles Ensor, Captain Parsons and Higgins in North Canterbury all had been or still were large owners. Even Dr Turnbull, the leader of the Canterbury Greyites and a fanatical admirer of everything

25 The Coleridge election was a classic of its kind, a struggle between local body factions which split the commercial and farming communities as well as the county and borough councils and the road boards. Christchurch apart, this was the most fiercely fought and bitter election in the province, although national issues such as Greyism played no significant part. See this writer's thesis, pp. 234-251.

connected with Sir George, had been a squatter and a speculator in land in all parts of the province. He certainly never mentioned 'landed oligarchs'.

Thus, on the land questions, as on the other policy issues, one can draw no line of party division which will leave Grey, Fisher, Andrews, Allwright, Montgomery, Turnbull, Feldwick, Deane, Fendall, Wearing, and Treadwell in one 'Liberal' group, and Hall, Bowen, Stevens, Rolleston, Richardson, Wright, Wakefield, Moorhouse, Studholme, Hart, and Aynsley in a 'Conservative' group.

There is an approximate split if the merits of provincialism and centralism are discussed. Grey bewailed the abolition of 'his' constitution, and his strictures on the new system were echoed by Montgomery, Andrews, Fisher, Wearing, Fendall, Cunningham, and the Liberal Association led by Dr Turnbull. Hall, Bowen, Stevens, Richardson, Moorhouse, and Rolleston were fervent upholders of the central government and, except for Rolleston and Moorhouse, had been well to the fore in the abolition movement. In South Canterbury an even stronger local feeling than in the northern part of the province became manifest. In Coleridge Joseph Ives, the violently Greyite editor of the *Ashburton Mail*, refused to either form a Liberal Association or intervene in a local fight as a Greyite or 'Liberal' candidate; actually, he organised Wright's campaign. Perhaps he realised that Grey, as an Aucklander, would be unlikely to evoke much enthusiasm among parochially-minded southern settlers. Similarly in Timaru a great deal of Richard Turnbull's avowed distrust of Grey as a party leader may have been calculated to allay local fears.

The Canterbury results, summarised in such a general fashion here, would seem to be matched by those in other provinces. In Otago things were quite as confused as in Canterbury, with Bible in schools and local options being more important issues. Above all, the interests of Otago were the interests of most of the new members and while many were pledged to support any ministry containing Macandrew, Grey himself lost support. Nelson, Marlborough, and Westland were similarly predominantly concerned about getting as much loan money as possible spent in their districts and their members were willing to support any ministry ready to oblige. Only Westland, where Seddon won his first electoral success, was markedly Greyite. Taranaki and Hawkes Bay rejected Grey completely, and only two Greyites were returned in Wellington province. In Auckland Greyism won, to use Wilson's words, 'in what appears, on the surface, to be a clear-cut

party election'.²⁶ All Aucklanders who had voted with Fox were defeated. After closer investigation, however, Wilson does admit that the desire for 'liberalism' was linked with a strong desire for 'justice for Auckland' and a hope that Grey in office would mean continuation of government expenditure in that province and a large share of the new loan.

After the last votes had been counted, the state of the parties was more confused than before. When Parliament met later in October 1879, Hall's no-confidence motion found Grey defeated by two votes, those of the famous Auckland 'rats' or 'patriots', depending on one's point of view. The political initiative had been lost by Otago and Auckland; a ministry representing the central provinces was now in power.²⁷

It is obvious that Grey was not the sole author of the 'liberal reforms', and it is obvious that he strove mightily to direct attention away from his Government's woeful record of broken promises and poor administration. It is also obvious that Greyism had two aspects: reformist and provincialist, of which the latter was by far the stronger. Perhaps the clearest conclusion from all this is that the nicknames 'Conservative' and 'Liberal', with or without capital letters, have no real meaning when used in connection with the Grey Government and the 1879 election. The structure of politics was provincial and personal, and if names must be used far better the names of the leaders or simply the names of the provincial groups themselves. There is little benefit to be gained from searching for a 'Liberal' party or a 'Conservative' Opposition. In 1879 Grey failed to convince the electors of New Zealand of the presence of these phenomena; a few years later, when Pember Reeves reviewed the colony's history, many of the facts had been forgotten and only the glowing periods of Grey's propaganda were remembered. The modern researcher must look behind the outward appearances, and challenge the well expressed generalisations which have been uncritically accepted by so many of our most celebrated commentators.

26, *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

27 Grey's original Ministry consisted of: Grey himself and Sheehan from Auckland, Macandrew and Larnach from Otago, and Fisher from Canterbury; Whitmore in the Legislative Council was from Hawkes Bay. Hall's original Ministry contained Hall himself and Rolleston from Canterbury, Atkinson from Taranaki, Bryce from Wanganui, Oliver from Otago, and Whitaker, in the Legislative Council, from Auckland.

Socialism and Social Reform in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand*

JOSEPHINE F. MILBURN

WHILE NEW ZEALAND is widely recognised as one of the first countries to have initiated social legislation, there has been disagreement about the consequent existence of socialist character in the country during the latter half of the nineteenth century. In this article discussion will be focused on the effects of socialist thought and activity upon the labour movement and upon governmental measures especially during the 1890's.

POLITICAL THOUGHT

Early political thought in New Zealand was moulded by the views of the English settlers, and was later influenced by American writings. While politicians restricted their planning to the solution of immediate problems, by 1890 political thought and action had become dependent largely on two beliefs: that the state existed to aid its people; and that the people should participate in government by selection of their representatives. In 1893 popular participation in government was furthered by granting the vote to women. With regard to the first belief, we find that Sir Robert Stout in 1899 said: 'The Government is . . . believed to be the benign father and mother whose every care is for the people.'¹ Later Le Rossignol and Stewart termed the faith in state action 'paternalism'. In like manner Albert Métin referred to the government as 'le plus grand patron de la colonie', while J. B. Condliffe characterised the government as 'maternal', and described the widening of state functions as 'étatism'.¹ Another

* This paper is based upon a study of the socialist and labour movements made by the author in New Zealand during 1954 and 1955. The comments and suggestions of members of the labour and socialist movements, officers of the Labour Party, and Members of Parliament have been of great assistance. The author is also indebted to, among others, Professors K. J. Scott and F. L. W. Wood of Victoria University for their helpful advice on various stages of the work.

¹ Sir Robert Stout, 'New Zealand', *Contemporary Review*, 76 (October, 1899), 541; James Edward Le Rossignol and William Downie Stewart, *State Socialism in New Zealand* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1910), p. 18; Albert Métin, *Le Socialisme sans doctrines* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 2nd ed., 1910), p. 140; J. B. Condliffe, *New Zealand in the Making* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930), pp. 464, 164-165.

term, 'colonial socialism', was applied to the extension of governmental activity by Guy H. Scholefield, who drew upon William Pember Reeves's description of the colony. Reeves pictured the colony as a co-operative society in which the men and women of the country were shareholders and the Government was the elective board of directors.² André Siegfried explained the New Zealand attitude toward the government in the following words: 'Their land is small, the Government is close at hand; it seems that one has only to stretch out one's hand to grasp it, and to dictate to it laws and regulations.'²

Along with the political beliefs there developed a society which became aware of the interests of both the farmer and the worker, even though each of these groups upon arrival in New Zealand usually found more desirable conditions than those known in the former country. When the farmer desired improved facilities, or when the worker desired legal recognition for his organisations and changes in working conditions, he appealed to the government and frequently received assistance. After the depression in the 1880's the discontent and unrest evidenced by the small farmer and the worker led to a change of Government.

SOCIALIST THOUGHT AND ACTIVITY

In the political writings before 1890 only a few articles mentioned socialism or indicated that a socialist theory had been considered.³ In 1874 James McPherson evidenced a vague knowledge of Marx when he wrote about the 'workers' international'. In the next decade the Very Reverend Father des Chesnais displayed his antagonism to radical thought, which he described as socialistic. The most important

2 G. H. Scholefield, *New Zealand in Evolution* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), pp. 244-245; William Pember Reeves, *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1902), vol. 1, pp. 71-72. Siegfried's explanation is found in *Democracy in New Zealand* (London: Bell and Son, 1914), pp. 55-56.

3 See for example: James McPherson in *Reasons Why the Working Men of New Zealand Should Become Internationalists* (Christchurch: By the Author, 1872), advocating political and financial reform through the existing political institutions and the formation of an international workers organisation; cf. the review by Herbert Roth, 'How Marxism Came to New Zealand', *Political Science*, 5 (March 1953), 56; the Very Reverend Father le Menant des Chesnais, *Lectures on liberty, authority, freethought, socialism, naturalism, atheism* delivered at St. Patrick's Cathedral, St. John the Baptist's and St. Benedict's in Auckland (Auckland: Freeman's Journal Office, 1883); Pharos (pseudonym for William Pember Reeves), *Some Historical Articles on Communism and Socialism* (Christchurch: Lyttelton Times Office, 1890). All three of these discourses are located in the Turnbull Library, Wellington.

socialistic literature of the period was William Pember Reeves's learned article of 1890 on the tenets of communism and socialism. In the last two decades of the century some interest developed in the overseas reform writings of Henry George in *Progress and Poverty* (1879), of Edward Bellamy in *Looking Backward* (1887) and of the Fabian Society in the *Fabian Essays* (1889). In addition, the work of John Stuart Mill in forming the Land Tenure Reform Association (1870) created interest in New Zealand.⁴ But generally it might be concluded from the scarcity of indigenous written materials on socialism that such theories were not a significant part of early New Zealand thought, despite the fact that some immigrants had brought with them the ideas of the Chartists and Owenites, and that some interest arose in foreign reform works.

Socialist activity in New Zealand became quite evident after 1895, when several short-lived socialist organisations were established. The inspiration for such groups came in part from English and some American literature, but mainly from English immigrants who read *The Clarion* or who had been active in such British organisations as the Independent Labour Party, the Labour Churches, the Fabian Society, and the Social Democratic Federation. Some of the new organisations in New Zealand included a Fabian Society in Christchurch (1896), a Fabian Society in Dunedin (1896-1902), the Socialist Church in Christchurch (1896-1905?), and the Socialist League in Wellington (1897-1898?).⁵ The ultimate goal of each

4 J. D. Salmond, 'The History of the Labour Movement, 1840-1894' (Otago University: Ph.D. thesis 1924); some parts of this thesis have been published as *New Zealand Labour's Pioneering Days* (Auckland: Forward Press, 1950), see p. 1 for mention of the Chartists; also see Frank Rogers, 'The Single Tax Movement in New Zealand' (Auckland University: M.A. thesis, 1949) pp. 131-142; and Sir George Grey, correspondence with Henry George, located in the Auckland Public Library, and in *Notes of Fowlds* (Wellington: Turnbull Library, typescript), pp. 2-3.

5 Information about the Fabian Society (Christchurch) may be found in an article by James Thorn in the *New Zealand Worker*, 12 December 1928; *New Zealand Liberal and Labour Associations' Directory*, 1897 (Christchurch: Progressive Liberal Association, 1897) pp. 8-9; Canterbury (Fabian) Society, *Minutes*, 1908-1913, located in the collection of Herbert Roth (National Library Service, Wellington). For discussion of the Fabian Society (Dunedin) see some of the above-mentioned sources and *Otago Daily Times*, 29 August, 19 and 26 September, and 9 October, 1896; and the *Democrat* (Dunedin) from July 1897-November 1897, and *Fabian News* (London: Fabian Society), 1898. Sources on the Socialist Church were in the *Socialist* (August-October 1897, and January 1898) located in the collection of Herbert Roth and at the Turnbull Library, and at the Mitchell Library, Sydney; and letters from H. A. Atkinson, nephew of the Premier and leader of the Church, July and September, 1955.

of these groups was the establishment of some type of socialist society through parliamentary reform measures. It was unlikely that any other method for change would have received favour in the country at that time.

Indigenous socialist literature during the 1890's was on the increase, but was limited to a few newsletters and pamphlets. The Socialist Church published a newsletter, the *Socialist*, during 1897 and 1898. Some news of socialists and single taxers was also included in the weekly, the *Forward*, which was published during 1896 in Auckland. Two pamphlets favourably inclined toward socialism were Robinson Crusoe's (pseudonym for A. Sanford) *Looking Upwards* (1892), and A. R. Barclay's *The Origin of Wealth* (1899). On the other hand anti-socialist thoughts were expressed in O. T. J. Alpers's *The Man and the State* (1891), and Archbishop Francis Redwood's *Pastoral Sermon* (1892).⁶

Foreign visitors in the late 'nineties helped to create for a short time some interest in the socialist organisations; one of these leaders was Ben Tillett, who gave a number of lectures to socialist groups. H. D. Lloyd, after his visit, described New Zealand and its social measures in *Newest England*. According to the diary of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, their visit in 1898 was made with the intention of observing the arbitration court in action; the Webbs made no mention of special efforts to contact socialists or socialist groups.⁷ The socialist organisations of the 1890's did not enjoy extensive support, despite the increase of some New Zealand socialist literature and visits from some overseas socialists.

SOCIALIST INFLUENCES UPON THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

The labour movement showed little interest in socialist ideas before 1890. It was only in the 1870's that labour began to organise to any extent.⁸ In the 1880's labour tried both political and industrial

6 The pamphlets mentioned in this paragraph are located in the Turnbull Library.

7 Tillett's visit was recorded in *Lyttelton Times*, 22 February 1897; *New Zealand Times*, 22, 25, 26 March 1897; Albert Métin, op. cit., p. 239. Henry Demarest Lloyd, *Newest England* (London: Gay and Bird, 1901). Beatrice Webb, *Visit to New Zealand in 1898*; *Beatrice Webb's Diary with Entries by Sidney Webb* (Wellington: Price, Milburn and Co., 1959).

8 Accounts of labour history before 1900 are found in: J. D. Salmond, *New Zealand Labour's Pioneering Days*, pp. 15ff.; W. Pember Reeves, *State Experiments*, vol. 2, pp. 107-181; A. Métin, op. cit., p. 194; G. H. Scholfield, *New Zealand in Evolution*, pp. 213-227; and Beatrice Webb, op. cit.

action to bring about better working conditions. By 1890 the labour movement was so affected by the economic depression that it was ready to embrace a political theory which would offer some amelioratory measures.

After industrial action had met with failure during 1890 and 1891, labour turned to support of the Liberal Party and its programme, which recommended measures of benefit to labour. Both the Knights of Labour (which had been recently formed after contacts with the American assemblies) and the trade union groups (which had organised political committees) began to co-operate with the National Liberal Association during election campaigns. The worker, thus, was deflected from support of socialist aims by the practical and immediately achievable offers of the Liberals.⁹

Socialist thought had very little effect upon labour during the 'nineties. The Trades and Labour Councils (T. & L.C.) were interested in promoting the general welfare of the worker, and the members made no mention of aims for a socialist society. Some writers, however, have mentioned that the Council's proposals for additional state controls gave support to state socialism.¹⁰

SOCIALIST INFLUENCES UPON GOVERNMENTAL MEASURES

Features of state socialism in governmental action before 1890 may be detected, but such measures were not introduced as part of a socialist plan. Although some legislation advocated by Sir George Grey,

9 For a discussion of industrial and political action by labour in the 'nineties see W. T. Charleswood, 'Labour Troubles in New Zealand', *Economic Journal*, 1 (December 1891), 714-716; J. D. Salmond, *New Zealand Labour's Pioneering Days*, pp. 46-49, 78-94; W. B. Sutch, *The Quest for Security in New Zealand* (London: Penguin Books, 1942), pp. 65-72, 112. Mention of the Knights of Labour is also made in Salmond, op. cit., pp. 145-146. For information on the Liberals' support of labour measures and the strike of 1890 see James Drummond, *The Life and Work of Richard John Seddon* (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1906), pp. 103-105, 127-129; G. H. Scholefield, op. cit., p. 203. J. D. Salmond, op. cit., pp. 83-89; A. Siegfried, op. cit., pp. 82-83; W. Pember Reeves, *State Experiments*, vol. 2, pp. 27-32; and J. B. Condliffe, op. cit., pp. 156-157.

10 The Trades and Labour Councils (T. & L.C.) held their first conferences in 1885 and 1890. These councils had existed from time to time in several cities since 1876. See T. & L.C., 'Congress of 1885', reported in John Norton (ed.), *The History of Capital and Labour in All Lands and Ages* (Sydney: Oceanic Publishing Co., 1888), pp. 213-215; 'Report of the Proceedings of the [1890] National Conference', *Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives*, Session 1, 1891, H.-1; other reports from 1895 to 1913 in the collection of J. T. Paul. Also see J. D. Salmond, *New Zealand Labour's Pioneering Days*, pp. 97-103, 115-124, 129-130; Salmond mentioned that the political thinking of the conference resembled 'state socialism', p. 124.

as Premier, has been referred to as the beginning of state socialism, his political views should not properly be considered as socialist because of other political theories, e.g., single tax ideas, which seemed to influence his thought. Land nationalisation advocates, including Sir Robert Stout, could also be called the pioneers of one phase of state socialism. Yet the thought of these leaders should not be considered to be socialist-inspired, because they did not often support other types of public ownership.¹¹

During the Liberal Government under John Ballance and then Richard Seddon, assistance was afforded not only to the small farmer and the worker, but also to other members of the electorate. The small farmer felt benefit from such legislation as the Land and Income Tax Act of 1891 and provisions for governmental purchase of land in 1894. These measures aided in the break-up of the large estates. Through the Arbitration and Conciliation Acts, beginning in 1894, labour was to receive legal provision for arbitration and unionism. Democratic features of the election process were enlarged by the granting of the vote to women in 1893. Welfare benefits were provided in pensions for the aged in 1898. State ownership was increased during the Liberal administration by purchase of some mines, and later (1903) by the establishment of State Fire Insurance.¹²

The existence of state socialism in the Liberal legislative programme has also been considered by a number of writers. Agreement is generally found in discussion of the motives for the programme and in the conclusion that there was no general Liberal plan for society.

11 James E. Le Rossignol and W. D. Stewart (op. cit., p. 19) maintained that socialist doctrines had not inspired legislative measures, but that these measures in fact contained elements of socialism. Elements of socialism were revealed in Grey's actions and thoughts in Harold Miller, *New Zealand* (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 2nd ed., 1951), p. 102. See, however, William Lee Rees and Lily Rees, *The Life and Times of Sir George Grey, K.C.B.* (Auckland: H. Brett, 1892), pp. 417-424; statements by Sir George Grey, *Parliamentary Debates*, 28-31 (1878-1879). See also statements of Robert Stout, *ibid.*, 24 (1878), 39; 52 (1885), 69-72; 51 (1885), 525; 53 (1885), 341-343; 54 (1886), 107-108; and R. H. J. Hamlin, *Sir Robert Stout* (Wellington: Turnbull Library, unpublished thesis, 1939), p. 75. T. G. Wilson has made a study of the rise of liberalism which has been published in part in Auckland University Bulletins, *The Grey Government, 1877-1879* (Bulletin no. 45, History series, no. 5, 1954), and *The Rise of the New Zealand Liberal Party, 1880-1890* (Bulletin no. 48, History series, no. 6, 1956).

12 Among the numerous sources describing the Liberal programme are: W. Pember Reeves, *State Experiments*, vols. 1-2; G. H. Scholefield, op. cit., chaps. 13-23, *et passim*; Lealie Lipson, 'Democracy and Socialism in New Zealand', *American Political Science Review*, 41 (April 1947), p. 307.

The Liberal leaders were certainly not motivated by the desire to obtain a socialist society.¹³ It could be argued that Reeves was the exception because he called himself a state socialist. However, perusal of his own statement about his socialist activities reveals that he would postpone socialist considerations when necessary.

Pember Reeves considered himself to be a state socialist in the sense of distrusting financiers and of supporting an increase in State powers. In describing his belief he stated :

But please understand that my socialism is experimental and practical. I have never done anything for the mere pleasure of applying a principle, without seeing at the same time some real and immediate advantage which would proceed from it.¹⁴

Reeves explained that he had always refused to associate with any socialist organisation, because of this practical approach to politics and his aim as a cabinet minister to work for the present and immediate future. He also supported his non-socialist association by implying that socialist membership could hinder his efforts to satisfy the voters' demands for action.¹⁴ It should be noted that Reeves was considered an outstanding member of the Liberal cabinet. Yet his influence upon the cabinet was only felt from 1891 to 1896, when he was appointed Agent-General to London. Because his major concern while in the cabinet was with labour affairs, his contributions were mainly seen in the introduction of labour legislation including the Industrial Conciliation Act and some factory acts.¹⁵

13 Discussion about the motivation behind the Liberal programme is found in: J. Drummond, *op. cit.*, pp. 327, 340; G. H. Scholefield, *op. cit.*, p. 251; A. Siegfried, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 202, 371; A. Métin, *op. cit.*, pp. 141, 239; W. Pember Reeves, *State Experiments*, vol. 1, pp. 71, 91-92; J. B. Condliffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-167. R. M. Burdon mentioned that Seddon being grimly practical was unable to separate theorists from sophistry and evasion; and that he was content to read Hansard, the newspapers, and May's *Parliamentary Practice*; see Burdon's *King Dick* (Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1955), pp. 75, 302.

14 Reeves's description of his socialist beliefs is found in Siegfried, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

15 R. M. Burdon and G. H. Scholefield describe Reeves's relation to the cabinet and his activities as Minister of Education and Justice in the Ballance Cabinet, and as Minister of Labour under Seddon, see Burdon, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-106, 174, 135, 257-261, and Scholefield, *op. cit.*, pp. 229, 245. J. B. Condliffe credited Reeves with the initiation of much of the Liberal programme and considered it unfortunate that Reeves as an author did not picture his importance in the process, 'Political Parties and State Experiments, 1876-1921', *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (Cambridge: University Press, 1933),
Continued on bottom of next page

The Liberal leaders did not consider that their legislative programme would bring about a socialist economy. They turned their back on general theories and were only concerned with proposals that would deal with some pressing problem. Nevertheless, some historical writers have seen all increases in state control as establishing elements of socialism, and thus, have characterised these liberal measures as an approach to 'state socialism'.¹⁶

Other authoritative writers, however, do not describe the Liberal programme as being socialistic. In 1904 André Siegfried in his review of governmental action in New Zealand stated that the country was not socialist, but rather democratic in nature. In discussion of the Liberal programme J. B. Condliffe asserted that the widening of state functions was not designed to try out theoretical conceptions of social organisation, but was 'due primarily to colonial opportunism and freedom from theories'.¹⁷

16 See J. E. Le Rossignol and W. D. Stewart, op. cit., p. 19. Robert H. Hutchinson referred to the economy as a state capitalist economy in *The 'Socialism' of New Zealand* (New York: New Review Publishing Association, 1916), p. x; and Rt. Hon. Earl of Onslow discussed state socialism in the Antipodes in *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, 25 (1893-1894), p. 5. Other views of the legislation are found in: Hugh H. Lusk, *Socialism in New Zealand* (New York: Sturgis and Walton, 1913), p. 226; and H. D. Lloyd, *Newest England*, pp. 364-377. Compare these views with A. Métin, op. cit., p. 140; A. Siegfried, op. cit., pp. 90-91; W. Pember Reeves, *State Experiments*, vol. 1, pp. 91, 71; J. B. Condliffe, *New Zealand in the Making*, pp. 164-165, and his 'Political Parties and State Experiments, 1876-1921', op. cit., p. 197; and G. H. Scholefield, *New Zealand in Evolution*, p. 251.

17 Siegfried, op. cit., p. 194; and J. B. Condliffe, *New Zealand in the Making*, p. 164.

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vol. 7, part II, p. 179. Because of his departure from the cabinet in 1896, Reeves did not have an opportunity to administer the Industrial Conciliation Act. Very few of Reeves's records concerning these years of his life were available in 1955. Keith Sinclair of Auckland University has been making a study of some parts of Reeves's career. Seddon was becoming an autocratic leader of the cabinet by 1896 and took over both Reeves's and Ward's portfolios upon their resignation. See footnote 13 for mention of Seddon's humanitarian political views.

CONCLUSION

Socialist ideas were introduced into the country mainly by immigrants and through overseas literature. However, socialist theories were not widely accepted, because demands for changes in conditions usually received the attention of the government. The prevailing ideas about the function of the government made possible state activity when demanded by the people. Labour was in the position of seeking a change in working conditions in the early 'nineties and probably was opened to socialist ideas. Yet the Liberal government offered solutions to these problems without reference to or use of a socialist plan, so labour did not turn to socialism. During the nineteenth century socialism was not an influential movement in New Zealand, even though governmental activities were considerably increased.

Fluoridation in Dunedin: A Study of Pressure Groups and Public Opinion

AUSTIN MITCHELL

FLUORIDATION 'is the hottest controversial subject in New Zealand today' claimed Mr D. M. Robinson, President of the New Zealand Anti-Fluoridation Association (and present Mayor of Auckland) in April 1959.¹ An exaggeration if it refers to the national scene, Mr Robinson's statement clearly contains a good deal of truth if it is taken as referring to politics at the local level. Ever since the Commission of Inquiry on the Fluoridation of Water Supplies reported in July 1957 that the addition of fluoride to the water supplies is beneficial to dental health, and has no harmful consequences,² the issue has been one of considerable importance in the local politics of some parts of New Zealand.³ In spite of the fact that an impressive list of authorities advocated fluoridation, that the Department of Health and the Ministers of Health in both the National and the succeeding Labour government urged it and it had the authoritative sanction of the Commission's Report, referenda in eight places in November 1959 all resulted in heavy majorities against its introduction. It is the purpose of this article to examine the events leading up to this decisive rejection of medical and scientific opinion in one place, Dunedin, as a case history of the operations of pressure groups and their influence on local bodies and on public opinion. This is combined with an attempt to discover the factors influencing the voters as an illustration of the way in which public opinion functions on a scientific and medical question of a type that may well be increasingly important in politics in the future.⁴

With the publication of the Commission's Report the question of fluoridation was passed on to the local authorities since the Commission recommended that they should take the decision on implementing it. Dunedin became, as D. M. Robinson put it, 'the

1 *Otago Daily Times* (henceforth cited as *O.D.T.*), 24 April 1959.

2 *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies*, Wellington, 1957, p. 153.

3 *O.D.T.*, 10 March 1959. 'This is the most controversial question in the city at the present time.'

4 I am indebted to Dr Muriel Bell and Dr George Davies, for help and information.

fluoridation hot spot of New Zealand', for there the controversy became more bitter than in most towns.⁵ Locally fluoridation was supported by the Otago Branch of the B.M.A., the local Dental Association, the Junior Chamber, the Plunket Society, and the large Dental and Medical Schools of the University.⁶ In contrast with this impressive array the groups opposed to fluoridation appeared to be small and weak. One of them was the Christian Campaign for Freedom, an organisation with extreme right wing tendencies which published in its monthly periodical *Wetherbys* frequent warnings against 'Mass Medication', and 'Communism via the Water Tap'.⁷ Another was the local branch of the Organic Compost Society which resolved that fluoridation was dangerous and that in any case the dental decay which it was designed to combat 'has its origin in faulty nutrition caused and coupled with incorrect husbandry'.⁸ Other smaller bodies ranging down to the Tropical and Cold Water Fish Club opposed fluoridation, but the main leadership for the opposition came from the Dunedin Anti-Fluoridation Society, through its energetic secretary, Miss R. S. Andrew. Formed in February 1957, the Society had only seventy-three members at the end of its first month, but towards the end of the year when the Auckland Anti-Fluoridation Society was formed it began to receive support and encouragement from that body, and, early in 1958, from the New Zealand Anti-Fluoridation Association.⁹

5 Auckland Anti-Fluoridation Society. President's Annual Report, 1959, p. 2.

6 Mr Robinson alleged of the schools that: 'Both . . . are heavily subsidized by the Department of Health, and therefore carry out the Department's policy.' *Ibid.*, p. 2.

7 The Campaign has no definite membership. I am informed by its local organiser that its main object is to 'combat Zionism', and that fluoridation was attacked mainly because of the infringement of liberty involved. The Campaign will shortly attack 'the Mental Health Racket'. Regular subscribers to *Wetherbys* number approximately fifty, but one thousand copies of each issue are printed, most of them being distributed free. (Interview: Mr J. Simon, Mr A. A. Lind.) The tone of the periodical is indicated by the titles of some of the articles, e.g. 'World Revolution Furthered by United Nations' (July 1959), and by the contents of others, e.g. 'When we look over the current scene we see clearly the workings of the diabolic mind. Integration of races, fluoridation of water, confiscatory taxation, "foreign aid", the U.N.O., labour tyranny, forced unionism . . .' (January 1959).

8 *O.D.T.*, 12 December 1956.

9 The exact relation between the Auckland Society, the National Association, and the local Societies is not clear. The Association's subscription of five shillings entitles members to be put in touch with the nearest 'branch'. The Auckland Society and the National Association have the same president (D. M. Robinson), secretary (Mrs D. E. Eccles), and box number. My letters of inquiry to both have been acknowledged but not answered.

Puny though these opposition bodies appeared to be in the earlier stages of the controversy, they were vociferous, and they had one great advantage over the supporters of fluoridation. The measure had to be implemented by the local authority, a body dependent on public opinion, so that the supporters had to handle the situation very delicately. It was the policy of the Health Department to persuade local authorities of the benefits of fluoridation in the hope that they would take the decision to introduce it on behalf of their electors. At the same time a public health education campaign was to be organised, working primarily through small community groups and organisations to inform the public of the advantages of fluoridation of the water. However, fluoridation was a new process in New Zealand, and both American experience and events at Hastings clearly showed the ease with which public fear and emotion could be stirred up by opponents prepared to stress indiscriminately the dangers of poison.¹⁰ Once this had happened not only would the local authority not dare to implement fluoridation, but it would become extremely difficult to remove the misconceptions which had been spread abroad. Hence, while the two processes of conversion and education were going on, supporters of fluoridation wanted to prevent it becoming a public issue which would bring opponents into the field. Speakers at a Fluoridation Symposium held in Wellington by the Department of Health in May 1958, therefore stressed that 'we must avoid fuss in the community. We must work quietly', 'we have to avoid if possible public meetings and debates', 'We must avoid fluoridation becoming a public issue, but once it does get into the Press it must be dealt with and the opposition countered before it gathers too much momentum.'¹¹ This cautious approach was one which allowed the opponents of fluoridation to take the initiative. They were able to force the issue before the public, to raise their own points, and to sow doubts in the public mind, while the Health Department and

10 For American experience see D. R. McNeil, *The Fight for Fluoridation* (New York, 1957). For events at Hastings when fluoridation was introduced see D. Taylor, 'Fluoridation comes to Hastings', *New Zealand Medical Journal*, Vol. LIV, 1955.

11 Fluoridation Symposium. Conference of Medical Officers of Health and Principal Dental Officers, held in Wellington on 1 May 1958. This document is marked: 'For Departmental Use Only'. However, damaging extracts taken out of context and designed to show that the Health Department was trying to force fluoridation on the public, were secured by Mr W. A. C. Penlington of the Hastings Anti-Fluoridation Society, and released by him to the press, together with his own comments. See *Hawke's Bay Herald Tribune*, 8 January 1959, and *O.D.T.*, 15 January 1959. The editor of the *O.D.T.* subsequently used quotations in editorials.

supporters of the measure were placed in the position of appearing to be forcing something on the public by underhand methods.

Initially, however, the cautious approach was successful. Fluoridation did not at first, become a public issue, and interest centred on the City Council, and the attempts to persuade that body to introduce it. Early in 1958 the Junior Chamber and members of the Faculty of the Dental School requested the Council to fluoridate the water supply, while the Otago Branch of the Dental Association pledged its support. The Water Committee of the Council at first resolved that 'there does not appear to be sufficient public demand for fluoridation to warrant any action on the Council's part', but when this resolution came before the full Council, it was referred back on the motion of the Mayor, Sir Leonard Wright, who pronounced strongly in favour of fluoridation.¹² The Water Committee, therefore, decided to invite written submissions, and to hear deputations on both sides of the question.

In order to persuade the Council not to agree to fluoridation the Anti-Fluoridation Society promptly organised a petition against it, which was taken round by members and obtained 2,236 signatures. Over half of these were secured in a concentrated door-to-door canvass in certain parts of the town, and the canvassers claimed that in these areas 88.8% of the people approached were opposed to fluoridation, and only 5.8% in favour of it, figures which were received with some scepticism.¹³ The Society also placed advertisements in the newspapers inviting all those who objected to being compelled to take 'an UNCONTROLLED dosage of a substance which many experts declare to be a dangerous CUMULATIVE POISON', to make their objections known in writing to the Council.¹⁴

The result was that the Council received 291 letters against fluoridation, the shortest one coming from the Christian Campaign for Freedom, and claiming simply that: 'To compel one to drink fluoridated water is a sin against the Holy Ghost.'¹⁵ Only seventy-seven letters were received in favour of fluoridation, though a larger

12 Dunedin City Council, Water, f/1 976/1958.

13 R. S. Andrew to the Mayor and Councillors, 26 May 1958. The writer of a letter to the *O.D.T.* claimed that when he refused to sign the petition he was 'treated to a ten minute harangue . . . and was eventually accused of being one of those prepared to poison elderly ladies and small children' (2 March 1959).

14 *O.D.T.*, 8 February 1958.

15 A. A. Lind to the Mayor and Councillors. Undated. I am indebted to the Town Clerk, Mr J. C. Lucas, for permission to go through the submissions.

proportion of these came from organisations such as school committees. Supporters of fluoridation had in fact concentrated their efforts on preparing submissions and expert deputations to the Committee. Consequently when the Water Committee, to which all the other Councillors had been invited for the occasion, met to hear the representations on 26 May 1958, it received sixteen submissions in favour of fluoridation, and twelve against, and heard ten deputations, mostly medical and dental authorities, argue in its favour, and only two against it. After having considered at length the evidence put forward, the Committee reported back to the Council in October 1958 that fluoridation should be approved in principle. This was agreed to. The approval was only limited, for the Chairman of the Water Committee, Cr M. Connelly, had been asked by that body to add the proviso that before being implemented the matter should be brought before the Council again so as to allow the public further time to consider it.¹⁶ However, the preliminary decision had been taken, and no opposition had been voiced. In fact the only discussion was provoked by Cr M. W. D. Anderson who claimed that progress should be more rapid.¹⁷

Yet, though the battle for fluoridation appeared to have been partly won, the gain was offset by other factors. In the first place, fluoridation was becoming a public issue. True to their policy the supporters of fluoridation had launched a health education campaign on the issue. The New Zealand Dental Association prepared a handbill listing the advantages of fluoridation and the organisations and authorities who had endorsed it, and this was distributed to every householder through the post.¹⁸ In addition, in the course of 1958, specialists from the Dental and Medical Schools addressed over twenty organisations and groups, including kindergarten mothers clubs, parent teacher associations, and professional bodies. The opponents of fluoridation were, however, less cautious and had set out to stimulate public interest in the question. As early as 1957, one thousand

16 *Evening Star* (henceforth referred to as *Star*), 21 October 1958. Hon. M. Connelly: Chairman of the Water Committee; former miner, railwayman, trade unionist, and member of the Legislative Council; President, Dunedin Savings Bank, and Association of Savings Banks; elected to City Council 1950; Senior Labour Party Councillor until his retirement in November 1959.

17 *O.D.T.*, 21 October 1958. M. W. D. Anderson, age 37: rural valuer, stock and station firm; elected to the Council 1956; chairman of the Reserves Committee.

18 *O.D.T.*, 24 February 1958. Distribution costs were paid by the Health Department.

pamphlets had been distributed to householders in South Dunedin warning that: 'Fluoridation is Mass Murder by Slow Poisoning', and claiming that the label on every bag of fluoride read: 'DEADLY POISON, MAY BE FATAL IF INHALED OR SWALLOWED'.¹⁹ In 1958 the Anti-Fluoridation Society organised most of the agitation, beginning in March with the distribution to householders of 30,000 copies of a pamphlet, 'Fluoridation is Compulsory Mass Medication'.²⁰ The main argument put forward by this pamphlet was that fluoridation was an infringement of liberty in that everyone would be compelled to undergo 'medication' by drinking it, but the pamphlet also warned of the danger of poison:

There is ample evidence that fluoridation of public water supplies at 1 p.p.m. [the proposed level in Dunedin] causes chronic fluoride poisoning. This affects kidneys, bones, nerves, teeth and other parts of the body.

To complete the picture the pamphlet added: 'a few cases of deaths suspected to have resulted from fluoridation have been reported'. At the same time letters and literature giving the case against fluoridation were sent to the Councillors, and to organisations in the city, statements were released to the newspapers,²¹ and in April and May two public meetings were held, and addressed by D. M. Robinson of Auckland.²² In each case the audience consisted of about 150 people, and vocal opposition came from groups of medical and dental students in the hall. Mr Robinson went out of his way to provoke this section of the audience, and the resulting uproar gained wide publicity for the meetings.²³ All these efforts helped to bring the question

19 Interview: A. A. Lind.

20 This was a slightly altered reprint of a pamphlet issued by the Auckland Society. At the prices charged by that body for supplies, 30,000 would have cost over £130. As it was reprinted locally, the cost was probably slightly smaller.

21 *O.D.T.* and *Star*, 7 February 1958.

22 D. M. Robinson: Elected Mayor of Auckland, November 1959; retiring managing director 'Childswear' Ltd., and seven years Dominion President of the Organic Compost Society. Nationally Mr Robinson was the most active opponent of fluoridation.

23 *O.D.T.*, 10 April 1958. Mr Robinson early on attacked the students, calling them 'arrogant and ignorant'. An example of some of the resulting exchanges is provided by the following:

D. M. Robinson: "The most ignorant people at a meeting are usually the most vociferous."

Student: "Who's been doing most of the talking tonight." Stamping of feet."

before the public and to put it into the newspapers, and the growing interest in it was reflected in the correspondence columns of these papers, where over 270 letters on fluoridation appeared in the course of the year. This was a great increase over the numbers for the previous year, and, so far as public opinion could be measured from the letters, it appeared to be against fluoridation since 172 letters opposed it, and 102 supported it.

More important at this stage than the developing agitation was a change on the City Council. In August 1958, Mr J. A. Stead, Secretary to the Labour Representation Committee, was elected unopposed to the Council on the death of another Labour Councillor. Cr Stead was opposed to fluoridation on 'moral and scientific grounds', and believed strongly that the people should be consulted on it. In December, therefore, he gave notice of a motion requesting a referendum before fluoridation was implemented. This was the first active opposition on the Council but it crystallised opposition which was already there, and when the motion was discussed on 2 February 1959 it was supported by the four other Labour Councillors. Because of this one-party support, Cr Stead had to deny imputations that the Labour Party had used 'the big stick' on its members. In fact, the Labour Representation Committee had made no ruling on the issue, and Cr Stead's initiative was an individual one, but it did bring out scruples which some Labour Councillors had felt on fluoridation. One member of the group, Cr Calvert, was opposed to compulsory fluoridation, another, Cr Connelly, thought that the people should be allowed to decide the question. Cr Abernethy, though very much in favour of fluoridation, took a similar view, while Mrs McMillan, the fifth member of the group, announced that, in view of the amount of division and controversy 'she should sink her own feelings and leave it to the people to decide'.²⁴ Thus the five Labour Councillors arrayed themselves in favour of a referendum. They were opposed, however, by the seven Citizens' Association Councillors, and by the Mayor, and Cr Stead's motion was defeated. The opponents of the motion stressed that the public was neither qualified, nor well enough informed to judge such a technical question :

²⁴ *O.D.T.*, 3 February 1959. J. A. Stead: First elected to the Council 1951; died 1959. R. J. Calvert: Age 50; dental laboratory proprietor; elected to Council April 1958. A. S. Abernethy: age 39; printer; first elected to the Council 1950; Chairman of the Works Committee, and Chairman of the Dunedin Metropolitan Milk Board. Ethel McMillan: M.P. since 1953; first elected to the Council 1950; Chairman of the Public Health Committee.

If decisions of this type were to be left to the layman, we would still be suffering from many of the notifiable diseases claimed Cr M. W. D. Anderson.²⁵

The decision not to have a referendum provoked a flood of comment, most of it unfavourable, in the correspondence columns of the two newspapers. From 3 February to 21 February, fifty-two letters were printed, only a quarter of them in favour of fluoridation and the Council's decision. Such protests, and the protests made to him personally were influential in causing Cr M. W. D. Anderson, hitherto a leading supporter of fluoridation, and a strong opponent of a referendum, to change his mind about the latter. On 23 February, announcing that 'that largest body of citizens is opposed to the introduction of fluoridation, or at least feels that a referendum should be held', Cr Anderson asked the Council to have another look at the matter, and later submitted a motion to reconsider the previous decision on a referendum.²⁶

This change of attitude was the end of all hopes that the Council would introduce fluoridation on its own authority. That body was now evenly divided on the question of a referendum, and, though the Mayor's casting vote was known to be against any referendum, it was unlikely that fluoridation would be imposed by such a narrow majority. In the absence of any clear majority on the Council, therefore, public opinion took on a decisive importance, and as a means of demonstrating what that opinion was the *Otago Daily Times* hired an Auckland firm to conduct a public opinion survey in the city. Three men interviewed something over 400 people drawn, the managing director of the firm claimed, from all sections of the population. The main conclusion to emerge was that there existed a clear majority in favour of a referendum since 67% of those inter-

25 *O.D.T.*, 3 February 1959.

26 *O.D.T.*, 24 February, 3 March 1959.

27 *O.D.T.*, 16 March 1959. Since nothing is known of the methods used in this poll, nothing can be said of its reliability, though it should be noted that the proportions for and against fluoridation in the poll bear little relation to those shown by the referendum later in the year. The editor of the *O.D.T.* was not informed of the methods used and my own letters to the firm conducting the survey were not answered. People interviewed were, on at least one occasion, interviewed in a group of three, and their opinions were taken down collectively, after discussion. Questions on three other topics (one political) were asked at the same time. Presentation of results was entirely in percentages, and no figures were given.

viewed favoured it, 31% did not. This did not, however, indicate the proportions for and against fluoridation, since 52% thought that this should be postponed, 44% that it should not.²⁷

The *Otago Daily Times* published the results of the poll, begun a week before, on the morning of the crucial Council debate at which Cr Anderson's motion was to be discussed. The demonstration afforded by the poll of the state of public opinion had a considerable effect on the discussion. The poll was mentioned several times in the course of the evening, and Cr Sidey, the Deputy Mayor, stressed that the Council had 'no intention of introducing fluoridation unless they felt a reasonable majority wanted it', a statement greeted by several cries of 'quite right!'²⁸ When an amendment was proposed to Cr Anderson's motion, that a referendum should be held at the next local body elections if requested by a petition signed by 10% of the electors and that no steps should be taken on fluoridation in the meantime, the original motion was withdrawn, and the amendment carried by nine votes to three, with one member absent. Four other Citizens' Association Councillors had thus followed Cr Anderson by changing their minds, a factor which can only be put down to the influence of public opinion.

The Council's compromise decision satisfied no one. Both the *Otago Daily Times* and the *Evening Star* criticised it severely, and leading supporters and opponents had earlier on attacked the idea of a referendum.²⁹ Both were now compelled, however, to work for it to secure a definite decision on the question, and the opponents took the initiative, for Miss Andrew, secretary to the Anti-Fluoridation Society, promptly announced that her society would 'get on with the job of obtaining the ten per cent needed to demand a referendum'.³⁰ The Society actually delayed for two months before taking action, but in May work began with more than seventy volunteer helpers. These canvassers evidently combined their collection of signatures with efforts at persuasion, since Miss Andrew stated:

Our canvassers have found that some people are confused and think that when they have a vote in November they will be asked to give an opinion on something about which they have no expert knowledge,

28 *O.D.T.*, 17 March 1959. Mrs McMillan was absent from this meeting.

29 *O.D.T.* and *Star*, 17 March 1959. See also *Star*, 23 December 1958.

30 *O.D.T.*, 17 March 1959.

which, supporters of fluoridation would have said was perfectly correct; however, Miss Andrew added:

They are relieved when it is explained to them that they are not concerned with the technicalities of fluoridation or whether it is good for children's teeth or not. They are concerned only with the results they want. Those who vote for fluoridation will be determining that everyone will be compelled to drink fluoridated water for the rest of their lives. Those who vote against fluoridation will be retaining everyone's freedom to decide for themselves whether they will take sodium fluoride.³¹

Thus, this canvass, like the previous one, was a means of influencing public opinion as well as a means of collecting signatures. In the latter respect at least it was extremely successful, for 6,610 signatures were secured, 2,000 more than were required. Early in September the petition was presented to the Council, and arrangements went ahead for a referendum.³² The decision had now passed definitely out of the hands of the Council, and into those of the public. From early September to the date of the referendum in November both sides had to place their case before public opinion.

The Anti-Fluoridation Society had hitherto taken the lead in this respect, and it continued to be active. Just before the poll a further leaflet was distributed by hand to a large proportion of the householders. This, too, placed the main stress on the argument that fluoridation infringed liberty, in fact it was entitled 'Freedom or Compulsion', but again the argument that there was a danger of poison was used, and the leaflet announced that fluoride 'is a dangerous CUMULATIVE poison, and is used in many insecticides and vermin poisons'. In addition, two days before the poll a large advertisement, again entitled 'Freedom or Compulsion', and measuring seventy column inches, was placed in each of the local papers.³³

There is a certain amount of mystery about the Dunedin Anti-Fluoridation Society. Its executive of six, which includes three housewives, contains no one of any great importance locally. Its secretary, Rhoda S. Andrew, a spinster housekeeping for her mother, who had gained her political experience as a Social Credit worker, was unknown before the controversy. Its membership figures, though

³¹ *O.D.T.*, 10 June, 1959.

³² *O.D.T.*, 8 September 1959.

³³ *O.D.T.* and *Star*, 20 November 1959. The cost of advertising on inside pages of the *O.D.T.* is twelve shillings per inch.

probably small, are also unknown, as are its financial resources. Yet there is no doubt that it waged what was, for its purposes, a masterly campaign. In its propaganda, the Society placed its main emphasis on freedom, on the right of the individual to reject compulsory medication. In addition to this, however, the Society had two most profitable lines of attack which it used to great effect. It set out to convince the public that fluoridation could be dangerous and succeeded in implanting a 'poison image' in the public mind. It also convinced large sections of the public that there was strong opposition to fluoridation among doctors and scientists. The Society was able to do this because Miss Andrew was in touch with opponents of fluoridation and centres of opposition in other parts of the world, and especially in the United States.³⁴ Hence the Society was able to claim that:

Our files are full of protests against fluoridation by eminent doctors, dentists and scientists all over the world.³⁵

The voluminous information secured in this way was widely used in the campaign to arouse new fears among the public, and to contradict supporters of fluoridation, and the Society was able to claim with some truth that 'for every authority they quote for fluoridation we can quote one against it'.³⁶ The result was that the public, unable to discriminate between the welter of opinions offered, accepted the view that there was serious division among scientists.

The Society concentrated on these three main arguments, and wisely avoided less profitable side issues. In particular it avoided the claim, vociferously used in the United States, that fluoridation was associated with Communism. The claim was in fact raised on a small scale in Dunedin. The Christian Campaign for Freedom, in a postscript to its letter to the Council, claimed that 'the idea of Water Fluoridation was brought to England from Russia by the Russian Communist Kreminof',³⁷ and pamphlets originating with the Campaign's representative in Christchurch claimed that fluoridation 'is Mass Murder by Slow Poisoning, is a Crime Against All Civilisation . . . is a pure Hoax and Swindle, is a Communistic Plot to Destroy

34 These centres are listed in an American pamphlet *75 Reasons*, distributed on a very small scale in Dunedin. Some opponents also subscribed to *National Fluoridation News*, published bi-monthly in Detroit.

35 *Star*, 16 November 1959. All information about the Anti-Fluoridation Society is taken from the small amount revealed in the newspapers, since the secretary and committee refused to give any help to the author.

36 *Star*, 13 November 1959.

37 A. A. Lind to the Mayor and Councillors, op. cit.

Christianity'.³⁸ Other pamphlets from Lower Hutt distributed on a very small scale in Dunedin reprinted an ex-Communist's testimony and showed how the party wanted fluoridation because :

It would keep the general public docile during a steady encroachment of Communism . . . keeping a store of deadly fluoride near the water reservoir would be advantageous during the time of the revolution as it would give us the opportunity to dump this poison into the water supply.³⁹

However, this attack on fluoridation as an aspect of the approach of Communism, though it evidently played some part in the thinking of leading members of the Anti-Fluoridation Society, was not pressed by that body.⁴⁰ In fact, at one of his meetings, Mr D. M. Robinson specifically disassociated himself from such claims.⁴¹ What had been profitable in America during the McCarthy era was likely to prove merely puzzling in contemporary New Zealand.

Faced with this skilful campaign, supporters of fluoridation had a difficult task before them. They had not wanted the question to become a public issue in the first place, and the bodies supporting it were not such as could carry out a large-scale public campaign. In fact, the only lay body among their number, the Junior Chamber, had fallen into the background during the last stages of the campaign. What was needed was a body wholly devoted to pressing fluoridation in the same way as the Anti-Fluoridation Society was to opposing it. Soon after the referendum was announced, therefore, the Otago Children's Dental Health Association was formed, with the active encouragement of the Dean of the Dental School, and the President of the local Dental Association. The new body consisted of laymen, many of them members of the Junior Chamber, and of Rotary, and from its foundation it was independent of the Dental and Medical Schools and of the Health Department, though its impressive list of patrons included people connected with those institutions and it utilised the services of an advisory panel from the Schools. Time did not allow a special drive for members as the Association had to

38 *Think of the Plight of the Poor Hastings Children who have been Condemned to a Living Death.*

39 *Fluoridation: Ex Communist's Testimony.*

40 Miss Andrew claimed before the Commission that fluoridation was part of a 'collective trend', and that 'some individuals and groups of people who believe in the Communist ideology deliberately propagandise this trend'. Fluoridation Commission, Dunedin Evidence, 7 E 2.

41 *O.D.T.*, 10 April 1958.

concentrate on its main task, but the final membership stood at just over 250, and a considerable subscription was raised from the members and from local businesses.⁴²

The first step taken by the Association was to distribute through the post to all householders, two small leaflets prepared and provided by the Health Department, outlining the successful results of fluoridation at Hastings. The Association also prepared and distributed a further pamphlet of its own to put the case for fluoridation,⁴³ and from 22 October up to the poll sponsored a regular series of small advertisements, each about eleven column inches, in the two newspapers. The total space taken by these advertisements was slightly less than the one large advertisement sponsored by the other side, but, being smaller, it may well be that they did not attract as much attention. However, the Association made up for this by also advertising on local cinema screens. All these advertisements stressed the advantages of fluoridation and its complete safety, and advised people who were undecided to consult their doctor, dentist or chemist. A panel of speakers was also arranged and offered to interested organisations, an offer which was taken up by twenty-five bodies, so that about 2,000 people were reached in kindergarten mothers' clubs and parent teacher associations. A sub-committee was set up to reply to misleading statements, and letters to the press, using the advisory panel where expert advice was needed.⁴⁴ Sub-committees for correspondence, finance and publicity were meeting nearly every day as the campaign reached its final stages, and in the short period of its existence the Association was probably influential in rallying support for fluoridation. Yet it had been formed too late to be completely effective. The Anti-Fluoridation Society had been in action since 1957 and had, through its pamphlets, advertising, letter writing and canvassing, succeeded in

42 I am indebted to Mr F. P. Evans, Vice-President of the O.C.D.H.A., for his help. Mr Evans has provided me with complete information on the income and expenditure of the Association, but because of the refusal of the Anti-Fluoridation Society to provide similar information I have not revealed this.

43 The pamphlet contained a quotation from the Dean of Dunedin designed to give Christian guidance on fluoridation. This had earlier been attacked in *Wetherbys* as 'a resumé of Judaeo-Masonic-Communitistic policy' (July 1959).

44 This method had its pitfalls. When the *O.D.T.* carried a statement by Dr Sutton of Melbourne critical of methods used in fluoridation experiments, the committee asked Dr G. N. Davies of the Dental School to draw up a reply. In this Davies, an expert in the field, criticised Sutton's statements as 'irresponsible'. Since the reply was published by a lay body, the editor of the *O.D.T.* was able to criticise the 'effrontery' of 'an association of laymen', in criticising scientists (*O.D.T.*, 9 November 1959).

spreading abroad a large number of fears and misconceptions which it was difficult to combat in the limited space available. Hence, for the expenditure of what was probably a slightly smaller sum of money, though over a longer period, the Anti-Fluoridation Society had secured a greater return.

While both sides were attempting to prepare public opinion for the referendum, the press was exerting its influence and had been doing so for some time, for both local papers had taken up their stand with the publication of the Commission Report in July 1957. The evening paper, the *Evening Star*, circulation 27,000, had come out immediately in favour of fluoridation, and from July 1957 to the referendum defended it vigorously in 180 column inches of editorials. The morning paper, the *Otago Daily Times*, circulation 37,000, had from the first stressed the 'right of the individual to accept or reject such treatment as he sees fit'.⁴⁵ The *Times* admitted that 'In scientific terms the fluoridation issue is virtually beyond analysis by laymen', but at the same time it advocated 'letting the people decide this contentious issue in the democratic way', and it continued to demand a referendum in 170 column inches of editorial matter.⁴⁶

The clearly set editorial policy tended to a certain extent to be reflected in the news content of the two papers. Thus the *Star* pressed the Anti-Fluoridation Society until it revealed a limited amount of information about itself, while the *Times* in reporting the foundation of the Dental Health Association emphasised the fact that its pamphlets had been paid for by the Health Department.⁴⁷ Both papers, while giving coverage to news on both sides of the case, tended to give rather more news favouring their viewpoint, and to allocate space according to viewpoint. For example, a statement by the Anti-Fluoridation Society on their canvass of 1958 received thirty column inches in the *Times*, eight in the *Star*.⁴⁸ From the beginning of 1959 up to the referendum the *Star* included nearly eighty inches of news items favourable to fluoridation which were not in the *Times*, while the *Times* made rather more use of this tactic, since it included

45 *O.D.T.*, 22 July 1957.

46 *O.D.T.*, 3 February 1959.

47 *Star*, 17 March 1959. 'What's Behind the "Anti" Society Mask?' This led to the publication of some information by the Society, *Star*, 23 March 1959. See *O.D.T.*, 10 October 1959, for the formation of the Dental Health Association.

48 *O.D.T.* and *Star*, 26 February 1959.

in the same period some 200 inches of items opposed to fluoridation which were not in the *Star*. Most of these went to reinforce the view that there was considerable division among scientists.⁴⁹

Besides the news and editorial content of the papers, their correspondence columns played an interesting role in forming public opinion, and possibly in reflecting it, since the proportions of letters on each side of the case printed in the columns bears a very close relationship to the proportions received by the two editors. Over the whole period from July 1957 to the referendum, the *Times* published more letters than the *Star*, nearly 500 as opposed to about 200, but the proportions of letters for and against were roughly the same in both papers, the ratio being approximately three for, to five against, over the whole period. Some of this preponderance of letters against fluoridation is, however, due to the fact that a few people on the anti-fluoridation side tended to send in a comparatively large number of letters. Thus, Mr A. A. Lind sent in thirty, Miss Andrew slightly fewer, and 'British Freedom' slightly fewer again with twenty-two letters. No one on the other side had such a prolific performance, and the result was that many assertions against fluoride were not rebutted. Only in the last month or so was there any consistent attempt to defeat opposition arguments.

An illustration of the arguments used is provided by an analysis of the correspondence columns from 1 October up to the poll, a period in which just over 110 letters against fluoridation appeared, and just over ninety for. The letters against fluoridation illustrated the diversity of motives for opposing it. The expense involved was criticised by 7%, and a similar proportion claimed that fluoridation at Hastings had been a failure and that the most dire effects followed the drinking of Hastings's water.⁵⁰ 15% claimed that fluoridation would be unnecessary, if people would eat 'wholesome' food, would stop children eating sweets, or drinking 'fizzy' drinks, would go in for composting, or adopt other pet nostrums, while 21% attacked fluoridation as an infringement of liberty, and another step towards the all-powerful state. One thing nearly all the diverse threads of the opposition could agree on was that fluoridation was dangerous, hence 36% of the letters put this forward as their main argument, 'cumulative

⁴⁹ The *Times* also included sixty inches favourable to fluoridation, not in the *Star*.

⁵⁰ One correspondent claimed that he had developed adenoids and a hare lip after visiting Hastings (*O.D.T.*, 19 November 1959). This is presumably a joke, but it is not usually safe to assume that arguments of a similarly fantastic nature are intended to be humorous. For facts on the Hastings experiment see *New Zealand Dental Journal*, Vol. 55, October 1959, pp. 176 179.

poison' being the danger most commonly invoked. This proportion would possibly have been higher had it not been for the fact that the editor of the *Times* had privately warned the Anti-Fluoridation Society not to over-exaggerate the danger of poisoning, and was refusing to print 'further statements that fluoridation would kill the populace outright'.⁵¹ On the other side, 17% stressed that the weight of scientific and medical opinion was for fluoridation and should be heeded, 23% that it was safe, and 35% outlined the benefits to be secured from it, especially by children. An illustration of the way in which supporters of fluoridation had been forced on to the defensive in the controversy is provided by the fact that 40% of the letters for fluoridation were attempts to rebut arguments put forward by the opposition, and only 22% of the letters against were of this type.

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THE REFERENDUM on fluoridation was voted on at the local body elections on 21 November 1959. In the last few weeks before the poll there appeared to be more interest in fluoridation than in the elections, and a cartoon by Scales, the regular cartoonist, in the *Times* showed the two mayoral candidates, their voices drowned by the din of the fluoridation tap. The correspondence columns were dominated by the issue, and both papers devoted large amounts of space to it, printing views from both sides just before the poll, so as to put the case before the electors. At the elections just under half of the people entitled to vote actually did so, but the interest in fluoridation is shown by the fact that there were eight more votes on the referendum than on the mayoral election.⁵² Fluoridation was rejected; 14,247 voting against it, 8,312 for it, a majority so decisive that it was not considered necessary to count the special votes. When analysed the results indicate that there was a connection between Labour voting and voting against fluoridation, since in all but two of the sixteen polling stations where fluoridation was rejected by a majority of two or more to one, the Labour candidate for the mayoralty was placed in a majority. Of the eleven places where fluoridation was rejected by a majority of 1.5 or less to one, the successful Citizens' Association candidate was placed in the first place in the mayoral contest in all but two.

51 *O.D.T.*, 25 February 1959.

52 23,000 voted, 47,000 were entitled to do so. Over 500 votes on fluoridation were informal, though the ballot paper was a simple one. It was announced beforehand that the result of the referendum was not binding on the Council, but in view of the fact that most Councillors had been at pains to express their deference to public opinion it was unlikely that they would take any further action against the public decision.

TO SECURE SOME KNOWLEDGE of the factors influencing the public, a postal opinion survey combined with a small-scale interview survey was used.⁵³ The tendency for people in lower socio-economic and educational groups not to reply to postal surveys is well known, and to counteract the effects of this, the people in the sample (which was selected at regular intervals from the electoral register), who lived in the most markedly working and lower middle class districts, were

QUESTION	ANSWER	FOR	AGAINST	UNDECIDED
'Will fluoridation make any difference to the taste of the water?'	<i>Yes</i>	5	34	23
	<i>No</i>	62	17	17
	<i>Don't</i>	33	49	60
	<i>Know</i>			
'Do you think there is any danger in fluoridation?'	<i>Yes</i>	3	60	21
	<i>No</i>	87	12	25
	<i>Don't</i>	10	28	54
	<i>Know</i>			
'Do you think fluoridation at Hastings has been a success?'	<i>Yes</i>	66	6	19
	<i>No</i>	1	25	5
	<i>Don't</i>	33	69	76
	<i>Know</i>			
'Do you think fluoridation of the water supplies will stop, or reduce tooth decay in children, or have no effect?'	<i>Stop</i>	11	4	2
	<i>Reduce</i>	88	40	73
	<i>No</i>	1	56	25
	<i>Effect</i>			
'Do you think the weight of scientific and medical opinion is for fluoridation, against it, or divided?'	<i>For</i>	85	20	34
	<i>Against</i>	1	11	0
	<i>Divided</i>	14	69	66
'Would you allow your decision on fluoridation to be influenced by the advice of your doctor, dentist, or chemist?'	<i>Yes</i>	53	17	37
	<i>No</i>	35	62	24
	<i>Don't</i>	12	21	39
	<i>Know</i>			
'Do you object to the expense of fluoridation?'	<i>Yes</i>	4	58	16
	<i>No</i>	88	30	47
	<i>Don't</i>	8	12	37
	<i>Know</i>			
'Do you think fluoridation of water supplies is an infringement of liberty?'	<i>Yes</i>	10	85	59
	<i>No</i>	90	15	41
'Do you think fluoridation is being forced on the people by the health authorities?'	<i>Yes</i>	16	89	41
	<i>No</i>	84	11	59

The responses of the three groups—for, against, and undecided—are separated in the three columns, into percentages of their group.

⁵³ I am indebted to Misses Rosalie Sutherland, Loris Sparks and Judith Chapman for their help in sending out, and taking round, the questionnaire.

interviewed personally instead of being written to.⁵⁴ Both sections of the survey showed, with only one exception, exactly the same trends, and though circumstances did not allow a full-scale opinion survey, this method does give a satisfactory idea of the nature of public opinion on the fluoridation issue.

The table indicates clearly the attitudes of the people in the three categories of for and against fluoridation, and undecided, into which the replies fall, and the success secured by both sides in putting their views over to the public. It also indicates that opponents of fluoridation had been more successful in this, though clearly they would be aided by initial public suspicion of a new development, and by the fact that their viewpoint was more straightforward and easier to convey to the public than that of supporters of fluoridation with its scientific qualifications and reservations. It is worth noting that the supporters of fluoridation in the sample were more reserved than the opponents in their acceptance of claims and arguments. Thus only 11% believed that fluoridation would actually stop, as opposed to reducing, tooth decay in children, and in answer to another question only 7% believed that fluoridation would make it unnecessary to stop children eating too many sweets, 75% that it would not. Of those on the other side, however, 25% believed that fluoridation at Hastings had been a failure, and 56% that it would in any case, have no effect at all, while on another question 74% believed that lack of care and eating too many sweets were the real causes of tooth decay in children, and that if these were prevented there would be no need for fluoridation. Only 10% did not believe this, some as a result of experience with their own children.

54 For the problem of non-response see W. J. Goode and P. K. Hatt, *Methods in Social Research* (New Yorks, 1952), p. 173. The tendency there described is clearly shown in this sample. 760 people received questionnaires by post, 310 (40%) replied of which 290 (38% of the whole) were used. From the occupations given in the register the men were classified into groups. Of professional people 82% replied, clerical 68%, management, business and own business, 53%, retired 38%, workmen 33%. These classifications are of course only approximate, being based on the brief descriptions in the register and in the replies themselves. Also the percentages are approximate since no occupation is given for a few people in the register so that their replies could have been added into any category, since anonymity was preserved. Of the 153 people falling into the interview section 113 were interviewed successfully. 60% were women, 25% workmen, 8% retired. In the whole sample of 403, professional, clerical and business groups, and people in the age group 35-49 are over-represented, workmen, women, and people over 50 are under-represented as compared with the census returns.

In assessing the factors influencing opponents it is clear that the argument that fluoridation is an infringement of liberty gained the widest acceptance in this sample (85%), closely followed by the argument that it would be unnecessary if proper care were taken of children's teeth (74%), and by fear of danger (60%), while the expense of the measure was objected to by 58%.⁵⁵ When opponents of fluoridation were asked on which argument against it they laid the most stress, the infringement of liberty, the danger, or the expense, the two sections of the survey showed their only divergence. In the postal section 43% said liberty, 30% danger, while in the interview section 37% said danger and 27% liberty. It may well be then that, in the population as a whole, fear of danger played almost as great a part as fear of an infringement of liberty in leading to the defeat of fluoridation. It is also possible that, had no danger been feared, less emphasis would have been laid on the infringement of liberty, since people may have been less anxious to defend their rights had they been convinced that no danger would result from the loss of them.

The sample indicates that the supporters of fluoridation had reached the greatest numbers in the distributing of pamphlets. Thus 64% of the sample had received leaflets from both sides, but 21% had received only leaflets in favour of fluoridation, and only 6% solely the leaflets against it. Newspapers, too, were a source of information, and only 3% of the sample read no newspaper, while 53% read both local papers. Those people who read only one newspaper did not differ significantly in attitude from those taking the other paper or both; thus 25% of the 'fors' took only the *Star*, and 24% of the 'antis'.⁵⁶ It is interesting to note, however, that many people could not say which side their own newspaper took in the controversy. Only 36% of the sample answered this question, and of these 41% made the mistake of thinking that the *Times* was for fluoridation, and 18% thought that the *Star* was against it.⁵⁷ The correspondence

55 Some people wrote short comments on their questionnaires. These make it clear that people suffering from stomach ulcer feared that this would be aggravated by fluoride. People whose children drank abnormally large amounts of water were afraid of the poison danger.

56 A larger proportion of the sample read the *Star* than read the *Times*. This is not because of any bias in the sample but because the *Star* has the larger sale in the city itself.

57 34% of the 'fors', 40% of the 'antis', and 85% of the 'undecideds' mistook the attitude of the *Times*. The proportions mistaking the attitude of the *Star* were smaller. Of those answering the question 39% thought the *Times* was biased, 22% that the *Star* was (154 answered this last question).

columns in the papers may have helped to influence people, and, in fact, 9% of those in favour of fluoridation said that they never read the columns, 27% claimed to read them regularly, and the rest stated that they were occasional readers. Of the 'antis' a smaller proportion, 6% never read them, while a higher proportion, 48%, classified themselves as regular readers.

Discussion and consultation with friends was probably another source of information and attitude formation. In the sample this was the case for 62% of the 'fors', and 67% of the 'antis'. However, the 'fors' proved to be more likely to hold an opinion on fluoridation which differed from that of their friends. Only 4% of the 'antis' who had discussed it with their friends stated that these friends were, 'on the whole', in favour of fluoridation, while 36% of the 'fors' who had consulted friends stated that these friends were, 'on the whole', against fluoridation. Besides being more independent in this respect more of the supporters of fluoridation had taken pains to secure information, since 20% had attended meetings or talks, as opposed to 11% of those against, and 5% of the undecided group, and 28% had consulted their doctor, dentist or chemist, as opposed to 15% of those against, and only 8% of the undecided group.⁵⁸

It was not the purpose of this survey to assess the proportions of the population who were for and against fluoridation, but the sample does indicate that there may well be a sizable proportion of the population who are still undecided on the question. Of the postal replies 12% came from people who were undecided, and, as might be expected, the proportion was even higher (24%) in the interview section, for people not decided or not interested would probably tend not to reply to a postal questionnaire.⁵⁹ Yet the fact that they had

58. The proportions who had consulted doctor, dentist, or chemist were slightly smaller in the interview section than in the postal.

59. The proportions falling into the three groups were:

In the postal section 42% for fluoridation, 46% against, 12% undecided.

In the interview section 21%, 55% and 24% respectively.

One possible reason for this difference is that people opposed to fluoridation were suspicious of the University with its Dental and Medical Schools, and did not reply. Another is that supporters of fluoridation were more interested in the question (an introductory question revealed that 88% claimed to be interested as opposed to 60% of those against), and so would be more likely to reply. The interview section revealed some things which would not have emerged in a purely postal survey. For example five people thought fluoride was in the water already, and one of them, a woman, thought it had burnt her kettle. A few people confused fluoride with chlorine, and in South Dunedin the almost unanimous complaint was that the water was bad enough already.

not made up their minds did not prevent a third of the undecided group from voting on the question, and probably, in nearly every case, against fluoridation.⁶⁰ All these people attended the poll primarily to vote on the Council elections, and two-thirds of them made up their minds how to vote on fluoridation, on election day itself, a further 17% having made up their minds in the course of the week before.

This pattern of decision was exactly opposite to that of both the supporters and the opponents of fluoridation. Among the supporters, for example, 46% had made up their minds on the question before 1959, a further 26% decided in the course of the year, 24% in the month before the poll, and 4% on the day itself. The pattern was similar for the opponents, 22% of whom made their decision in the month before the poll, and 4% on election day. Very few people said that they had changed their minds at all; only 5% on both sides. Similarly only a small proportion, 12% on each side, thought that fluoridation was of more importance than the Council elections, and attended the poll primarily to vote on it.

The few personal details which were requested in this survey make it clear that some factors conditioned voting in the sample.⁶¹ Age was one of these factors since only 23% of the supporters of fluoridation were over fifty years of age, as opposed to 31% of the undecided group, and 40% of those against.⁶² Parenthood was another such factor, for 25% of the 'fors' had no children, but a higher proportion, 38% and 32% of the 'undecideds' and the 'antis'. This fact emerges more clearly, however, when only young parents whose children would be of an age to benefit from fluoridation are considered, for 29% of those in favour were parents under the age of thirty-five, but only 14% of

60 There was no question designed to elicit which way these people had voted. In the interview section nearly all of them indicated that they had voted against.

61 The patterns shown in this section of the survey hold true in other parts of the world. See *Scientific American*, February 1955, for a survey carried out in the United States by B. and L. Mausner. This survey showed that older people and people in the lower educational and social ranges tended to be opposed to fluoridation. In the Dunedin survey the figures in the 'for' and 'against' groups have been tested against each other by the Chi-Square Test. The items for age, parents under thirty-five, sex, and school leaving above and below sixteen were tested. All are significant at the 5% level.

62 The *O.D.T.* survey stated that younger people tended to favour fluoridation, but no figures were given, and no question on age was asked. (*O.D.T.*, 16 March 1959.)

those against.⁶³ The women in the sample took up a significantly different attitude to the men, for 31% of the supporters of fluoridation were women, as compared with 48% of the opponents.

The idea that Dunedin is a very conservative place and reluctant to change was much canvassed during the controversy, and the sample does lend some slight support to the theory, for 31% of the 'fors' had lived in Dunedin all their lives, 49% of the undecided group, and 40% of those against.⁶⁴ This difference is not clear enough to be significant. Education, on the other hand, quite clearly conditioned attitudes, for only 41% of those in favour of fluoridation had left school under the age of sixteen, as opposed to as many as 63% of those against. To put it another way, 27% of the 'fors' had left school after the age of sixteen, and only 10% of those against. Naturally the same patterns were seen in educational qualifications. To take only one example, 47% of the supporters of fluoridation had none of the qualifications listed on the questionnaire, 64% of those against had none, and 80% of the undecided group. Supporters of fluoridation had significantly higher proportions of School Certificates, University Entrances and Degrees, though the proportions with professional qualifications were slightly more even.

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THIS ARTICLE is intended to present a factual report rather than to draw any conclusions. However, a conclusion which presents itself is this: the City Council, after hearing evidence and arguments on both sides, favoured fluoridation by a heavy majority, probably eleven to two.⁶⁵ This decision was reached at a time when the state of public opinion was not known, and was arrived at solely on the merits of the case. A referendum was held, however, because certain members believed on principle that the public should be consulted, and because the public opposition, fostered by the Anti-Fluoridation Society, led to a failure of nerve in some other Councillors, once it began to emerge clearly in the course of 1959. Defeat followed

63 It was hoped by supporters of fluoridation that all parents who gave their children fluoride tablets would vote for it. In fact however 11% of the 'fors' used the tablets, 5% of the 'antis' (nearly all of these placed their main stress on the infringement of liberty involved in fluoridation).

64 There was almost the same proportion on the two sides, of people who had not lived in New Zealand all their lives.

65 The late Cr Stead, who was not on the Council when the evidence was heard, opposed fluoridation. Cr Calvert favoured the retention of the 'status quo'. He did not deny the benefits which would result from fluoridation, but stated: 'Its implementation is what I am opposing.' (*O.D.T.*, 3 February 1959.)

almost inevitably when the issue was put to a public vote, partly because it was difficult to persuade people of the necessity of a measure, the benefits of which were not immediate and obvious, and partly because it was easier for opponents of fluoridation to place doubts in the public mind than it was for supporters to remove them. Few people had time to go fully into the matter or even to read the Commission's Report, which refuted at length nearly all the objections which were put forward against fluoridation in the Dunedin campaign. In these circumstances it was probably a considerable achievement to secure over 8,000 votes for the measure. This is a personal conclusion. Supporters and opponents of fluoridation will no doubt draw their own.

Book Reviews

THE FRENCH RELIGIOUS WARS IN ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, by J. H. M. SALMON. Oxford University Press, 1959. vii + 202 pages. U.K. price 25s.

THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS shows signs of changing its character as a discipline. Instead of studying the rise and progress of systematic theories and philosophies, we are now increasingly concerned with the vocabulary of ideas – the conceptual tools available for understanding and explaining political problems – which the men of a particular time and place possessed; with the reasons why they possessed this particular vocabulary and not any other; with the uses to which they desired to put their vocabulary and with its adequacy to the problems put before it; and lastly, with the consequences for men's thought and behaviour of their possession of what was necessarily a historically limited means of understanding and expressing themselves. This development should be welcomed by both historians and political scientists, since it compels us to study with greater precision the relationship between theory and experience – a relationship which it is all too easy either to take for granted or (with equal ignorance) to deny altogether.

Mr Salmon's is a book of this kind, concerned with the growth of theoretical concepts in comparable but dissimilar historical situations, and with their migration from one of these situations to the other. His subject is the part played in English political thinking from 1560 to about 1714 by awareness of the French Religious Wars and of the concepts and theories worked out by French thinkers during those wars; and always in his mind is the question of how far Englishmen were able to use French experience and its interpretation as a guide to their interpretation of their own experience. He does not believe that English thought was so self-contained and insular as to be formed purely by reflection on English experience and by the use of an English vocabulary of concepts. The problem that he has raised is fundamentally that of the English mental horizon during the seventeenth century. No doubt English publicists were aware of recent and contemporary French history and had some acquaintance with the theoretical and political literature which that history had produced; the real problem is how far there existed in their minds a common context or contexts in which French events and ideas could be related to English events and ideas and the two seen as parts of a single history. And the problem would vary in complexity according to the level of theoretical abstraction at which political thought was being conducted – a level which, as the student of political theory knows, can shift disconcertingly and be hard to fix

even for a single writer. We are studying the subjective aspect of a piece of history : how and in what terms did the men of a particular time and place formulate an awareness of what was happening to them ?

In both France and England, at the relevant period, it was possible to explain and debate political problems in either or both of two ways : first, by the mainly insular technique of reference to the legal and historical tradition of the nation in which the debate was taking place ; second, by reference to the stocks of political ideas — drawn mainly from the scholastic and civilian storehouses — which both nations possessed in common as members of the general West European tradition, and which were supposed to have a universal validity not limited by time or place. When English thinkers drew on France for ideas applicable to English experience, it is not surprising that they turned mainly to ideas for which this universal significance could be claimed. But these ideas were themselves undergoing transformation under the pressure of new problems and new historical contexts ; and the central and most important chapters of Mr Salmon's book are those in which he shows how the master concepts of European political thought — natural law, contract, and sovereignty — were made available to Civil War Englishmen in the form in which they had been restated as a result of the French Religious Wars. Dutch and German observers performed the task of abstraction and generalisation ; Grotius and Besold passed on to England doctrines of natural and public law in which their debt to French experience and reflection is observable. Here — though Mr Salmon has been concerned mainly to establish the facts of this transmission and migration of ideas — is an answer to the problem of the common context. Englishmen, when they thought they were appealing to a body of universal maxims and laws, were in fact appealing to the changing content of the international thought of Western Europe.

But it is an enduring problem in the history of English political thought to determine how near concepts generalised from a wider tradition have come to the heart of English experience and English thinking. England is a conservative and insular society, one, that is, often content if not preferring to draw on its own traditions for the interpretation of its experience ; and the period which Mr Salmon studies was one in which the habit of explaining English problems by allusion to purely English precedents was, to say the least, prominent. Mr Salmon holds that it was a period in which this habit suffered diminution, in which we may observe a marked shift away from explanations based in English law, precedent and history, towards explanations based in abstract and 'universal' concepts ; and he seems also to hold that awareness of French experience and ideas played some part in bringing about this change of method.

Here it seems possible and profitable to dispute with him. To appeal from the new to the old interpreters, he has Burke in the field against him. Burke in 1790 could call it 'the stationary policy of this kingdom' to proceed 'on the principle of reference to antiquity'—a purely English antiquity as his words show—and Hallam and Macaulay after him could continue the debate as to how far contemporaries had justified the Revolution of 1688 in terms of Locke's philosophy and how far in terms of the medieval precedents of the common law. The question, it seems, is not yet settled. It is true that the Civil War and Interregnum raised problems which could not be settled by appeal to precedent but necessitated some theory of the ultimate location of power; is it yet certain that this experience produced in English thinking any marked abandonment of precedent or preference for theory? Burke thought not. Was Burke a reactionary, returning in spirit to a former age, before the Civil War, when all problems had been solved in terms of precedent and insular history? We still conceive the history of political thought in terms of its great men; we are brought up in the belief that Locke converted the English to a race of political rationalists and that Burke, 'rebellious against the eighteenth century', brought them back again to a belief in their own history. But he may not have been required to perform any such function. Before we accept, with Mr Salmon, the widespread belief in a shift from historical to philosophical explanation at the end of the seventeenth century, we badly need some study of the ways in which political argument actually was conducted in the age between Locke and Burke.

Mr Salmon does not believe in these naiveties, and the criticisms just put forward do not invalidate the general structure of his argument or the worth and purpose of his book. He is writing on the right subject; he has raised the question of how far English political thought was insular, how far part of a series of problem-situations common to all Western Europe; how far it relied on native traditions, and how far it went further afield, in search of the ideas which would make English experience intelligible. The criticisms which this review contains are rather suggestions for the further prosecution of his enquiry.

J. G. A. POCKOCK

DEMOCRACY AND THE CHALLENGE OF POWER, by DAVID SPITZ. Columbia University Press and Oxford University Press, 1958. 179 pages plus notes, bibliography, and index. U.K. price 40s.

IN THIS SHORT BOOK Professor Spitz has tried to do for the mid-twentieth century what J. S. Mill, in his *Considerations on Representative Government*, did for the mid-nineteenth. Granted, that is, that representative democracy is the best form of rule (and Mill recognised more explicitly than does Spitz that it is not always an

appropriate form), how can we ensure that the 'challenge of power' — the denial to some individuals and groups of political liberty and civic equality, whether by political or by private agencies — is resisted?

Spitz's answer is, briefly, that we cannot ensure any such thing. The strength of his book lies in his insistence that the challenge of power is not a single problem with a simple solution. We have rather to combat continuing and multiform challenges by varying agencies of power, and no political Maginot line (whether constructed out of 'good men', or 'good principles', or 'good institutions') can provide us with an adequate and enduring defence in this mobile war on many fronts.

What we need, then, is a strategic theory appropriate to the present phase of this mobile war, taking account both of the sociological context (How have the growth of bureaucracy, of pressure groups, of mass communications, of suburbia, affected the struggle?) and of the functioning of institutional defences within it (Which have been effective, which not? Which battles have been won, which lost — and why?). Whether one calls this sort of activity political theorising is a question of definition. As Spitz evidently considers that the political theorist should deal in propositions of a higher degree of generality than this, he should not be criticised for leaving it to others to develop such a strategic theory. The conclusion is inescapable, however, that at the level of generality he has chosen the function of political theory is predominantly destructive: while he argues impressively that there is no 'patented solution' to the problem of preserving civil liberties, his arguments are of little help in determining what 'running adjustments' we should make here and now. In other words, his book tells us more about the limitations of political theory (as here understood) than about limitation of the challenge of power.

R. H. BROOKES

THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE WORLD, by J. D. B. MILLER. London: Duckworth, 1958. 308 pages. U.K. price 25s.

MOST DISCUSSIONS, and nearly all speeches, on the Commonwealth rapidly lapse into political metaphysics with assertions as to the ineluctable mysteries — to non-members — of this uniquely British-inspired institution. That the Commonwealth as a grouping of sovereign states is unique is probably true; that its bonds, workings, and cement are beyond comprehension is not however so. Most misunderstandings of the Commonwealth are based on ignorance of fact; some, particularly among the older generations of the 'British' (i.e. European-settled) members, stem from a fond romanticism that the 'Empire' is not dead; while many are the product of the extravagances and wishful thinking of editorial writers and itinerant

Commonwealth politicians who see a fictitious unity and power in the size and total population of this fortuitous collection of states.

Mr Miller, an Australian now resident in the United Kingdom, has written, in my view, the most sensible, realistic, and intelligent book on the contemporary Commonwealth and its functionings that I have ever read. The book is organised in three parts. Part I is mainly an historical account covering the period from the beginning of the century up to 1957 followed by a brief description of 'Contemporary Institutions' such as the Crown, rights of members, means of consultation, nationality law, transport and communications, and sterling area. Part II treats the 'Interests and Policies of Commonwealth Members' in a series of uneven chapters on the external policies of individual members of whom Great Britain, Canada, and India are clearly held to be the most important. In Part III certain hypotheses are advanced as to 'the springs of action' of the Commonwealth and various possibilities as to the Commonwealth's future are tentatively discussed.

Mr Miller's conclusions might be summarised thus. The Commonwealth, a 'concert of convenience', is primarily a British interest, for Britain has the clearest interest in maintaining and amplifying its scope. As *The Economist*, approvingly quoted by Mr Miller, says :

For Britain, the Commonwealth is a gentle let-down, a featherbed of fine phrases and outward forms, to ease the psychological impact of the loss — now approaching its last phase — of a powerful Empire. . . . It has given a short respite in which the adjustment can be made to the real loss of power. . . . (pp. 299-300).

Other members retain or acquire membership because they consider it more in their interests to be in the Commonwealth than out of it. The United Kingdom fosters this attitude in order to make Commonwealth membership as easy and profitable as can be, without importing elements of obligation and responsibility which might make it seem unattractive.

Such criticisms as I have of Mr Miller's work are of marginal importance only and do not affect his conclusions, with which I agree. Mr Miller, I think, overrates the importance of a Commonwealth consciousness in the formulation of the external policies of its members. In the 'British' countries, apart from the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth is so much taken for granted by policy makers that there is a tendency perhaps to overlook its existence until confronted with conflicting claims to the Commonwealth seats on either the Security Council or ECOSOC or the like. The non-Commonwealth members, in my experience, largely ignore the Commonwealth altogether except when seeking support in elections in the United Nations and Specialised Agencies or demanding aid from the more developed members in the name of brotherly love. Similarly, on consultation, Mr Miller, I think, over-emphasises the

extent to which it takes place. There is certainly a stream of C.R.O. material to Commonwealth countries but this example is not followed in anything like the same degree except possibly between Australia and New Zealand. On issues of real consequence the Commonwealth falls into an inner or 'old Commonwealth' group composed of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (which approaches 'the core theory' of which Mr Miller disapproves) and the rest.

One future possibility, it seems to me, that Mr Miller has not seriously looked at is what will occur to the Commonwealth when Mr Nehru goes. Mr Miller feels that even without Mr Nehru : . . . a similar line might have been taken and very similar aims pursued . . . [and] it would be inadvisable to extend the identification of Prime Minister and policy to the point of believing that, if the Prime Minister were changed, there would also be a marked change in the policy. (p. 144.)

This is possible but I am not convinced. Krishna Menon, a near-contemporary of Mr Nehru's and exposed like him to a part-United Kingdom education, does not seem to be motivated by any Commonwealth love. If this is true, what will be the attitude of their successors who, as Miller recognises, will increasingly be 'élites native to their own areas' (p. 261)? My guess is that post-Nehru India will increasingly move to the left under the stress and magnitude of its problems and that its new leaders will shed the Commonwealth tie not so much because it will not be considered to be worth something but mainly in deference to a nationalist sentiment which will demand severance with the 'imperialist' past. Once India quits it will be followed by the other non-European members of the Commonwealth with the possible exception of the West Indies. The 'core' notion will thus become a reality by default.

In conclusion, and in the hope that this really excellent book will be reprinted, I would draw attention to the following minor errors. The Australian practice of making its High Commissioner in London subordinate to the Prime Minister's Department (p. 74) is mainly for historical reasons; on most defence and political questions (but not trade) its Embassy in Washington is more important. Commonwealth consultation of a kind does exist in the United Nations (p. 75) but is not particularly effective. There is a common British nationality and Commonwealth citizenship, which mean little in practice, together with distinct national citizenships (which mean a lot) but not separate nationalities (p. 76). The Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan, even up to 1958, had twice met outside the Commonwealth (p. 80), at Saigon and Seattle respectively, and in 1959 a meeting was held in Djokjakarta. It does not follow that, because New Zealand was not an extensive base for American land operations in World War II, New Zealand's conception of

American assistance must necessarily be primarily of naval help (p. 184). New Zealand has had diplomatic representation at Singapore since 1955 (p. 184), while in 1959 it opened up further Asian posts at New Delhi and Kuala Lumpur. The 1944 pact between Australia and New Zealand has not been a complete dead letter, particularly on questions of consultation (p. 187). The Ceylonese 'high standard of living' (p. 221) is high merely in relation to other Asian countries; considered by itself it is deplorably low. Pakistan, besides being in military alliance with the United States, receives considerable economic aid (p. 246).

A PUBLIC SERVANT OF A COMMONWEALTH COUNTRY

THE PRINCE CONSORT, by FRANK EYCK. Chatto and Windus, 1959. 269 pages. U.K. price 30s.

MANY BOOKS have been written about Albert; some tedious hagiography, some percipiently malicious. Mr Eyck does not attempt to cover the same well-trodden ground but, from new material in the Royal Archives, to discuss the Prince Consort in an European context, especially in his German policy. Albert wanted German unity under liberal Prussian leadership, and he certainly had a grasp of the intricacies of German politics, shared perhaps only by Palmerston, who disagreed with him. It is, of course, idle to criticise Albert's views and policy in retrospect; for the same reason it is idle to conclude in retrospect, as Mr Eyck does, that a healthy solution of the German question of Albert's kind is praiseworthy: Albert was not a man ahead of his time. Mr Eyck's book has some fascinating material and is well worthy reading, but some of his judgements should be treated with caution.

FRANCIS WEST

ELECTIONS AND PARTY MANAGEMENT — POLITICS IN THE TIME OF DISRAELI AND GLADSTONE, by H. J. HANHAM. Longmans, 1959. 468 pages. U.K. price 50s.

NO ONE would now suppose that what is radical in Liverpool is conservative in New Zealand. In Victorian times this was not so remarkable. Dr Hanham's great-grandfather was a leader of the radical party on Merseyside, and later became a prominent conservative member of the New Zealand House of Representatives. Dr Hanham, who is now a lecturer in Government at the university of that other Lancashire capital, Manchester, confesses that his interests in the period are a legacy from his Victorian ancestor. Some years ago he presented an honours thesis at Auckland University concerned with the structure of Auckland politics between 1853 and 1876.

In his present book Dr Hanham describes comparisons between Victorian and modern politics as 'not so much odious as meaningless'. He insists that the election of 1885 is the great dividing line between past and present in the study of British elections and political parties. He believes that there are no modern issues to cloud an objective study of the age of Disraeli and Gladstone.

It is the measure of Dr Hanham's mastery of his subject that he should achieve so faithful a balance in the presentation of his material. He has divided the book into three sections, resembling the arrangement adopted by Professor Gash in *Politics in the Age of Peel*. The three parts are entitled 'The Constituencies', 'Elections and Electioneering', and 'The Party Machinery'. His first theme is the divergence between that old order in the counties and small country towns which survived the 1832 Reform Act and the new political influences in the industrial cities. A second major theme is the emergence of a two-party system, in contrast to the confusion of alignment in preceding decades. There is an inevitable tendency for some topics to overspill into other chapters. A good many aspects of electioneering appear in the section devoted to the constituencies. An excellent summary of the changing shape of party organisation is given in the chapter describing the big town constituencies in 1868. The role of the main cogs in the political machinery of the time, the registration agents, is discussed in the context of elections, but the co-ordination of their activities is left to the final section. Difficulties of this kind cannot be avoided when the author has set himself so diverse and amorphous a subject as 'the problems of the ordinary party politician and the growth of party organisation'.

The book invites comparison with *Politics in the Age of Peel*. Many of Dr Hanham's chapters are necessarily sequels to those of Professor Gash. This is true of his treatment of the survival of proprietary boroughs, of political clubs, and of techniques of corruption, and it reflects that element of continuity which distinguishes the British political tradition. Dr Hanham's material is much wider than that of his predecessor (his bibliography occupies twenty-nine pages, as opposed to six); his book is less compact; his generalisations are closer to the particular and more generously illustrated. It is the peculiar charm of the book that, amid such an array of statistics and so scholarly an apparatus, the author has an eye for the humorous anecdote. He describes the iniquity of a landlord whose encouragement to his tenants to kill rabbits was adjudged a corrupt inducement to support him at the poll. When he remarks on the disturbance caused by a change of patron in the nomination borough of Malmesbury, he explains that the new patron in 1866 rented the electoral influence primarily for the hunting, and that his control of the

corporation lapsed when he was 'carried out to sea in a balloon and believed drowned'. He quotes an unequivocal election manifesto in a contest between rival landowners at Wareham:

Electors of Wareham! I understand that some evil-disposed person has been circulating a report that I wish my tenants and other persons dependent upon me to vote according to their conscience. This is a dastardly lie, calculated to injure me. I have no wish of the sort. I wish, and I intend, that these persons shall vote for me.

Dr Hanham quietly disposes of several popular and academic myths. It is no more true that Victorians voted according to principles than that their elections were invariably flavoured with corruption. He points to the obvious but hitherto unobserved fallacy that the virtual disappearance of corruption at the end of the period was due entirely to the Ballot Act of 1872 and the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883. (The principal reason for the decrease in petitions against corruption was the 1884 disenfranchisement of the corrupt constituencies.) He discredits Sir Robert Ensor's theory of the role of the public houses and the liquor trade in the 'torrent of gin and beer election' of 1874. He reaches valuable conclusions on the importance of election, as distinct from registration, agents, on the experimental procedure of trial ballots, on the effects of canvasses, and on the prevalence of uncontested, or compromise, elections. There is an excellent survey of the Lancashire elections of 1868, in which the defeat of Gladstone is ascribed partly to obscene defamations by a fanatical Orangeman, William Murphy, and to a notice in the *Preston Guardian*: 'Englishmen, which will you have to reign over you? The Queen or the Pope? Will you permit Gladstone to take away the supremacy of your Sovereign, and hand it over to the Pope? — Britons never shall be slaves.'

Dr Hanham has the art of employing the trivial to demonstrate the important. He is as much at ease with the politics of Kirkcudbrightshire as he is with those of the Carlton and Reform Clubs. His canvas is vast, and his variations of light and shade show subtlety and imagination. His chiaroscuro treatment of the age achieves the rare distinction of being as entertaining as it is informative.

J. H. M. SALMON

THE SHOP STEWARDS' MOVEMENT AND WORKERS' CONTROL, 1910-1922, by BRANKO PRIBICEVIC. Basil Blackwell, 1959. xii + 179 pages. U.K. price 25s.

THIS BOOK describes the life cycle of a flower which was blighted before it bloomed. An unsatisfactory strain, it could not survive the tough transitional conditions of working-class politics in the second decade of this century.

The author, a Yugoslav scholar who studied under Professor G. D. H. Cole at Oxford, examines the movement for workers' control in the British engineering industry with admirable detachment. He explains both the misapprehension of managerial and economic realities which Professor Cole in a foreword to the book calls the essential weakness of the guild socialist, and the preoccupation of the shop stewards with the overthrow of the capitalist system, which isolated them from the rest of the trade-union movement and led their part of the movement finally to accept the tenets of the Bolshevik revolution, which was, however, after the disastrous experiment of the early period, to have no use for workers' control.

The theoretical background to the movement was a compound of Marxism, from which it derived a root-and-branch dislike of capitalism, and French syndicalism. The later evolution of guild socialism supplied a characteristic local variation to the main theme. As usual, practice was much more complicated. For example, the proletarian activism of the workers' committees was combined for mutual advantage with the conservative craft restrictionism of skilled engineers. If the movement had not been isolated and defeated by the government and the employers in the slump of 1921-22 this *mésalliance* must have led to fundamental dissession.

Dr Pribicevic explains the complicated shifts in attitudes quite well although his narrative is rather too condensed for real clarity. He provides, however, an excellent explanation of the real strength of the shop stewards, who are still very much with the British engineering industry as the mavericks of industrial relations. With the failure of the socialist movement to find a road round their present *impasse* these activist elements in the trade union movement may, as they did in 1910, lose faith in politics and revive the cause of direct action. If so, they should read this book to remind them of the fundamental inadequacy of syndicalism as a basis for political organisation.

J. L. ROBERTS

NATIONALIZATION IN BRITAIN: THE END OF A DOGMA, by R. KELF-COHEN. London: Macmillan, 1958. 310 pages. U.K. price 25s. **THIS IS A DISAPPOINTING BOOK.** The author himself states that his interest in nationalisation has spanned almost half a century — from his moving a motion in favour of railway nationalisation in the Debating Society of the Manchester Grammar School in 1911 to his being deeply concerned with the nationalised industries as a government official from 1945 to 1955.

The book contains four sections: one on early socialist and Labour party thought on the subject; another on five particular industries, coal, transport, electricity, gas, iron and steel; a third on particular

aspects of nationalised industries — their relation to Parliament and to consumers, their finances, their staffs, and the men on the boards; a final section on recent Labour party thought on nationalisation (chiefly Mr Gaitskell's *Public Enterprise*) and a consideration of future prospects. But although, as the author says, there 'is very little general literature on the nationalised industries', he has not done very much more than bring together a considerable body of information easily available in the nationalised industries' *Annual Reports*, in the Acton Society Trust publications, and in the pages of *Public Administration* (London), and flavour the result with his own (dogmatic) point of view. Fatally, but superfluously, he shoots several sitting ducks which have been shot before, such as the lack of detailed Labour party thought on nationalisation that could have helped in the framing of legislation in 1945.

Mr Kelf-Cohen makes several important recommendations, among them the need for better staffing at top levels and the proposal that the ministerial weapon of issuing general directions to the boards should be used more frequently — for instance directions to the Area Electricity Boards that they should take every possible step to improve their load factor, including devising tariffs appropriate to that end. However, the whole treatment is determinedly, almost fanatically, hostile to the Labour Party. It is easy enough to find ideologies and inconsistencies in the Party's views on this topic; nevertheless these are also interwoven with idealism. By its failure to give an understanding account of the evils which nationalisation was intended to remedy, Mr Kelf-Cohen's book loses balance and also the reader's sympathy. The true title of the book, if not pre-empted by Baudelaire, should have been *Spleen*.

R. S. MILNE

BRITAIN IN FIJI, 1858-1880, by J. D. LEGGE. London: Macmillan, 1958. xi + 307 pages. U.K. price 21s.

DR LEGGE'S BOOK consists of two parts: the first is a survey of British policy and attitudes towards Fiji, and of conditions in the islands themselves, from the first offer of cession in 1858 to the final acceptance of 1874; the second is an examination of the administration of Sir Arthur Gordon, the first Governor of Fiji. The subject is an important one, because the case of Fiji has often been used to illustrate the change which is supposed to have come over British policy in the mid-Victorian era: the transition from the anti-imperial policy of Gladstone to the pro-imperial policy of Disraeli. And for students of colonial administration the governorship of Gordon is important because it is claimed for him that well in advance of the concept of Indirect Rule enunciated by Lord Lugard in Nigeria he

had established such a system in Fiji as a result of conscious thought about the nature of native society which led him to what one might call a 'social-anthropologist's' attitude.

Legge's case for the continuity of British colonial policy is scarcely original; others have demonstrated the falsity of contrasting imperialist and anti-imperialist phases. Still, his survey of attitudes to Fiji is a useful summary of material which is not new. The more important and interesting part of the book is his discussion of Gordon's term of office, and the way in which Gordon's view of native society was worked out in his land policy, his system of native authorities, his labour policy, and his attitude to European settlers; all of these things being part of a policy which must be seen as a whole to be understood.

Like many people writing biographies, Legge makes too much of his hero. Gordon was a very remarkable governor, but he was not so much in advance of his time as Legge would have us believe; in particular, Gordon shared the evolutionary view of society which derived from Darwin, and he was a student of Maine's *Ancient Law* rather than a social anthropologist. Gordon's view of Fijian society is principally to be explained by the analogy with a fifteenth-century highland clan, from which Gordon seems to have expected Fijian society to develop through the same kind of phases. This is not so much Malinowski as Toynbee. Legge has pieced Gordon's view together from scattered evidence: he did not find an enunciated theory; and, as I think, he has missed some of the important points about Gordon. To put together a man's thought where he has not done so himself demands a more minute examination of evidence than Legge seems to have carried out. In short, this is the beginning of a book, not a definitive study.

Nevertheless, the book is useful. Legge has broken some new ground, and he has begun to discuss some of the issues which are important. Best of all, he has got away from the sterile kind of colonial history which relates what the governor said to the Colonial Office and *vice versa*, and has tried to describe the colonial situation from the Fijian end. He is not altogether successful, but his work will help a future scholar to do better.

FRANCIS WEST

THE NEW ZEALAND BUBBLE; THE WAKEFIELD THEORY IN PRACTICE, by MICHAEL TURNBULL. Wellington: Price and Milburn, 1959. 77 pages. N.Z. price 5s.

THE DIRECTORS of the New Zealand Company got drunk on a theory, and the colonists suffered the headache. This was the opinion of New Zealand's first historian, the witty A. S. Thomson, in 1858. Now, a hundred years later, Mr Michael Turnbull examines anew the

fervours and the disenchantments of Wakefieldism in the central districts of New Zealand.

While Mr Turnbull's essay contains a great deal with which I am in agreement, I cannot but regret his decision to dispense with the usual apparatus of historical scholarship. Footnotes are no doubt tedious to the idly curious, but their omission can be tantalising and even exasperating to those who believe that striking judgments and generalisations, however confidently advanced, are no substitute for the rigours of close analysis, adequately supported by references. Like those early emigrants who embarked for the Antipodes, we are invited to participate in an act of faith.

Mr Turnbull does not attempt a complete appraisal of the complex situation in New Zealand, nor does he consider Wakefield's theories in much detail; he focuses attention on land speculation and some of its consequences. Here he does well to emphasise that the Company deliberately encouraged land speculation, that the town acres were used as 'bait', and that a settlement lost its charms to the would-be investor once these had been sold. I agree that the Company's planned 'land-jobbing' must have created in Micawber-like souls an illusory hope of getting rich quickly; and I think it likely enough that 'nearly all colonists assumed that their earnings would be supplemented or their fortunes made by the rent or sale of land' (p. 42), although this is the kind of inference for which I would like to see more evidence. Mr Turnbull argues very sensibly that townsmen were more likely to succumb to the spell of these exaggerated hopes than farmers with their shrewder sense of reality; and he suggests that, although the Company had to organise their land-jobbing racket, this was the main cause of the failure of the first three settlements.

The historian, as Elie Halévy pointed out, often generalises, even when he is at pains to avoid generalisations. The temptation to impose on complex events a master formula is hardly resisted by Mr Turnbull. Indeed the novelty of his interpretation lies less in the facts presented (we knew before about the extent of land speculation and its consequences) than in his determination to relegate other important factors to a 'secondary' and even insignificant place (p. 59). Had New Zealand matched the expectations of the directors, and had the Maoris meekly acquiesced in the seizure and redistribution of their tribal lands, the Company would doubtless have fulfilled its contracts, and both colonists and absentee investors would have been issued with Crown grants. In such favourable circumstances the banks would have been prepared to advance much needed loans, on the security of land, for farming purposes, and the colonisation of New Zealand would have proceeded much more smoothly. But unhappily the conditions in New Zealand did not

favour the Company's schemes. Because he fails sufficiently to take into account these complex local difficulties, Mr Turnbull's essay tends to over-simplification. Nevertheless, he argues his case with vigour and enthusiasm. Within his self-imposed limitations he makes a stimulating and a very readable contribution to New Zealand history.

JOHN MILLER

A HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND, by KEITH SINCLAIR. Penguin Books, 1959. 320 pages. U.K. price 3s. 6d.

WHEN THE Pelican History of the World was planned as a series of national histories, it was hoped that it would also be, in a true sense, a history of the modern world. Dr Sinclair's New Zealand volume admirably fulfils this intention. It is a chain of questions and answers about the origins and identity of the New Zealander, fashioned by a man who is self-consciously a New Zealander, a man who belongs to a generation that has freed itself from slavish attachment to a nineteenth-century British heritage ossified by geographical isolation and local provincialism. Moreover it has been written with a breadth of professional knowledge and understanding that extends well beyond provincial, national, and imperial boundaries.

First and foremost Dr Sinclair has recognised that New Zealand is a Pacific country rather than a 'Britain of the South Seas'. Hence his first concern is to reconcile the oral traditions of the coming of the Maori in a great fleet about 1350 with the historical investigations of Andrew Sharp. He concludes that the earliest settlers were probably Pacific castaways, first moa hunters, later largely agriculturists who in centuries of isolation evolved the Maori society discovered by the European navigators. Next he makes good use of recent historical research to dispel some cherished myths of European colonisation. Far from being the brain-child of Wakefield planning, New Zealand, he shows, was really the colony of a convict settlement. Before 1840 traders and settlers were mainly Australian. (The importance of American and French whaling after 1800 (p. 34) is rather exaggerated.) In their wake came the subsequent waves of Australian sheepmen, gold-diggers, 'cockatoos' (small farmers), and labour leaders. Australians far outnumbered and outshone Wakefield's so-called 'vertical slice of English society'; Australian 'know-how' contributed more to the foundation of modern New Zealand than English education, gentility, and respectability.

Herein lie some of the bare bones of what might have been a much needed, full-scale history of the Australian frontier in New Zealand, but Dr Sinclair has been too much the specialist and the eclectic to write it. Instead he has concentrated upon two other important themes of New Zealand history in which he is the acknowledged expert: Maori and settler relations (there is a masterly

summary of his own book on the origins of the Maori wars carried a stage further into Grey's second governorship and the Waikato war); and state experimentation of the nineties (there is a forthright and well documented denial that this was the response of practical men to practical problems and owed nothing to theory). Then follows what is a confession of political faith in, as well as a historical assessment of, this 'main element in the New Zealand tradition' in the twentieth century. It provides the background to some chapters in which Dr Sinclair's pen blazes over an extraordinarily variegated and rapidly changing landscape. As history these chapters are not as well-synthesised, smooth-flowing, and authoritative as those on the nineteenth century, but as the political testament of a New Zealand scholar of Dr Sinclair's generation they have a particular interest. Cutting into them is a digression into imperial relations more notable for its exploration of the by-paths of imperial federation than of the main road from colony to nation, and unfortunately written before the publication of F. L. W. Wood's *The New Zealand People at War*, now the definitive study of this subject.

Elsewhere Dr Sinclair slips easily into the role of the social and literary historian. There is a vivid portrait of provincial society in the sixties and seventies and of an emergent New Zealand society from the nineties. To interpret the process of social growth in New Zealand, Dr Sinclair turns to the American prototype, for as he says 'New Zealanders belong to a brand of New World civilization, the main centres of which are Sydney, San Francisco and Auckland, the Pacific Triangle' (p. 296). This is obviously a book which will strain the loyalties of traditionalists who still live in the stronghold of what Dr Sinclair calls 'Britishness', but it is particularly refreshing to those more attuned to American and new-world history.

MARY BOYD

VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND IN 1898; BEATRICE WEBB'S DIARY WITH ENTRIES BY SIDNEY WEBB. Wellington: Price and Milburn, 1959. 70 pages. N.Z. price 5s. (paperback), 10s. 6d. (casebound).

THIS BOOK, the first in a series of historical and political commentaries to be published by Price and Milburn, records some of the incidents in the brief visit paid by the Webbs to this country in August 1898 during the full flush of the Liberal expansion. The roseate glow does not fool the Webbs, who were as usual indefatigable in the search for accurate information. Their account is cool and objective, so it is all the more surprising that the great impression which is left is of the omnipresence of Seddon. King Dick bestrode his narrow world in a way unmatched by any other democratic politician. The Webbs thought him 'incurably rough' when he visited England for the jubilee but they realised that with all his faults he stood out 'like a giant' at home.

There is more in the diary than Seddon, however. The Webbs picked their way fastidiously through local and central government, critical on the whole, but balanced and devastatingly frank. One still feels a twinge of pity for the judge of the Arbitration Court who is pinned down on the reformers' specimen board as '... hopelessly unfit. . . . Elderly and soured, with no knowledge of labour questions.'

There is much to entertain in the diary and not a little to illuminate New Zealand's *fin de siècle*. The diary was to have formed part of the autobiographical *Our Partnership* and as published here is a fragment taken from a much more extensive account of travels in America and the Empire. It has never appeared before. The publishers must be congratulated for their bold enterprise in producing original source material of this nature in paperback form.

The book has already been criticised for its lack of editorial comment and correction. It is difficult to know what to say about this. Certainly it would be useful to know the backgrounds of the many local dignitaries who appear in the diary. On the other hand, if the book had been cluttered up with explanatory notes the freshness, occasional malice, and lively narrative might have been impaired.

Charles Trevelyan travelled with the Webbs and the publishers have appended a letter written by him to Pember Reeves, who was by that time Agent-General in London. Trevelyan analyses the political situation for Reeves, reaching much the same general conclusions as the Webbs.

The Diary provides an interesting insight into both the nature of New Zealand politics and the character of the Webbs. There is no denying that the first was pretty rough-and-tumble nor that the second was pharasaical. The combination was bound to produce sparks. One only regrets that the Webbs did not stay long enough to start a good radical bushfire.

J. L. ROBERTS

GROG'S OWN COUNTRY, by CONRAD BOLLINGER. Wellington: Price and Milburn, 1959. 192 pages. N.Z. price 10s. 6d.

'BEER-GARDEN DRINKING, with beer in jugs, might be all right for older countries but it was not so for New Zealand.' If the above remark, recently reported as proceeding from the magisterial bench, reflects or is liable to influence public opinion in more than a very minor degree, it is surely high time for some angry young man to speak his mind on the question. Mr Bollinger, who does so in *Grog's Own Country*, has a sorry tale to tell of the havoc wrought in New Zealand by the conflict between what he regards as major and minor evils — 'the trade', and the prohibitionists. He traces the progress of democratic control of licensing up to the Licensing Act of 1893, and the contemporaneous transition of the temperance to a prohibition movement. The latter, as a powerful pressure group,

contrived to reduce substantially the existing number of licences, thereby making those that remained more highly profitable. Prohibitionists gained what was perhaps a Pyrrhic victory by the institution of national option in 1911. Pyrrhic, because it drove the trade to counter-attack effectively, with resultant evils such as the dissociation of eating and drinking, 'the gradual imposition of bare, crowded, stand-up, all-male bars; six o'clock closing; no food with drink; no drink with food'. Bollinger believes that the problem of 'how to get drinking in New Zealand civilized' can only be solved by customers' initiative, and that the best solution lies in some form of State control, or expansion of the Trust system now operating in Invercargill, Masterton, and other places.

Grog's Own Country is a strenuous polemic in which equivocal or soft speech would be out of place. Bollinger, however, shows no sign of erring in this respect. He is more inclined to impute unworthy motives on mere supposition, to convict on the slenderest evidence. Corruption appears to be his literary element. He sees the hidden hand of the trade everywhere, especially as a subversive power in the political background. No doubt the trade exerted clandestinely what power it could, but I doubt whether it was ever sufficiently powerful to manipulate electoral changes as he supposes it to have done throughout New Zealand's history.

Lucidity of exposition is an essential requisite for the writer who sets out to expose scandal or denigrate 'the establishment' in any of its various forms. What Bollinger means by 'a traumatic consciousness of the pathetic vulnerability of our basically primary-producing economy' could have been put more simply, and without offence to eye or ear. The rhetorical question is a device that can be used with effect, but not when so loosely worded and punctuated as the following: 'Was the whole affair an elaborate contrivance on the part of the trade to attempt its revenge on the Porirua Trust — and turning up, as it seems to so often in this story of liquor-licensing in New Zealand, on the same side as the teetotalers.' Some of the weapons in Bollinger's armoury may be defective, but he uses them in a worthy cause, and, obviously enough, his work is the product of laborious research. Even though he should do no more than shake some of his fellow-countrymen out of the fatuous complacency exemplified by the opening sentence of this review he will certainly not have written in vain.

R. M. BURDON

PORTRAIT OF A MODERN MIXED ECONOMY — NEW ZEALAND, by C. WESTSTRATE. New Zealand University Press, 1959. 310 pages. N.Z. price 22s. 6d.

PROFESSOR WESTSTRATE has made a valuable addition to the mounting collection of works on the New Zealand economy. His

purpose is to survey the features that were most characteristic of the economy between the end of the second World War and the middle of the fifties. He has managed to compress into a single volume the results of an impressive amount of research and appraisal.

The appearance of the book is particularly timely because of the light it sheds on some of the questions of economic policy that are currently under discussion. Many of the basic determinants of our economic problems are considered in the chapters on the welfare State, agrarian incomes, dependent economy, and economic growth. Professor Weststrate's approach to these subjects is helpful, for he sees them largely in terms of economic ends espoused by governments and realised with varying degrees of effectiveness. His principal interest is in primary production—secondary industry is dealt with in his chapters on industrial peace and on full employment, but elsewhere only incidentally, as on pages 29, 134 and 274.

The earlier chapters on organisation are essentially classificatory, and are highly ingenious. Unfortunately little use is made in this part of the book of international comparisons and parallels such as are found in later parts. The profusely detailed illustrations given, e.g. of controls, though correct and cleverly woven into the scheme of classification, leave me a little dissatisfied, for I am not convinced that many of them would not apply equally to other Western nations, whether more or less collectivist than New Zealand.

Probably the most impressive chapters are those dealing with industrial peace, dependent economy, and economic growth. In parts of these, e.g. on the effects of compulsory conciliation and arbitration, on the risks inherent in dependence, on the two proposals for insulation policy, and on growing pains, the author amply demonstrates his capacity for original thinking. An occasional point is arguable, e.g. the view on page 274 that import restrictions hinder the division of labour between New Zealand and the rest of the world (each concentrating on those industries for which most suited). At present levels of technology in New Zealand and in particular because of the current extent of agricultural protectionism elsewhere, absolute import freedom might result merely in unemployment without agricultural expansion. Again, New Zealand's ability to borrow during a balance-of-payments crisis was shown in 1958 to be greater than the author supposed (p. 280).

The book is heavily annotated. My firm impression is that some of the material in footnotes should have been integrated into the text. This would have assisted the reader by reducing the too frequent interruption of turning from the text to the footnotes. Secondly, many times I felt inclined to challenge some sweeping generalisation, and then found the appropriate qualification buried in some footnote.

Some definite but probably minor blemishes need to be mentioned.

The author commits a statistical fallacy in his assessment of the reduction in the quantity of work done by the labour force consequent on the raising of the school-leaving age. Cohort analysis would show that the reduction is a one-time effect operative in the first year, and is not a continuing loss, though there is an incremental effect as the cohorts grow in size because of growth in population. Identification of individuals with companies (p. 18) is an unnecessarily cumbersome device, easily avoided by using some such words as 'individuals and companies also'. Proof reading is not of a high standard, though few of the resulting errors would be misleading.

But let me pay tribute to the general excellence of the economic analysis. There is a consistently high standard of logical argument, enlivened by a breadth of vision that enables Professor Weststrate to bring to notice not only the directly operative influences in each situation but also cognate considerations. And analysis is always preceded by extensive and painstaking factual investigation, including wherever possible statistical investigation. In this book there is a nice blend of scholarship and judgment.

A. A. TEAGUE

NEW ZEALAND IN THE MAKING, by J. B. CONDLIFFE. Allen and Unwin, 2nd ed. (revised), 1959. 316 pages. U.K. price 30s.

THE WELFARE STATE IN NEW ZEALAND, by J. B. CONDLIFFE. Allen and Unwin, 1959. 396 pages. U.K. price 35s.

IN THESE TWO BOOKS Condliffe has written a clear account of economic developments in New Zealand. That is not to say that the two books tell the whole story of New Zealand in the making or of the welfare state in New Zealand. Rather, the books consist of a series of essays which together cover very considerable parts of New Zealand's economic history and more than a little of political and social history as well.

The form in which the books are written places a considerable strain on the capacity of a reader trying to construct for himself a coherent story of New Zealand's development. Such a reader should begin with the outline treatment of the main periods of development on pages 17 to 57 of *New Zealand in the Making*. Having read this, he will be helped in his efforts to place in perspective the events recorded in the remaining chapters of the two books. Considered alone, *The Welfare State in New Zealand* is rather a disjointed book.

It would be odd if 712 pages of writing on economic subjects did not contain some inconsistencies and errors. Such are to be found, but in general the material is well marshalled and the judgments expressed are fair. Indeed, it is in this objective approach that the main value of the work lies.

The indexing of both books leaves much to be desired. For example, on page 171 of *New Zealand in the Making* there is a classic criticism of the lending activities of the stock and station agents. It appears, however, in the chapter of the origins of State socialism, and is not indexed.

Both books lay considerable stress on the importance of New Zealand's grasslands economy, on her geographical isolation and on her dependence on overseas markets. Overseas markets and the price levels obtaining in them place a very real limit on the extent to which the welfare state can be developed in New Zealand, and Condliffe has done well to underline this fact. The key to an understanding of much that is written in the two books under review lies in the fact that policies such as social security, the guaranteed price and the wage policy implied in the Arbitration Court system depend for their success very largely on a continued increase in overseas earnings and prices, or at least upon the maintenance of prices in overseas markets.

The omission of any reference to the Korean war, to the very high wool prices of 1950/51 and to the wool proceeds retention scheme is surprising. Omissions like this are part of the price to be paid for the detached and balanced view of things as seen from California supplemented by an all-too-short period of revision in New Zealand.

One would have thought that a book about the Welfare State in New Zealand, and especially the chapter on the economic functions of government, would have dealt fairly fully with such matters of economic policy as are commonly covered by the Cabinet Committee on Economic and Financial Policy. Condliffe, however, usually stops short of any detailed analyses of economic policy.

Similarly, central banking policy and fiscal policy are merely touched upon and one derives very little help from Condliffe in considering the appropriate use of these instruments under different circumstances and in New Zealand conditions.

These two books deserve to be widely used for the vast quantity of factual material they contain and for the objective approach of the author. He has done much to prepare the way for the smooth economic historian who will one day write a definitive economic history of New Zealand. Until that time, students must submit to the rather rigorous discipline imposed by these two books.

A. MCGREGOR

THE BEST OF WHIM WHAM. Hamilton, N.Z.: Paul, 1959. 80 pages. N.Z. price 8s. 6d.

WHIM WHAM is New Zealand's cleverest rhymester. For twenty years he has made weekly comment in verse on us jokers and our welfare ways. This book is a selection of the best of 500 pieces written in the '50s. Within the limits of its intentions it is very good indeed.

A poet has none of the disabilities of the political scientist, who must probe and weigh, balancing the pros and cons. Instead, he can indulge his whim, voice his prejudice, bash his anathema; and not give a damn if he is even more unreasonable than he himself thinks. The poet is cavalier, not puritan. WHIM WHAM takes up a political position, basically anti-political; an economic position, basically *laissez-faire*; a social position, basically Middle Class; an educational position, basically Old School; a personal position, basically unscientific; an artistic position, basically High Brow; a Low Brow position, frankly jocular. He is professional only in his job, which is words. With these he is prodigiously clever. Moreover, as a professional, he knows all the tricks of prosody and parody; and wins them with the nonchalance of the brilliant amateur. He has a quiver full of arrows, and no defences. Indeed, all satirical verse reminds me of archery. It is archaic. It demands great skill, but does little damage. The target is invariably two-dimensional, and doesn't even know when it's being got at. Obviously a Bren gun is a more effective political instrument; but only a fool or a fascist would put a gun in the hand of a poet, and for all his foibles WHIM WHAM is a good joker and on our side. He is for democracy, but not bureaucracy; for beer, but not for boozing in the swill; for private gardens, but not for floral clocks; for living well, but not the Welfare State; for decent forms of individual lunacy, but not the lunik. I share most of his prejudices, and envy his capacity to make them articulate. I disagree most on the only subject I know much about: education. His barbs at Beebyism are as pathetically misplaced as the jibes of the *Evening Post's* editorial writer. An intelligent man shouldn't shoot at the only thing left on his side: a system of education designed to make people think.

ANTON VOGT

Book Notes

Community, edited by Carl J. Friedrich (Liberal Arts Press, 1959, viii + 293 pages, U.S. price \$5.00), is Yearbook II of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy. Yearbook I (1958) was *Authority*, and Yearbook III (1960) is announced as *Responsibility*. *Community* consists basically of papers read at a convention at which a most impressive panel of talent had been assembled. About a third of the contributions are history of political theory, about a third philosophical analysis, and about a third sociology.

United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction, by M. S. Rajan (Longmans, 1958, 544 pages, U.K. price 50s.), is a comprehensive study of the theoretical and practical implications of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter (which is concerned with the limitations on the jurisdiction of the United Nations in respect of both member and non-member states). The author reviews the action taken by the United Nations in a number of cases in which the question of domestic jurisdiction has been raised, and concludes by putting forward his interpretation of the Article. He emphasises the need to accord increasing weight to the views of the emergent nations of Africa and Asia.

G. A. Modelski's *Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc* (Melbourne University Press, 1959, 220 pages, Aust. price 30s.) is a survey, based largely on Soviet-bloc sources, of research into and development of the industrial uses of nuclear energy in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and China. The author covers in detail the period to the end of 1957, and adds a short postscript summarising developments in 1958. This very competent study, which will be of interest to scientists as well as to students of Soviet affairs, affords a valuable insight into the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet science.

Modern Forms of Government by Michael Stewart (Allen and Unwin, 1959, 284 pages, U.K. price 21s.) is a book on comparative civics ending with 11 pages on the conditions that produce democratic government.

The Spare Chancellor, by Alastair Buchan (Chatto and Windus, 1959, 287 pages, U.K. price 25s.), is the first biography of Walter Bagehot, according to Lord Bryce 'the most original mind of his generation', and according to Mr G. M. Young 'the greatest Victorian' (not '*Victorianorum maximus*' but '*Victorianus maxime*'). It is good to know something about the man who founded the study of what actually happens in the English Constitution; and interesting to learn that he invented the light and lively style of *The English Constitution*.

Peter the Great by Vasili Klynchevsky (Macmillan, 1958, 272 pages, U.K. price 30s.) is a new translation by Liliana Archibald of the section of Klynchevsky's famous *History of Russia* which deals with Peter. Though first published nearly half a century ago, it remains (as Sumner, himself an eminent authority on this period, has called it), 'far the best treatment of Peter and his reign available in English', and the new translation is most welcome.

Nehru — A Political Biography by Michael Brecher (Oxford, 1959, xvi + 682 pages, U.K. price 42s.) has been very well received both as a political history of India over the last forty years and as a biography.

British Universities and the State, by Robert O. Berdahl (University of California Press, 1959, ix + 229 pages, U.S. price \$4.00), is divided into two almost equal parts: a historical section in which about half the space is devoted to the University Grants Committee; and a section in which the author has gathered together representative opinions on university autonomy. He concludes:

In case of disagreement over ends or means between the state and the universities, the universities' judgment should prevail, with the understanding that they have the responsibility of demonstrating the wisdom of their decisions within a reasonable time, and subject always to ultimate political intervention in the face of a major breakdown in higher education. (p. 193.)

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

- J. R. A. Bailey, *National Ambitions* (Blackwell, 1958, vii + 231 pages)
- J. Basdevant *et al.*, *Les Affaires Etrangères* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1959, 459 pages)
- Richard Bigger, *Flood Control in Metropolitan Los Angeles* (University of California Press, 1959, 194 pages)
- J. E. Gorst, *The Maori King* (edited with an introduction by Keith Sinclair) (Hamilton, N.Z.: Paul, 1959, xxv + 284 pages)
- A. W. Martin and P. Wardle, *Members of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, 1856-1901* (Australian National University, 1959, xii + 249 pages)
- A Study Group of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, *Budgeting in Public Authorities* (Allen and Unwin, 1959, 299 pages)

C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

SIR,

In J. K. Cunningham's interesting survey, 'City Newspapers and the 1957 Election', in the September *Political Science*, he says, on page 24:

The short-lived attempt to establish a Labour daily in the form of the Wellington *Southern Cross* underlined the enormous financial difficulties that beset such an enterprise, and also revealed the irony of a radical newspaper dependent upon a news-gathering agency which was conservative.

Taking the latter statement first, may I remark that the *Southern Cross*, like any other newspaper, was dependent for its news primarily and mainly upon its own reporting staff.

The belief that the *Southern Cross*'s failure was due to financial difficulties is superficially true. It is undeniable that the establishment of a daily newspaper requires large capital resources. Yet I doubt whether the financial difficulties which ultimately overwhelmed the *Southern Cross* were not a consequence rather than a cause. I believe I am correct in saying that the root cause was the failure to solve the problem of editorial control. You will be aware that the London *Daily Herald*, in its early days, had the same difficulty, and a solution (or at least a workable compromise) was reached, after which that newspaper began to flourish. I believe that a study, by Mr Cunningham or someone equally interested and qualified, of the 'inner history' of the *Southern Cross* venture would be rewarding.

When a newspaper is the voice of a political party someone must decide what it will say and in what accents it will speak. Who decides? The party? The party executive? Or, when the party is in political power, is it the Government? What happens when the party, on some issue, or maybe on a question of tactics, is critical of the Government? I suggest that if Mr Cunningham could inquire along these lines his findings would be instructive as well as interesting.

Yours faithfully,

E. V. DUMBLETON,

Editor-in-Chief, *Auckland Star*

SIR,

The research I undertook for my article in *Political Science* was confined strictly to the city newspapers of the four main centres at the time of the 1957 election. By that time of course the *Southern Cross* had been out of circulation for several years.

1 'The *Southern Cross*: A Hostage to the Capitalist Press', *Landfall*, Vol. 4 No. 1 (Jan. 1950), pp. 105-16.

I know very little about the newspaper and my incidental reference to it quoted in Mr Dumbleton's letter was based upon the opinion of two men who had worked upon its staff. Their opinion may have been somewhat biased, but to what extent I have insufficient knowledge to judge.

The problem of editorial control in a political newspaper is indeed a worthwhile subject of research, and I agree with Mr Dumbleton that an 'inner history' of the *Southern Cross* would prove most rewarding. Robert Blake has conducted a *post mortem* upon the newspaper in *Landfall*,¹ but the title of the article indicates its partisan point of view, and the findings, informative though they are, do not provide more than a partial answer to the searching questions posed by Mr Dumbleton.

The recent demise of the *Standard* adds yet another corpse to New Zealand's graveyard of Labour or radical newspapers and makes it even more important that someone should carry out a thorough exhumation. I would have liked to do it myself, but I am afraid that a change in occupation leaves me no time to do the extensive digging required. I only hope that this exchange of letters may help to interest someone else in the task.

Yours faithfully,

J. K. CUNNINGHAM